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ERRATA 
p. 9 In line 5 of the first quotation (TW, 179) 'jinny' 
should read 'Jinny' 
p. 251 Lines 8-9 should read, 'Here I propose to trace 
one, arbitrarily chosen, line of its development. ' 
p. 279 Line 2 should read, 'to his model, and as has 
already been noted, he I 
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Abstract 
Following an Introduction which explains how "philosophy" 
is intended, Chapter 1 describes 's scale "of characters' 
'at-homeness' in the body. We awareness of the body's 
role is seen as preliminary to her concept of identity. 
Chapter 2 elucidates the concept of identity that emerges 
from the novels. Identity and self are distinguished, and 
self shown to be"analogous to 'soul'. Experiences'recorded 
in VW's diary ' are` shown to be significantly related to her 
fiction: her idea of 'reality' is'related to her idea of 
soul, or self. 
Chapter 3 examines the view of'human relationships that 
is found in the novels. Again, passages from the diary 
are shown to be closely related to We fiction. Relationship 
points up a lack in human life, reflecting the concept of 
identity and self outlined above. 
Chapter 4 intends to balance the pessimism of the earlier 
chapters. The development of VW's aesthetic is traced, and 
To the Lighthouse seen as a successful exemplification of 
her concept of art's potential for transcendence. The second 
part of the chapter examines The Waves, seeing it as a 
product of crisis, and a failure as a work of art. 
Chapter 5 focuses on UW's sense of the numinous, the 'lack' 
that has been revealed in the world described by the first 
four chapters. The religious contours of UW's beliefs 
and questions emerge more clearly. Time is identitfied as 
the key issue. 
Chapter 6 is a close reading of the 'Time Passes' section 
of To the Lighthouse which shows that it is intimately 
related not only to the rest of that novel, but to the 
entire emergent "philosophy" of VW. 
Chapter 7 examines temporality in the novels in general, 
especially as manifested by the fact of death. We 
concept of time is seen to be essentially Romantic. 
Chapter 8: Between the Acts is seen as the most confident 
and direct embodiment of We faith in 'reality'. The 
autobiographical and other writings of the last few 
years of U's life are seen as an illuminating context 
for her last novel. The modes of literary creation are 
ultimately seen'to share the mode of being of 'soul' (or 
self) and,. 'reality'. ' 
An appendix gives brief outlines of various concepts of 
the self from Socrates to R. D. Laing. 
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Note on the text 
The following abbreviations are used: 
AHH A Haunted House 
AWD A Writer's Diary 
BP Books and Portraits 
BTA Between the Acts 
CE I-IU Collected Essays, Vols. I-IV 
CR I-II The Common Reader, First Series, Second Series 
CW Contemporary Writers 
0. I-III The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Vols. I-III 
JR Jacob's Room 
L. I-UI The Letters of Virginia Woolf, Vols. I-VI 
MD Mrs. Dalloway 
MOB Moments of Being 
ND Night and Day 
0 Orlando 
RF Roger Fry 
TTL To the Lighthouse 
TVO The Vo yage Out 
TW The Waves 
TY The Years 
The name of the editor is sometimes used to identify where 
a quotation is from (e. g. Graham, 695 designates p. 695 of 
The Waves, edited by J. W. Graham). 
Virginia Woolf is referred to throughout as VW 
As an aid to the reader all notes and the bibliography are 
on coloured paper. Each note is followed by the number of-', 
the-pa be in'the'text to which the note refers. 
* 
Life and Art 
All you read a novel for is to see what sort of a 
person the writer is, and, if you know him, 
which of his friends he's put in. As for the 
novel itself, the whole conception, the way one's 
seen the thing, felt about it, made it stand in 
relation to other things, not one in a million 
cares for that. And yet I sometimes wonder 
whether there's anything else in the whole 
world worth doing. 
The Voyage Out, 262 
Somewhere, everywhere, now hidden, now apparent 
in whatever is written down is the form of a 
human being. 
'Reading' (1919? ) 
I wonder, parenthetically, whether I too, deal 
thus openly in autobiography & call it fiction ? 
- 
Diary, 14.1.1920 
Of course it [TTLJ is largely known to me: but 
all my books have been that. 
- 
Diary, 23,2.1926 
In short, every secret of a writer's soul, 
every experience of his life, every quality of 
his mind is written large in his works, yet we 
require critics to explain the one and biographers 
to explain the other. 
Orlando, 189-90 
One must write from deep feeling, said Dostoevski. 
And do I? Or do I fabricate with words, loving 
them as I do ? No I think not. 
... 
I daresay it's 
true, however, that I haven't that 'reality' gift. 
I insubstantise, wilfully to some extent, 
distrusting reality 
- 
its cheapness. But to get 
further. Have I the power of conveying the true. 
reality ? Or do I write essays about myself ? 
- 
Diary, 19.6.1923 
From this I reach what I might call ä philosophy; 
at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that 
behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that 
we 
-I mean all human beings - are connected 
with this; that the whole world is a work of 
art; that we are parts of the work of art. 
Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth 
about this vast mass that we call the world. But 
there is no Shakespeareq, there is no Beethoven; 
certainly and emphatically there is no God; 
we are the words; we are the music; we are, the 
thing itself. 
A Sketch of the Past (1939/40) 
- 
Moments of Being, 72 
I 
-i- 
Introduction 
On reading the manuscript of Jacob's Room, VW's 
husband, Leonard Woolf, remarked that she had "no - 
philosophy of "life"-(D. II1 186; 26.7.1922). " Certainly 
VW did not share Leonard's conviction of "the-fresh air and 
pure light of plain common-sense" tobe found in G. E. 
Moore's ethics. Furthermore, she found no philosophies 
from which she could derive satisfactory solutions to the 
existential questions with which she was constantly 
engaged. Some critics have traced a philosophy in We 
writings to sources in, for example, Bergson, Moore, 
and 
- 
bizarrely 
-. 
r1cTaggatt. 1 It is not my concern, here 
to trace any such (real or imagined) debts. 
The "philosophy" of my title is intended solely in 
the specific sense in which VW herself used the word in 
her late memoir-. A-Sketch of the Past (1939/40). There 
(MOB, 72) she wrote of her "philosophy", 'or "constant 
idea", as a "conceptual rod" which she felt stood always 
behind her art. It is the "philosophy" of UW in'this 
particular sense of what she felt was the background to 
her art that I-wish to elucidate. 
In an essay on 'Montaigne' (1924) UW wrote of the 
"soul" that no one knows' 
how she works or what she is except that of all 
CR I things she is the most mysterious and one's self 
96 the greatest monster and miracle in the world. 
- 
ii 
- 
In the dominant tradition of Western thought the self 
has constantly been the primary object of enquiry2. 
Descartes, Locke, and Hume represent a tradition which held 
that the nature of man is, in Hume's words, the "capital 
or centre" of knowledge. This tradition - which is 
predominantly Cartesian 
- 
is marked, up to Freud, by an 
objectivity which leads the`honest'philosopher into 
inescapable' dilemmas. We thus find Descartes caught out by 
his intuition of'the relationship between body and'mind, 
which he cannot explain. Hume must eventually dismiss 
questions of personal identity from philosophy, saying 
that'they are "grammatical" difficulties. "In Freud's 
psychoanalysis, his. natural scientific bias leads to 
what Ludwig Binswanger-has termed "a One-sided, i. e. 
irreversible, relationship between doctor and patient, 
and an even more impersonal relationship between researcher 
and, object of research"3. 
In contrast to this tradition stands the modern 
phenomenological movement, ' which sees man as "being-in-the- 
world". Practical application of phenomenological theory 
can be seen in the existential psychoanalysis of, for 
example, 'Binswanger"and R. D. Laing. There, the divisions 
and subdivisions of the dominant tradition are resolved into 
the idea of man as being-in-the-world, an embodied being, 
in relation to others. As before, the question of-'the 
nature of self is seen as primary; -the centre'of all 
subsequent enquiry. A leading exponent'of phenomenology, ' 
Merleau-Ponty, finds in the ambiguous self-- as'he believes 
- 
iii 
- 
Montaigne did 
-"the place of all obscurities, the 
mystery, of mysteries, and something like an ultimate 
4 truth" 
* 
UW's novels are concerned with knowledge: knowledge 
of others, and knowledge of. the world. The question of 
the nature of self is at the heart of her thinking, and 
is the dynamic of her fiction. Her novels, I believe, 
uncover what Georges Poulet has called "the essentially 
religious nature of human centrality"5. Beginning with 
VW's ideas of self and identity, we are led-eventually 
to realise that her concept of-the essential nature of 
human being was religious in character. Although an ardent 
atheist, VW gradually came to hold what can best be described 
as a faith, the essential element of which was belief in 
a "soul". Her point of departure is always a simple, but 
radical, wonder in the face of being at all; a style of 
thought that places her in the company of such thinkers as 
Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, tempered though it-is 
by an English-dryness 
6. 
While the question of the nature ofýself-is, always at 
the heart of VW's thinking, 
-it is rarely explicit. In the 
course of this study it will emerge that the-problems of 
self are, indeed, as Hume said, "grammatical": 
-the question 
of the nature of self reveals a fundamental inadequacy in 
language. As a writer, VW was profoundly concerned with 
- 
iv 
- 
the scope of language, especially as her fictions explore 
what she quickly, decided is beyond words - the self. 
The conflict at the heart of VU's thinking and art is 
one between faith and despair: faith in the potential of 
human being to deny essential nothingness, and despair at 
the inadequacy of all human effort in the face of that 
nothingness.. This conflict she felt was particularly 
acute for the artist, whose effort she sees as a continuous 
reaching after a certainty which the artist knows better 
than anyone is an illusion. Throughout her writing 
VW moves between the poles of faith and despair, 
sometimes extolling the power of art to overcome transience, 
at others denigrating its poverty. While this tension 
between faith and despair is not explicitly linked to the 
question of the nature of self, it should be understood 
that that question is the source of the tension. 
* 
The relationship between life and art is an important 
and constant concern of VW's that once more bears on the 
question of the nature of self. The tension in her work 
between faith in an autonomous self (or soul) that gives 
meaning to the world, and despair at'the possibility that 
thereis-no. 'such self anticipates an argument that is 
focused on in current critical thought. This argument is 
characterised by opposing views of the authenticity of 
_-V"., 
literary art; this can be demonstrated by the juxtaposition 
of two representative passages: 
Lacan'speaks of the ego as fictive. 
... 
What our 
analysis of Proust adds to this is a description 
of various forms of "art" as exemplary fictions 
which the (imaginary) self tells itself in order 
to defend its (illusory) sense of autonomy.? 
That object wholly object, that thing made of 
paper, as there are things made of metal or 
porcelaine, that object is no more, or at least 
it is as if it no longer existed, as long as I 
read the book. For the book is no longer a 
material reality. It has become a series of 
words, of images, of ideas which in their turn 
begin to exist. And where is this new existence ? 
Surely not in the paper object. Nor, surely, in 
external space. There is only one place left 
for this new existence: my innermost self. 8 
In what follows I have confined the argument almost' 
exclusively to the terms of UW's own writings, drawing out 
the many points of contact between her fiction and 
autobiographical writings. Current literary theory I seems, 
as Wolfgang Iser remarks, to be "concerned primarily with 
approaches to'' literature and not with literature itself" 
g. 
This study does not, therefore, follow dogmatically a 
particular approach. It is hoped that whatever looseness 
is consequent on an eclectic rather than strictly selective 
method will be compensated for by the effort to read the 
works as they themselves suggest they should be read. 
This will allow, as VW suggested, "the sunken meanings 
to remain sunken, suggested, not stated"10. The argument 
does not need to be transposed to critics' terms; it is 
- 
vi - 
implied in VW's work, which is above all a literature of 
rigorous honesty in its exploration of what it is to be. 
The concept of identity that emerges from the novels 
allows for knowledge only of what VW termed (in Mrs. Dalloway) 
"apparitions". This concept has affinities with Hume's 
notion of imaginary identity in a constant flux. What 
also emerges, however, is that UW was more interested in 
the gaps in being that such a concept revealed. Hume 
turned away from the soul as being beyond our comprehension; 
to VW 'it became the most significant aspect of'being. 
"Soul" and "self", I will suggest, were synonymous for 
VW. The self, or soul, is an 'essence' apart from all 
identities (apparitions) that cannot issue in the world 
but that may survive even death. By comparing passages and 
noting descriptive homologies it is seen that VW often 
wrote about the soul without actually stating it. 
The main focus of this study is on VW's idea of a 
'reality' that she apprehended in the actual world, but 
that transcends it. Her sense of the numinous and her 
idea of the soul are eventually seen to be intimately 
related. The inherent conflict between faith in 'reality' 
and the soul, and despair at the sense of futility in all 
human effort is, manifest in the various thematic concerns 
of UW's art. 
My study may be divided into two parts. The first 
part is primarily descriptive, seeking to provide an 
understanding of the actual context within which VW's 
- 
V11 
- 
exploration of human being takes place. The picture which 
emerges is of a world charactetised by a lack, by a sense 
of an abstract 'gap' in being which cannot be directly 
referred to in language, but which is certainly a potential 
of human experience. In the modes of art this tension 
is formalised, and in my fourth chapter art is seen to be 
VW's means of approaching fundamental existential questions. 
The second part of that chapter brings to the forefront of 
the discussion the problematic relationship between art 
and life, and the problem of a disjunction between language 
and reality, as it is seen in The Waves (1931). Usually 
regarded as her masterpiece, I find in The Waves a serious 
failure in the terms of VW's own aesthetic. 
The sense of the numinous, VW's idea of 'reality'., and 
its relation to art is the focus of the latter half of the 
study. Temporality, as particularly manifest by the fact 
of death, is isolated as the most important concern in 
VW's emergent 'religion'. Her ultimate resolution that 
literary art can embody the autonomous self, or soul, in 
the virtual space described by the act of reading is most 
confidently enshrined in her last novel, Between the Acts 
(1941). UW's suicide, and her belief that; Between the Acts 
should not be published might be taken as controverting that 
novel's generally affirmative character, a final emblem of 
the polarity by which her life and art was riven. 
-'viii - 
Notes to Introduction 
_ 
1. (p. i) See S. P.. Rosenbaum, 'The Philosophical Realism-.. ' 
of Virginia Woolf' in English Literature and British 
Philosophy, edited by S. P. Rosenbaum 
and'Avrom Fleishman, 'Woolf and McTaggart', ELH, 
xxxvi, 1969, pp. 719-738 
2. (p. ii) The reader is directed to the Appendix (pp. 251-300) 
which gives a brief history of 'The Self in Philosophical 
Thought' 
3. (p. ii) Ludwig Binswanger, " 'Freud'a Conception of Man 
in the Light of Anthropology'*, "in Being-in-the World, 
p. 170 
4. (p. iii)'Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence' 
in Phenomenology, Language and Sociology. p. 123 
5. (p. iii) Georges Poulet,. The Metamorphoses-. bf the Circle, 
P. 95 
6. (p. iii) Cf. 
-Diary, 22.9.1928: 
We dont"belong to. any 'class!; we thinkers: 
0. III might as well be French or German. 
- 
Yet I am 
198 English in some way 
-) 
" . 
7. °(p. v) Jeffrey Inehlman, A 'Structural. 
-Study of Auto-. '-" 
biography,. p. 39 
8. (p. v) Georges Poulet, 'Phenomenology of Reading', New 
Literary History, 1 (1969), p. 54 
9. (p. v) Wolfgang Iser, ', The Current Situation'of 
Literary Theory: 'Key Concepts and the Imaginary':, NLH, 
XI, 1, Autumn, ' 1979. p. 3' 
ix 
10. (p. v) 'Craftsmanship`, (1937) CE II:, 
In reading we have to'allow, the sunken meanings, 
to remain sunken, suggested, not stated; lapsing 
and flowing into each other like reeds on the 
bed of 
. 
the river. 
Chapter One_ 
The Body 
It seems proper to begin this study of VW's novels 
by examining briefly_her awareness of the body's role 
in human being., The tradition of empirical and rational 
enquiry into the self has had to face (or ignore) the 
question of, the relation of body and 'mind'. The dominant 
tradition of Western philosophy is still Cartesian, 
treating body and mind as separate substances, one 
extended, the other, not. Dualistic theories must 
assume the possibility of disembodied existence, but 
whenever such an idea is brought into contact with 
the world in. which we actually live its inadequacies 
are evident 
Merleau-Ponty 
- 
whose phenomenology of perception 
has been influential in breaking down the Cartesian 
theory of the "ghost, in the machine". 
-, starts from a 
position very different to that of Descartes. Any 
apprehension of the world, and of our place in it,, is. 
from the situation of a body: the body is our general 
medium for having a, world. The body is both that through 
which we experience the world immediately, and that by 
which we are experienced (initially) in the world by 
others: the body is the "vehicle of being in the world" 
, 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 82)., 
Exponents of phenomenological theory have-gone so 
-2- 
far as to make the verb "to live" transitive, in so 
far as it implies a body. Thus, instead of the Cartesian 
formulation "I live in a body", Plerleau-Ponty, Sartre, 
and R. D. Laing after them, would say "I live my body. " 
The idea that to live is at once to 'live' a body lies 
behind Laing's analyses of the embodied and unembodied 
self (see The Divided Self, ch. 4). 
Laing's concepts can be used to identify the 
(phenomenological) way in which VW creates characters 
and conveys a sense of lived experience in her novels. 
Laing writes that "Everyone, even the most unembodied 
person, experiences himself as inextricably bound, up 
with or in his body" (The Divided Self, 66). 
-Embodiment 
and unembodiment are not fixed, passive states but active 
tendencies, the possibilities of the way-the body is lived 
giving rise, to what Laing terms "a basic difference in 
the self's position in life" (op. cit., 66). 
The body, 
-therefore, 
is the correct starting-point 
in an account of self. Every person must 'live' his or 
her body in some way, even if that way is to deny that 
it is 'his' or 'hers'. As Laing suggests, the basic 
difference in ways of being lies in an individual's 
feeling of existing commensurately with the body or not: 
of being, in Laing's terms, embodied or unembodied. 
The novels enquire into human being, and take account 
throughout of. the effect on perception and action that 
ways of living the body have.. We early. awareness of 
the lived body is well exemplified by her presentation 
-3- 
of Rachel Vinrace, the heroine of her first novel, 
The Voyage Out (1915). Rachel becomes increasingly 
involved with her body as an object of thought; the 
way she lives her body is focused on as the novel progresses. 
The Voyage Out concentrates on the problems of engage- 
ment and marriage, and, most significantly for our 
purpose here, the problems encountered by Rachel arise 
predominantly from her being forced to live her body in 
a way she is'totally unprepared for. 
A kiss roughly'forced upon her by an older man early 
in the novel (84-5) drives her to see her body as an 
instrument of passion and temptation 
- 
one that she cannot 
live. Her engagement with a young man (Terence Hewet) 
compounds the problem. Her body, to her, eventually 
becomes "the source of all the life in the world" (315). 
Rachel's escape from the world she perceives as entirely 
threatening can be seen as an existential 'fading-out' 
which is conveyed 'in images of the physical: 
Her'body became a drift of melting snow, above 
which her knees rose in huge peaked mountains 
of bare bone. 
... 
For long spaces of time 
she would merely lie conscious of her body 
floating on the top of the bed and her mind 
driven to some remote corner of her body, 
423-4 or escaped and gone flitting round the room., 
' ýý 
The tendencies towards embodiment and unembodiment^ 
can be taken as the opposing extremes of a scale of ways 
in which the body is lived. In VW's novels'the broad 
range of this scale is well exemplified in the variety 
-4- 
of ways characters are more or less 'at home' in their 
bodies. ' The Waves (1931) provides a microc6sm of this 
scale in the six different existential 'settings' of the 
characters in one actual world. 
In-the following examples, two of the characters 
from that novel serve to demonstrate the opposing extremes 
of the scale of ways in'which the body can be lived: 
Jinny stands as the most fully embodied of all VW's 
characters, whilst Rhoda lies'at the extreme of unembod- 
iment. The examples given do not follow the novels' 
chronology as they are intended to illustrate a spectrum 
against which all'the characters of the novels may be' 
measured. 
*- 
,** 
(i) Embodiment 
Of all'the novels' characters it is Jinny in The Waves 
who is most 'at home' in her body, most completely embodied. 
finny is her body: she experiences no gap between 
consciousness ` and body, but lives entirely through her 
body. Her life as a child adumbrates the fierce 
sensuality of her adulthood: "I see a'crimson tassel 
... 
twisted with gold threads" (6). The words of her lessons 
- 
seen differently by each of the six children whose lives 
form the substance of the book 
- 
are bright and burning; 
r 
they inspire in her a'dream of the fiery, 'yellow, fulvous 
dress she will wear to parties, attracting'attention 
-5- 
to herself, ' to her body. 
The two other girls with whom ninny grows up (Rhoda 
and Susan)'are her immediate rivals; even Rhode's face 
bestowed on her by Jinny, because to herself she has 
"no face" -' is a threat, for 'it is "completed", whereas 
Jinny complains of eyes too close together, lips too far 
apart. Jinny is complete to herself: 
I see my body and head in one now; for even 
in this serge frock they are one, my body and 
30 my head. 
The implication is that she feels no difference 'at all 
between body and mind: she 'lives' her body absolutely, 
with no mediation between thought and action. ' Jinny 
does not dream because her imagination is "the body's". 
Her mind is reduced to a mere' breath in her body; her 
perceptions are vibrantly alive; -but without mystery, 
without depth, for she sees only with her body: 
YettI cannot follow any word through its 
changes. I cannot follow any thought 
30, from present to past. 
Memory can hardly exist for her, for the body does'nbt 
remember: its experiences are all momentary. 
That Jinny should try to banish night is under-'' 
standable; it is the realm of dreams and solitude when, ' 
in sleep, the body falls away and the mental'part of life 
dominates. At night Rhoda must stretch out to the hard 
-6- 
rail at the foot, of her bed to preserve some sense of 
embodiment; Jinny, however, longs "that the week should 
be all one day without divisions" (39), and attempts to 
make it so by turning night into day with bright lights. 
in brilliant rooms, by wearing a radiant white dress. 
Thos3experiences which terrify Rhoda delight Jinny: 
The door is opening and shutting. People 
are arriving; they do not speak; they hasten 
73 in. 
How strange it is, thinks Jinny, that people should go 
to sleep, putting out the light and losing consciousness 
of their bodies. 
Her childhood aspirations" are realised as she grows 
up to take her place in what she calls the "great society 
of bodies. " In Jinny's lived experience, consequent on 
her fully incarnate being, there is no need of a mind 
with any degree of detachment from the body, for life 
is carried on by instinct. Under an admiring gaze her 
body "instantly of its own accord. puts forth a, 
_frill" 
(45), 
communicating- " with others in a wordless society, of 
bodies. Her. body she describes as being 'open', or. 'shut' 
at will (46), including or excluding another from that 
society, her-world. 
Jinny's life is a sexual adventure from beginning 
to end, and it is at parties, where, she makes her conquests, 
that she is seen at her most 'at home', in the world: 
-7- 
Among the lustrous green, 
-pink,, pearly-grey. 
women stand upright the bodies of men. They 
are black and white; they are grooved beneath 
their clothes with deep rills. I feel again 
the reflection in the window of the tunnel; 
73 it moves. 
Dancing at a party is significantly described as a sea, 
and as a body: Jinny and her partner are swept in and out, 
round rocks, flowing but enclosed within a larger figure 
(74). The image of the sea emphasises that Jinny's 
actual world is that shared world of all the others, 
existing in itself, over above the individual world she 
experiences through the way she lives her body. 
In the context of her full embodiment, the world 
for Jinny is a glittering party of bodies where names 
are unimportant. In this fulfilling of, herself she is 
supremely confident: 
I look straight back at you, men and women. 
74 
°I am one of you. This is my world. 
Only when the pact-is firm between the bodies can she 
feel herself "admitted toý-the warmth and privacy of 
another soul" (75). The soul, though, has no interest 
for herýbecause-she-constantly seeks moments'af physical 
ecstasy; once passed, these moments give. way to°"slackness 
and indifference" and the search for a new partner - 
"beauty must be broken daily to remain-beautiful" (124). 
finny, I suggest, is at-one extreme of that scale of 
ways in which the body can be-lived; she can-imagine 
-8- 
nothing. "beyond the circle cast by my body" (92). Her 
sense of unity projects itself : through her body and affects 
others, as-she is, aware. - Coming-into-the restaurant 
for Percival! s-farewell dinner, Jinny seems to Susan to 
centre everything, to pull everything to her. She makes 
others conscious of their bodies: the men straighten 
their ties'(clothes, 
- which Jinny always notices, being 
in a sense an extension of the body), and Susan hides 
her hands beneath the table (86-7). finny proclaims herself 
wholly through her actions, and she perhaps makes others 
uncomfortable because she reminds them that they too 
have bodies, which they would rather forget: 
My body goes before me, like a lantern down 
a dark lane, 
-bringing one thing after another, 
out of darkness into a ring of light. I 
dazzle you; I make you believe that this is 
92 all. 
There is nothing interesting to Jinny in the stories 
one may read in people's faces, for there is no 
certainty about them. Body and mind to her are one: 
"We who live in the body see with the body's imagination 
things in outline" (125).. 
Most of the firmly embodied characters in the novels 
are in some degree threatening to those who fight a constant 
battle with their bodies. Those who tend to unembodiment 
are outcasts, outsiders and visionaries. Jinny, though, 
is envied rather than feared, even if that envy is 
frequently manifested as a sort of fear. One of her 
-9- 
friends, 'Bernard, remembers her in his summing up, which. 
concludes The Waves, aststerile, seeing only what was 
before-her, on the surface; yet he admires her-animal 
honesty. She relates to others solely through her 
body, as Bernard recalls: 
It was a tree; there was the river; it was 
afternoon; here we were; I in my serge suit; 
she in green. There was no past, no future; 
merely the moment in its ring of light [past 
by jinny's body ? 3t and our bodies; and then 
" 
179 the inevitable climax, the ecstasy. 
Jinny's embodiment is explicitly sexual. She cannot, 
like Neville, range in her memory back and forth in time, 
nor, like Susan, can she be ,a mother, for a relationship 
with children would not be physically sexual. When Jinny 
notices that'she-is ageing this, to her, is not merely a 
case of more wrinkles on her face. and less spring in her 
walk, but: a real depletion of her very being. Her world 
begins toidisappear as her charms fade: 
But look 
- 
there is my body in that looking- 
glass. How solitary, how shrunk, how aged! 
I am no longer young. I am no longer part of 
the procession. 
... 
I still move. I still 
137 
-live. But who will come if I'signal ? 
To overcome this ontological depletion she rouses herself- 
to prepare a face to. meet-the faces that she meets; ,a 
face created by colour, by the movement of the mechanical, { 
world running smoothly and noisily about her (138). Ultimately, 
finny is a machine; 'she thrives in the-world of technology 
- 
10 
- 
and manufacture, for it seems that 'they' are, as she is, 
engaged in prolonging'the appearance of bodies, of erasing 
mind and=emotion in"favöur of the mechanistic physical: 
Look how they show off clothes here even 
underground in a perpetual radiance. They 
will not let the earth even lie wormy and 
138 sodden. 
* 
Susan lives her body almost as completely embodied 
as Jinny, but differs in that there is in her make-up a 
sense of distance between consciousness and body. She 
lives through her senses (which are acute), accepting 
her body as the natural home of her being, as she is at 
home in the larger world of nature. As a child she 
develops a hatred of anything foreign to her native 
soil: the smells and regulations of school are anathema 
to her, as are the firs and mountains of Switzerland, 
where she finishes her education; this radical auto- 
chthony characterizes her throughout her life. 
Jinny's kissing Louis, in the garden where the 
book opens (9), is an event which affects all the children. 
The Jealousy it arouses in Susan makes her perceive 
acutely that her body is "short and squat". This childhood 
trauma leads her to feel excluded from the sexual adventures 
of others; she feels low, near the ground and the insects. 
- 11 - 
This early body-image'dictates the'subsequent development 
of the way she lives her body. 
Susan is uninterested in the artificial, the 
meretricious: 
I do not want, as Jinny wants, to be admired. 
I do not want people, when I come in,, to look 
up with admiration. I want to give, to be 
given, and solitude in which to unfold my 
39 possessions. 
The idea of possession is central in Susan's character: by 
possessing all that is around her, and that her senses 
bring her evidence of, she can create her own world through 
her body. Her identification with sensory experience is 
so intense that she can believe herself to be what she 
experiences: 
At this hour, this still early hour, I think 
I am the field, I am the barn, I am the trees; 
mine are the flocks of birds, and this young 
hare who leaps, at the last moment when I 
70-' step almost on him. 
In this can'be seen the difference between the ways 
Susan and Jinny live their bodies. "While Jinny is a 
sexual being, Susan is formed entirely from the experience 
of her senses and the feeling that her body is like the 
'body' of the earth, warm in summer, cold and cracked in 
winter. At times, indeed', her identification with the` 
earth tends towards a sort of unembodiment. This can be' 
observed ins moment', the description of which makes it 
- 
12 
- 
sound strangely like Bernard's experience of the "world 
without a, self": 
I think sometimes (I-am not twenty yet) I 
am not a woman, but the light that falls on 
this gate, on this ground. I am the seasons, 
I think sometimes, Jamuary, May, November; 
71 the mud, the mist, the dawn. 
The moment is short-lived,, as the weightof her body, 
leaning on the gate, recalls her from her reverie; 
it serves to illustrate the point that embodiment is not 
static, but. a flux, conditioning the-way an individual 
experiences the world. Susan's embodiment is. more complex 
than Jinny's from the start. 
Sometimes Susan envies Jinny and Rhoda living in 
London;,, itýseems to her that. they are able to control 
the inexorable pressures of life. To the others, Susan 
presents someone who "despises the futility of London" (85), 
but there is in her some longing for variation, for an 
escape from the unchanging routine of the seasons. At 
the. farewell dinner-party where the six friends gather 
to say goodbye to their hero, Percival, who is leaving 
for India, Susan feels; out;, of place; it is Jinny's 
territory. Sheýgathers, her, 
_, 
"possessions", her fields 
and damp grasses, to protect-her-"soul"-(87). In--the way 
they live their bodies, Jinny and, Susan oppose against 
each other the lives of city and-country. While-both-are 
very fully embodied, they, are so in different ways. Susan 
has accepted her-body withwhat seems, compared to Jinny's 
- 
13 
positiveness, almost resignation. 
- 
Being embodied so 
completely, Susan is similar to Jinny in disliking words 
and taking everything at, Tace value, but distinct from 
her in the discomfort she feels about her body in the 
setting of a town restaurant.. 
The position of nature as the source of the way 
Susan lives her body is usurped by her new=born child. 
It is of her body, as a tree is of the earth. She 
cradles it with her body. *,. 
... 
all spun to a fine thread round the cradle, 
wrapping in a cocoon made of my own blood 
the delicate limbs of my baby 
... 
making of 
of my own body a hollow, a warm shelter for 122 my child to sleep in. 
j_. 
Her body, to her, assumes the contours of the land. This 
child is more than just another possession; it is an 
extension; of her body: 
'His eyes will see when mine are shut, ', I 
think. 'I shall go mixed with them beyond 
122-3 
-my body.... 
' 
Her idea here is of what could be called a 'physical m 
transcendence' rather than atranscendence of the physical. 
There is always in Susan a, sense that to have to 
live a body is regrettable but inevitable. 
. 
"I shall never 
have anything but natural happiness, " she says, somewhat 
ambiguously, with her friends in London, quietly hinting, 
that she feels she misses something: 
-"It will almost 
_. 
- 
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- 
content me. " 'From her early experience of herself'as'' 
squat and ugly she has come to be embodied in a way that 
causes her, none of the tension of` the`unembodied, but also 
prevents her'from realising aspects of herself that she 
is ' made` acutely aware of by her visits'to London, particularly 
in Jinny's company. 
This sense-of unfulfillment weighs on her when her 
children are grown. She feels that she has reached the 
summit of her desires; she'"has planted and nurtured and 
brought tö maturity part of her own body. With this 
completion, she begins to tire of her life: 
Yet sometimes"I"am sick"of natural happiness, 
and fruit growing, and children scattering 
the house with oars, guns 
... 
and other trophies. 
I am sick of the body, I am sick of my own 
136 craft, industry and cunning, 
,.. 
Susan has been constrained by her early experience 
of her body; she has lived in harmony with the nature she 
felt close to as a child, but has never overcome a sense 
of 'loss, ofýnot being able to grasp the "air-ball's string" 
of words that Bernard and the other city-dwellers seem to 
grasp with 'such facility. She has resigned will 'to reaction, 
imagination to sensory experience, and as she grows old 
she-thinks-perhaps her life has not been 'real', for she 
has made no effort to oppose nature: "Life stands round 
me"like glass round'the imprisoned reed" (137). -A more 
adventurous, more 'real' (to her) Susan looks out from her 
"rather squat, grey before my time" body, through "clear eyes, 
- 
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- 
pear-shaped eyes"2, and it is. this Susan who withdraws 
her square-tipped fingers from Jinny's sight in the 
restaurant. Susan begins to detach herself from her 
body as she grows older, filled with a sense of loss. 
For Jinny the world of bodies is enough, but Susan sees 
beyond it. 
At the final reunion of the six friends, at Hampton 
Court, Neville's self-confidence, bolstered by his 
qualifications, withers before Susan. In an effort to 
make her identity-"crouch" beneath his he tells her of 
the variety and vigour of his life, comparing it to 
Susan's seasonal routine. The difference in their lives 
is shown most clearly in-the way they-have lived. their 
bodies. "I", says Neville, 
took the print of life not outwardly, but 
inwardly upon the raw, the white, the 
unprotected fibre. I am clouded and bruised 
with, the print of-minds and faces and things 
so subtle that they have smell, colour, 
texture, substance, but no name. I am 
. 
merely 'Neville' to you, who see the narrow 
limits of my life and the line [body] it 
150 cannot pass. But to myself I am immeasurable. 
Susan's life is emblematised in her body, with which she 
now challenges Neville: her life has been solid, in huge 
blocks, not flickering and evanescent like his, because 
she has lived through her senses, through her body, and 
the body does not refine, does not chop things small 
with words: 
- 
16 
- 
I 
My body has been used daily, nightly, like a 
152 tool by a good workman, all over. 
With her body she demolishes the world of phrases: 
I sit among you abrading your softness with 
my hardness, quenching the silver-grey flickering 
moth-wing quiver of words with the green spurt 
153 of my clear eyes. 
However, Susan has perceived the restriction her embodiment 
entails, and the last words she speaks in the bookýsum 
up-her sense of loss: 
Still I gape 
... 
like a 'young bird, unsatisfied, 
165 for something that has escaped me. 
* 
For those, like Jinny and Susan, whose way of living the 
body tends very much to complete embodiment, the world 
is not usually a threatening place. They are marked by 
a sense of security, of 'belonging'. This is not to say 
that embodied being is immune to doubt, but at least-such 
embodiment provides an initial firm foundation for being. 
When the way the body is lived tends more towards 
unembodiment, the self's position in the world is altogether 
more precarious. Again, by description of two examples, 
the other extreme of the scale of ways of living the body 
is illustrated. 
*** 
I 
-17- 
(ii) Unembodiment 
He had gone through the wholeshow, friendship. 
European War, death, had-won promotion, was 
still under thirty and was bound to survive. 
MD He was right there. The last shells missed 
96 him. He watched them explode with indifference. 
Septimus Warren Smith, in Mrs. Dalloway (1925), begins 
to tend towards unembodiment when he is urged by his 
employer, Mr. Brewer, to develop "manliness" (by playing 
football! [551 ). When his friend" Evans dies' in battle, 
Septimus sees an opportunity to display his manliness 
to the world by showing no feelings. The Septimus that 
others experience is not at all identical with Septimusrv'' 
äs he speaks to 'himself'. R. D. Laing, `in The Divided 
Self, is instructive in understanding'the nature"of the 
dissociation in Septimus: 
The individual is developing a microcosmos 
within himself; but, of course, this 
autistic, private, intra-individual 'world' 
is not a feasible substitute for the only 
74 world there really is, the shared world. 
Septimus believes that the world, not he, has altered, 
and he must hold on to"this belief for the security of 
his own being: "it might be possible, " he thinks, "that 
the world itself is'withöut meaning" (98). 
Septimus is not protected from the world by the 
defining line of his own body. His unembodiment leads 
him to experience his own being as terrifying and 
- 
18 
- 
uncontrolled, for-the medium by which the world can be 
kept at a distance seems not to be 'there'. He feels 
that his body has been soaked away, "macerated until 
only the nerve fibres were left" (76). 
- 
From this way 
of living his body comes hisýsense: of being freed from 
the earth, able to look down from "the back of'the world" 
on-all mankind (76). 
Septimus's world initially depends, as each person's 
does, on how he lives his body. 
- 
His unembodiment frees 
him from the constraints of a normal physical body in 
his own perception; this perception is in direct conflict 
with the world outside him, a world which makes no 
distinction between 'him' and, his body. Most of the time 
Septimus regards his body as an 'other', as, for instance, 
when he melodramatically drops his head in his hands, 
making his wife, Rezia, send for help (100). 
Throughout-the novel, Septimus is largely unaware 
of his body as it appearsto others in the actual-world: 
Happily Rezia put her hand with a tremendous 
weight on his knee so that he was weighted 
26 down, transfixed. 
To him, his body is one more object in that world, bobbing 
up and down in the breeze along with the trees, feathers 
and birds., Septimus's unembodiment causes a serious 
disjunction between his perceptions and those, of others 
around him. In order to stave off the madness which 
Septimus feels this disjunction threatens him with, he. 
- 
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translates his sensations into an inexpressible "religion" 
of which he is the prophet, and gives meaning to a world 
which he sees might well be meaningless. 
If he was embodied he would have to feel, and thus 
have to face,, primarily, Evans' death. Unembodied, he 
can create a solipsistic world in which "there is no 
death" (2B). His body is in the world of death 
- 
"There 
was his hand; there the dead" (28) 
- 
and so he must abandon 
that body as far as he can. His sensations are given 
significance by his 'self' (in Laing's sense of a 'core' 
of being looking out of an alien body). Septimus must 
remain unembodied in order to live for himself; to live 
the body in this way, however, appears in the actual 
world as an abberation to be 'cured'. 
In Septimus's world "there is no death", and so 
he reasons that he does not have to, feel, for Evans. The 
death of his friend and the demands on him to be "manly" 
have driven him to a state of extreme unembodiment. His 
omniscience ("He knew all their thoughts, he-said; he 
knew everything.. He knew the meaning of the world, he said. " 
[74 ). is necessary to him if he is to deny his body as 
a physical limit to himself. Again, the condition is 
described by Laing (op.,. cit. ): 
... 
the hidden shut-up self, in disowning 
participation 
... 
in the quasi-autonomous 
activities of the false-self, system, is 
living only 'mentally'. Moreover, this shut-up 
self, being isolated, is unable to be enriched 
by outer experience, and so the whole inner 
world comes to be more and more impoverished, 
- 
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- 
until the individual may feel he is merely 
a vacuum. The sense of being able to do 
anything and the feeling of possessing everything 
then exist side by side with a feeling of impotence 
75 and emptiness. 
VW conveys the hopeless paradox of Septimus's position 
with telling psychological insight; he is trapped between 
the extremes of omnipotence and eternal suffering: 
Look, the unseen bade him, the voice now 
communicated with him who was the greatest of 
mankind, Septimus, lately taken from life. to 
death, the Lord who had come to renew society, 
who lay like a coverlet, a snow blanket, 
smitten only by the sun, for ever unwasted, 
suffering for ever, the scapegoat, the 
eternal sufferer, but he did not want*it, he 
moaned, putting from him with a wave of his 
hand that eternal suffering, that eternal 29 loneliness. 
The world that Septimus tries to escape from is 
represented by the doctors, Holmes and Bradhsaw, by Mr. 
Brewer, and even to some extent by his wife, Rezia. They. 
try to make Septimus take notice of "real things". Such, 
attention would necessitate embodiment for him, and thus 
feeling and recognising, death. The insistence of the 
actual world drives Septimus further into unembodiment. 
Holmes and Bradshaw treat the body, but Septimus, as 
he lives his body, cannot be touched by them: 
But even Holmes himself could not touch this 
last relic straying on the edge of the world, 
this outcast, who gazed back at the inhabited 
regions, who lay, like a drowned sailor, on the 
103 shore of the world. 
- 
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- 
Just before his suicide, Septimus is alone with' 
Rezia; he is calmed by the shimmering patterns of sunlight 
on the wall, but the peaceful'atmosphere is shot through 
with intimations of his imminent death (153-4). Carefully, 
Septimus, drawing calm and courage both from the sights 
and sounds of nature, and from Rezia's stability, begins 
to take stock of his surroundings:, 
But real things 
- 
real things were too exciting. 
156 He must be cautious. He would not go mad. 
He begins to move away from unembodiment, to 're-embody' 
himself through vision (primarily). When he closes his 
eyes, however, the world he has been carefully approaching, 
one item at a time, disappears. Alone, he feels that his 
world (that is, the world of his unembodied self) has 
gone forever 
- 
he is stuck with the sideboard and the 
bananas, which undermine his vision by their mundaneness, 
deny what he considers the truth. With what must be under- 
stood as a supreme effort, Septimus resolves to face "the 
screen, the coal-scuttle, and the sideboard" (160). He 
has begun to come back to his body, but the sound of Holmes 
- 
"human nature" (155) 
- 
on the stair, forcing his way in, 
reminds Septimus of that world that drove him to 
unembodiment and torment. Holmes and Bradshaw "mixed 
the vision and the sideboard" (163), his unembodied being 
and his appearance in the actual world; such people see 
with a single vision only, and yet have power over others. 
- 
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- 
Septimus is'now moving towards"embodiment and sees vividly 
that he is subject to the doctors, and that what he thought 
was an omnipotent being has in fact no authority, no' 
autonomy, 'in'their'world, ' the actual world. 
Rationally, the only-possibility for his embodied 
self is suicide, for it is the only way he can preserve 
his autonomy as embodied. Rezia understands why Septimus 
kills himself, ' having come to understand the way the world 
represented by Or. Holmes tramples on those who do not 
fit in it. The union of Rezia and Septimus''in opposing"` 
the single vision of Holmes (and thus Rezia's understanding 
of Septimus's act) is implied by an image both share. As 
Septimus begins to recover from his anguish, his torments 
are all "burnt out, for he had a sense, as he watched 
Rezia 
... 
of a coverlet of flowers" (157). After his 
death, Rezia is calm, feeling like "flying flowers over 
some tomb" (165). 
* 
At the furthest extreme of unembodiment of all We 
characters is Rhoda, in The Waves. The gulf between what 
she calls "myself" and the body by which she is recognised 
in the world is wide and deep; her isolation is emphasised 
from the start of the book. She is more alone than her closest 
friend, Louis, who is also predominantly unembodied, but 
can at night "put off this unenviable body. 
... 
and inhabit 
space" (38). -Rhoda does not have the imagination that 
- 
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partly rescues Louis from his uncomfortable relationship 
with his body; she suffers in every situation. It is 
only near the end of the book, at the reunion in Hampton 
Court, that she has taught her body to "do a certain 
trick" so that she will appear to have overcome her terror 
of the leaping tiger of society. 
Rhoda is thrown into the world by a, body she hates 
and tries to avoid: 
"That is my face, " said Rhoda, "in the looking- 
glass behind Susan's shoulder 
- 
that face is 
my face. But I will duck behind her to hide 
it, for I am not here. I have no face. Other 
people have faces; Susan and Jinny have faces; 
30-31 they are here. Their world is the real world. 
What makes Rhoda's position in life impossible, more 
painful than that of Septimus, is her understanding that 
the world of the embodied is, as she puts it, 'the "real" 
world, the world in which actions have effects, objects 
weight. The reflection of her "real" face shows her the 
actual world which has her in its grip, rather than her 
private fantasy of the swallow and the pool, which she can 
control. Always, though, Rhoda is trapped by her need 
for others, the need to replenish her dreams with figures 
from that world populated by those who are at home in 
their bodies. Louis, her ally in unembodiment, understands 
her position: 
We wake her. We torture her. She dreads us, 
she despises us, yet comes cringing to our sides 
because for all our cruelty there is always 
- 
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some name, some face, which sheds a radiance, 
which, lights up her pavements and makes it 
86 possible for her to replenish her dreams. 
She longs for "lodgement"'(94), that is, for a home in 
the world which her body does not provide. By copying 
others, she hopes to share some of their ease, to "light 
my fire at the general blaze of you who live wholly, 
indivisibly and without caring" (94). 
Rhoda does not deny her body entirely as she knows 
that she must live it in some way as aliving being: 
Alone, I often fall down into nothingness. 
... I have to bang my hand against some hard door 
31 to call myself back to the,, body. 
xý . 
Her feeling of being "committed" to life, in the sense. of 
being committed to prison, springs from the tension inherent 
in the way she lives her body. 
- 
She does-not want to die, 
but cannot be at home in her, body, and so lives in a 
twilight between life and death. As the book progresses, 
Rhoda slips further into unembodiment; her increasing 
dissociation 
. 
from, her body is a-strand of the book's,. 
overall movement as definite as the passage of the sun 
through the sky, or Jinny', sageing: 
Ihonth. by-month things are losing, their 
, 
hardness; 
even my body now lets the light through; my 
spine is soft like wax near the flame of the 
32-33 candle. 
- 
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- 
The ambivalence in Rhoda's way of living her body is 
seen in her, attitude, to night and sleep.. Going to bed, she 
must stretch her toes to touch the rail to assure herself 
of the world and her,. being in'it. - The-night invites sleep, 
and Rhoda fears that if she sleeps she will lose the already 
slight hold she has on her body and never come back to 
it; yet to relinquish her body and enter the world of 
dreams is a solace for her: 
Out of me now my mind can pour. I can think 
of my Armadas sailing on the high waves. I 
am relieved of hard contacts and collisions. 
19-20 1 sail on alone under white cliffs. 
As she falls asleep, however, 
-the panic of losing identity 
overcomes her; she. feels. waters closing over her and struggles 
to emerge from them by recognising the objects around her: 
Oh, but I sink, I fall! That is the corner of 
the cupboard; that is the nursery looking- 
glass. But they stretch, they-elongate. 
... Oh, to awaken from dreaming! Look, there is 
20, the chest of drawers. 
Rhoda does not want to give life up, and knows she 
must 'live' her body, but because she can never feel 'at 
home' in that body, her unembodiment is extreme'and. her--, 
tendency towards dissolution,. against which-she struggles 
less and less. effectively, eventually overcomes her will 
to live. The "thin sheet" of her childhood bed can no 
longer save her. At the extreme pitch of her despair, 
Rhoda echoes Septimus Smith's fear of falling into the 
- 
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sea or into flames (MD, 155), and his bitter observation 
that "once you fall 
... 
human nature is upon you" (154): 
After all. these callings hither and thither, 
these pluckings and searchings, I shall fall 
alone through this thin sheet into gulfs of 
fire. And you will not help me. More cruel 
TW than the old torturers,. you will let me fall 
158-9 and will tear me to pieces when I am fallen. 
Also like Septimus, Rhoda exhibits that feeling of 
omnisicience and omnipotence that Laing notes as characteristic 
of the unembodied self in its retreat from the actual 
world, (see above, pP. 19-20): 
Yet there are moments when the walls of the mind 
grow thin; when nothing is unabsorbed, and I 
could fancy that we might blow so vast a bubble 
that the sun might set and rise in it and we 
might take the blue of midday and the black 
of midnight and be cast off and escape from 
159 here and now. 
A crucial moment in Rhoda's life demonstrates her 
realisation of the inevitability of living'her body, 
a realisation which is the source of constant anguish 
to her: 
Also, in the middle, cadaverous, awful, lay the 
grey puddle in the courtyard, when, holding an 
envelope in my hand, I carried a message. I 
came to the puddle. I could not cross it. 
Identity failed me. We are nothing, I said, 
and fell. I was blown. like a feather, I was 
wafted down tunnels. Then, very gingerly, I 
pushed my foot across.. I laid my hand against 
a brick wall. I returned very painfully, 
drawing myself back into my body over the 
grey, cadaverous space of the puddle. This is 
- 
27 
- 
46 the life then to which I am committed. 3 
Recalling this experience (113) Rhoda states that "Unless 
I can stretch and touch something hard, I shall be blown 
down the eternal corridors for ever. " Rhoda is, in Laing's 
words, "guilty at daring to be, and doubly guilty at not 
being, at being too terrified to be" (op. cit., 157). She 
is saved from "chaotic nonentity" (Laing) by the brief 
security her sense of being in a body provides. It is, 
however, the fact that she stretches unembodiment as far 
as possible that leads to her clutching at the experience 
of her bodily senses for a sense of being at all. Eventually - 
we must assume from Bernard's report 
- 
Rhoda no longer 
made the effort to draw herself "across the enormous gulf" 
into her body (113). 
* 
The four characters discussed 
- 
Jinny, Susan, Septimus 
and Rhoda 
- 
are at either extreme of a scale of what I 
have called 'at-homeness' in the body. All the other 
characters of the novels fall between these two extremes 
in terms of their embodiment or unembodiment, which is, 
more or less emphasised. The question of the way the body 
is lived must precede any account of self precisely because 
human being lives a body as its foundation in the world. 
That VW saw the body as lived rather than merely as a 
given environment for a shadowy self is an indication 
of her intentions in the creation of character. 
- 
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Having seen that the body is not taken for granted, 
the next step in describing the context of We enquiry 
into human being is to investigate what is meant by 'I', 
the mark of a particular identity; that perspective from 
which even the most unembodied character may speak. 
29 
Notes to Chapter One 
1. 
-(p. 1) See Sydney Shoemaker, 'Embodiment and, 
Behaviour', in A. O. Rorty, ed., The Identities of 
- 
Persons 
2. (p. 15) To endorse Susan's view see the 2nd holograph 
draft of The Waves (Graham, p. ` 503) where she says: 
"It is my self. Icy self is. in my eyes. " 
3. (p. 27) This moment is drawn from an experience VW 
describes in her memoir A Sketch of the Past: 
There was the moment of the puddle in the path; 
when for no reason I could discover, everything 
suddenly became unreal; I was suspended; I could 
HIOB not step across the puddle; I tried to touch 
78, something,.... the whole world became unreal. 
For a full exposition of the implications of, this 
and other correlations between the lived experience 
of the writer and her'fiction see R. Poole, The 
Unknown Virginia Woolf. The question of embodiment 
is comprehensively discussed in this book; see 
especially Ch., 15,,, 'Virginia's embodiment', to which 
my, chapter must owe a great deal. 
- 
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Chapter Two 
Identity and Self 
III is, as Plartin'8uber put it, "the true shibboleth 
of humanity" (I and Thou, "115), but the word can be uttered 
in many different ways. Ws novels enquire into the 
status of 'I' as it is spoken by various characters in 
various contexts, and from this we may draw her concepts 
of identity and self, the distinction between which will 
emerge as we proceed. 
Frequently, there'is a moment in the novels when, 
with a feeling either of"exhiliration or anxiety, a 
character is suddenly overcome by a sense of being unique, 
of being ; I'. In The Voyage Out, that the heroine, Rachel 
Vinrace, has little sense of individual identity is 
emphasised from the start: she would "believe anything 
she was told, invent reasons for anything she said" 31). 
" 
Friendless, inexperienced and sheltered, Rachel's ordinariness 
is the most striking thing about her. She has had no 
social intercourse, and any impulse towards an individual 
attitude has been quickly supressed by her father or aunts; 
she thus believes that 
to feel anything' strongly was to. create an 
abyss between herself and others who feel 
34 strongly perhaps but differently. 
- 
This aspect of Rachel is so dwelt upon that the 
shattering effect on her of Dalloway's forced kiss is 
- 
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- 
unsurprising. The sudden sexual experience throws Rachel 
into a (sexual) world of bodies, making her regard her 
own body uncomfortably as an instrument of passion and 
temptation (84-5). That she could be an object of desire 
in a world she knows hardly anything about is profoundly 
shocking for her: 
Helen's words hewed down great blocks which 
had stood there always, and the light which 
91 came in was cold. 
For Rachel, what can be called the experience of 
self-discovery is fascinating; prompted by Helen Ambrose, 
she sees herself for the first time standing out against 
a background composed of all other people: 
The vision of her own personality, of herself 
as a real everlasting thing, different from 
anything else, unmergeable, like the sea or the 
wind, flashed into Rachel's mind, and she 
became profoundly excited at the thought of 
living. 
"I can be m-m-myself, " she-stammered, "in 
spite of you, in spite of the Dalloways, and 
Mr. Pepper, and Father, and my Aunts, in spite 
of these ?" She swept her hand across a whole 
94-5 page of statesmen and soldiers. 
Such moments of 'self-discovery' occur in all the novels, 
and provide what could be called a first signification 
of identity: the encountering of myself, called 'I', 
distinct from all others in the world, as continuous 
f 
and unmergeable. 
-32- 
Immediately, however, a problem is raised for'which 
the novels after Night and Day (1919) successively seek 
and offer solutions. Rachel's "vision of 
... 
herself" 
raises the question of who has that vision. It is not 
enough to say simply that the individual divides into a 
reflected and reflecting part. 'I' is, for the most 
part, spoken as a received cipher for one being among 
others. The experience of self-discovery distinguishes 
the individual 'I' from the faceless crowd that moves 
through all the novels, obliterating 'I', sweeping 
people along en masse. This crowd is the background 
against which the experience of self-discovery stands 
out. To emerge from that background requires an effort, 
for it is easier to flow with the crowd, as Katharine 
Hilbery, the heroine. of Night and Dayt finds: 
She stood fascinated at the corner. The deep 
roar filled her ears; the changing tumult had 
the inexpressible fascination of varied life 
pouring ceaselessly with a purpose which, as 
she looked, seemed to her, somehow, the normal' 
-purpose 
for which life, was framed; its complete 
indifference to individuals, whom it swallowed 
up and rolled onwards, filled her with at least 
465-6 a temporary exaltation. 
The problem I have referred to above is'that of 
discovering what inspires the effort to rouse an individual's 
'I' to emerge from the crowd. The question is put simply' 
in 'An Unwritten Novel', a sketch written in 1920 as VW 
was planning Jacob's Room: "When the self speaks to the 
self, who is speaking? " (AHH, 21). There is a distinction 
between the voice of the "self speaking to the self" and 
- 
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the 'I' that is uttered in the shared world of relationships 
between one identity and another., The status of 'I' as 
the defining word'of identity is thus complex rather than 
simple. In what follows, the novels' enquiry into the 
nature and status of identity, and their enquiry into the 
possibility of a unitary, autonomous self will be described 
and any implicit conclusions elucidated. 
* 
"There is, " says the 'narrator' of Jacob's Room (1922), 
"something absolute in us that despises qualification" (143). 
In this novel, ' that 
ý]t is no use trying to sum people up. One must 
follow hints, not exactly what is said, nor 
29, yet entirely what is done 
- 
becomes almost a refrain. The authorial stance in Jacob's 
Room is inquisitive, uncertain; in its hesitancy can be 
seen a determination to enquire honestly into the human 
situation, a 
, 
refusal to assume control and dictate a 
system into which life will be made to fit. That "life 
is but a procession of shadows, " that we cannot know others 
- 
except as what Clarissa Dalloway will call "apparitions" 
- 
that there is no way 
, 
of defining an individual 
- 
all this 
is affirmed. Jacob's Room sketches out the frame within 
which Ws investigations into the strange nature of 
human being take place: 
- 
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In any case life is but a procession of shadows, 
and God knows why it is that we embrace them 
so eagerly, and see them depart with such 
anguish, being shadows. And why, if this and 
much more than this is true, why are we yet 
surprised in the window corner by a sudden 
vision that the young man in the chair is of 
all things in the world the most real, the most 
solid, the best known to us 
- 
why indeed 7- 
For the moment after we know nothing about him. 
Such is the manner of our seeing. Such the 
7: 
-71 conditions of our love. 
Such, it might be said, the conditions of her enquiry. 
"Human reality cannot be finally defined by patterns 
of conduct" (Sartre, Being and Nothingness); cannot, 
Jacob's Room suggests, be finally defined by anything. 
The novel undercuts its own purpose by trying to create 
a unique character while at the-same time admitting the 
impossibility of the project: 
But though all this may very well be true 
- 
so Jacob thought and spoke 
- 
so he crossed his 
legs 
- 
filled his pipe 
- 
sipped his whisky, and 
once looked at his pocket-book, rumpling his 
hair as he did so, there remains over something 
which can never be conveyed to a second person 
save by Jacob himself. Moreover, part of this 
is not Jacob but Richard Bonamy 
- 
the room; the 
market carts; the hour; the very moment of history. 
Then consider the effect of sex 
- 
... 
But 
something is always impelling one to hum vibrating, 
like the hawk moth, at the mouth of the cavern 
of mystery, endowing Jacob Flanders with all 
71-72 sorts of qualities he, had not at all 
- 
... 
The individual is enmeshed in the influences, relationships 
and possibilities of the world, caught up in the movement 
through time and space, and so cannot be realised as one 
absolute entity. If there is a unique self to be identified 
- 
- 
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a 'summing up' of the person 
- 
it must be separated from 
its intervolvement with the world. However, such an 
operation may well lead to nothing. 
* 
At the beginning of Mrs. Dalloway (1925), Clarissa, 
recently recovered from an illness, delighting in a fresh 
day and the hustle and bustle of the West End, is undisturbed 
by the thought of her death. She will not say of herself 
"I am this, I am that" (11), preferring to see herself 
as a "mist" diffused among the familiar people and places 
of her life. 
I 
Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking 
towards Bond Street, did it matter that she must 
inevitably cease completely; all this must go on 
without her;, did she resent it; or did it not: 
become consoling to believe that death ended 
absolutely ?, but that somehow in the streets 
of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, 
11 there, she survived, 
In this mood Clarissa is particularly susceptible to the 
fading away of individual identity that engulfment by the 
crowd threatens. Content to be part of the "ebb and 
flow of things", her identity ("her life, herself", 12) 
begins thinning away, spreading out further and further,, 
until eventually no sense of 'I' as an individual identity 
remains to her. 
The crowd has absorbed Clarissa so completely that 
she can no longer say 'I' and feel that she utters her 
- 
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own identity: 
She had the oddest sense of being herself 
invisible; unseen; unknown; there being no 
more marrying, no more having of children now, 
but only this astonishing and rather solemn 
progress with the rest of them, up Bond Street, 
this being Mrs. Dalloway; not even Clarissa 
13 any more; this being Mrs. Richard Dalloway. 
'I' is Mrs. Richard Dalloway, just one more fashionable 
woman shopping in the West End. The importance of names 
should be noted here as they are significant in the question 
of identity. 'Dalloway' is, of course, not 'really' 
Clarissa's name but one imposed over her own by marriage; 
to be "not, even Clarissa any more" means that the 'I' 
she utters does not have, to her, the distinction of a 
unique individuality. 
An interesting comment on the significance of names 
is provided by the scene in which Clarissa's old lover, 
Peter Walsh, just returned from India, is seen following 
a pretty young woman. Having just left Clarissa's house, 
where their meeting again after a long separation has 
aroused many painful memories for Peter, he fantasizes 
about this 'ideal' girl he has glimpsed in the street: 
Straightening himself and stealthily fingering 
his pocket-knife he started after her to follow 
this woman, this excitement, which seemed even 
with its back turned to shed on him a light 
which conneqted them, which singled him out, as 
if the random uproar of the traffic had whispered 
through holloeed hands his name, not Peter, 
but his private name which he called himself in 
59 his own thoughts. (my italics) 
- 
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This unnamed name seems suggestive of an essence transcending 
mere identity; but here we are anticipating what must be 
more clearly explained. As a comment on this passage I 
will cite the following, from Geoffrey Hartman, Saving the 
Text: 
... 
for those who have a name may also seek a 
more authentic and defining one. This other 
name is usually kept secret precisely because 
it is sacred to the individual, or numinous (nomen numen): as if the concentrated soul of 
125, the person lodged in it. 
There. will be more to say about names later, but for now 
it is enough to note their function of providing one of the 
bases for identity. 
In Mrs. Dallowe 
, 
the simple 'I' with which Rachel 
Vinrace was seen to lay claim to an individual identity, 
gives way to more complex notions. Clarissa is engaged 
in what may be seen as a search for_herownmostrvidentity:. 
her recollections of childhood and an unresolved early 
. 
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love affair often prevent her from having_a_sense-of,,. continuity.. 
in her being. Memories dislocate her sense of a single 
identity by irrupting into her preset lifer so that 
she "would-not say of Peter, she would not say of herself, 
I am this, I am that" (11). 
When she returns home to discover that her husband, 
Richard, has been invited to lunch without her, Clarissa 
feels empty and lost: identity once more drains away, 
because she has not been included. To regain her sense 
of identity she detaches herself from the present, and dips 
- 
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into the past, her memories. As the sense of a rich 
relationship (with Sally Seton) and a moment of vision 
returns to her, the emptiness occasioned by her exclusion 
fills. She abruptly returns to the present, and 
plunged into the very heart of the moment, 
transfixed it there 
- 
the moment of this June 
morning on which was the pressure of all the 
41-2 other June mornings. 
This circling of the moment with all the other moments 
of life gives her identity point and continuity. Memory 
thus plays. a double röle, both disturbing and restoring 
the individual's sense of identity. From the sum of her 
life recalled, Clarissa is able to fill the moment and 
regain, her sense of identity, of being someone in the 
world to whom things have happened, to whom people 
have spoken, someone who has caused both happiness and 
sadness. Her physical being also has a part to. play in 
this gathering together, of herself. To see her own, body 
gives her some security; when she cannot see herself, 
the fading of identity that she experienced in Bond Street 
is quickened;. she feels "invisible". On returning home, her 
image in a mirror joins with memory as she reassumes (what 
is here specifically called) her self: 
That was her self - pointed; dart-like; definite. 
That. was her self when some effort, some call 
on her to be her self, drew the parts together, 
she alone knew how different, how incompatible 
and composed so for the world only'into oBe,. centre, 
one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing- 
- 
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room and made, a meeting-point, a radiancy no 
doubt in some dull lives, a refuge for the 
42 lonely to come to perhaps. 
There is, another "self", 
-the "she". who "alone knew" that 
this assembly of elements is "composed so for, the world 
only, " and. so "self" here is not unique, but a momentary 
resolution of, scattered attributes that saves, Clarissa 
from a moment of despair.,, 
Identity, then, is not a "thing", as Rachel Vinrace 
put it,, but a flux of sensations and attributes that can 
be-drawn together by an effort, based on such a 'security- 
ensuring stimulus (at least for the embodied) as the sight 
of one's own body in a mirror. Identity is made up of 
what Clarissa later;. in the novel 
. 
calls "apparitions". 
_ 
In 
this instance it appears to be an accumulation of. reflections 
unified by a name. When there are no acute stimuli, nor 
an available 'base' for identity, it can slip, as it does 
for Clarissa in the crowded street, and for Peter Walsh 
walking through London after his reunion with Clarissa, 
which arouses a welter of memories: 
... 
the strangeness of standing alone, alive, 
- r 
unknown, at half-past eleven in Trafalgar Square 
overcame him. What is it ? Where am I? And 
58 why, after all, does one do it ? he thought, 
Thus far it is suggested that if identity is not to 
be the undifferentiated identity of the crowd, an effort 
must be made. Individual identity is, however, formed 
in a nexus of relationships and influences without which 
- 
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it cannot emerge from the background of the crowd. What 
initially stimulates the necessary effort is not clear, 
but we may say that there is a tension between the desire 
for autonomy, and the necessity, in forming identity, of 
both interrelationships with others, and the boundaries 
of space and time. 
The party is a_foundation on which Clarissa can rely 
for identity, but, we know now, it is possible for identity 
to be "composed so for the world only". Because "anybody 
could do it" (187), and because she feels she must act 
a part as hostess, Clarissa once again feels that a "true" 
or "real" identity, her own 'I', eludes her: 
Every time she gave a party she had this feeling 
of being something not herself, and that everyone 
was unreal in one way; much more real in anotherti 
It was, she thought, partly their clothes, 
partly being taken out of their ordinary ways, 
partly the background; it was possible to say 
things you couldn't say anyhow else, things 
that needed an effort; possible to go much deeper. 
187-8 But not for her; not yet anyhow. 
Even this late in the novel the sense of incompleteness in 
Clarissa's identity is still very strong;. the 'I' that she 
speaks in welcoming her guests does not satisfy her. She 
is still uncertain of what, or who, "herself" is; she still 
will not say of herself that she is one thing or another, 
a virgin in a narrow bed, ora smart London hostess. 
Clarissa cannot feel herself as a single identity 
because she feels herself "everywhere; not 'here, here, "here';... 
but everywhere" (168). Her "youthful theory" states 
what we have already seen to be the situation of identity: 
- 
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to know anyone "one must seek out the people who completed 
them; even the places" (168). All that appears in the. 
world are "apparitions", but there is another "unseen" 
part of us which can survive even death, by attaching to 
other people, haunting other places. The problem of identity 
is intricately bound up with that of knowing others, and 
because relationships form such a constantly shifting and 
widening web of interconnections there is'no way of isolating 
one identity. What Clarissa suggests jean 'essence' which 
is somehow 'truer' than the "apparitions" of-it-which 
are identities in the shared world. The novel'does not 
attempt to analyse what this essence might', be, 'but clearly' 
the fact of death is significant in the'experience which 
allows for'its perception. 
The news of a young man's suicide disturbs that 
identity "composed so for the world only" that Clarissa 
has assumed for her party. Quickly, however, the specific 
death leads her to think simply about death itself; the 
finery of the party is stripped away: "one was alone" (202). 
For the first time in the novel there is a sense'that 
Clarissa has reached some sort of plateau; the death seems 
to have led her to a transcendence of identities; she 
becomes simply "Clarissa". The final lines of'the novel---- 
"It is Clarissa, he said. / For there she was" (213) 
- 
endorse this sense (not"stated) of completion, 'of`unity. ' 
The role of death as the prime manifestation of-the horizon 
of time in human being is important in VW's thinking'(as 
will become increasingly clear); this account of the 
- 
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novels' enquiry-must eventually concern itself with 
her concept of temporality. 
* 
That identity depends to a great extent on relationship, 
and that relationships are inevitably flawed, as. Clarissa 
Dalloway feels, is an idea that we-find in To the Lighthouse 
(1927). The novel is pervaded by a bewilderment in the 
face of human relations and a longing for knowledge and 
intimacy. The question of how we can trust any. of our 
feelings when each person-presents to the world-innumerable 
apparitions is; still much in the writer's mind, particularly 
expressed in the character of the artist, Lily Briscoe: 
How then did it work out, all this-? How did 
one judge people, think of them 7 SHow did 
one add up this and that and conclude that it 
was liking one felt or disliking 7 And to those 
42 words, what meaning attached, after all ? 
The failed relationships of To the Lighthouse are testimony 
to-that unsatisfactoriness of our knowledge of others that 
Clarissa Dalloway complained of. 
Lily Briscoe's relationship with Mrs. Ramsay (presented 
only from Lily's point of view) makes explicit, the,, 
-.. 
implications of the characteristic yearning for intimacy: 
in effect, Lily wants to be-Mrs. Ramsay, to know her in 
a way that would dissolve all difference 
, 
between them:, 
- 
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What art, was there, known to love or cunning, 
by which one pressed through into those secret 
chambers ? What device for becoming, like waters 
poured into one jar, inextricably the same, one 
, 
with the object one adored ? Could the body 
achieve it, or the mind, subtly mingling in 
the-intricate passages of the brain ? or the 
heart ? Could loving, as people called it, 
82-3 make her and Mrs. Ramsay one 7 
Knowing that she cannot, "know one thing or another 
about people, sealed as they were, " Lily is a development 
from the hawk moth of Jacob's Room that hovered at, the 
entrance to the cavern of mystery (JR, 72). Lily is a 
bee, haunting "the hives that were people" (83). This 
ghostly bee accepts the inevitability of ignorance, giving 
the novel its affirming character. Apparitions are all 
that we know, and they are endless: 
, 
One wanted fifty pairs of eyes to see with, 
she reflected. Fifty pairs of eyes were not 
enough, to get round that one-woman with, she 
thought. Among them, must be one that was 
stone blind to her beauty. 
... 
What did the 
hedge mean to her, what did the garden mean to 
303-4 her, what did it mean to her when a wave broke-? 
Even seen from everywhere, every experience`. understood, 
there remains missing that elusive-"something absolute, in 
us that despises qualification" (JR, 143): what I suggest 
might be the unnameable self, 'the' Mrs. Ramsay, transcending 
all apparitions. - 
The "unseen part, of, us" that Clarissa Dalloway 
thought might survive dea W is given greater significance 
in To. the Lighthouse. The "wedge-shaped core of darkness" 
- 
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of Mrs. Ramsey's solitary reverie (99): is. a development 
of what Clarissa called "the unseen part of., us, which 
spreads wide"_(Mo, 168); a, suggestion which is supported by 
a close similarity of description: 
... 
that since our apparitions, the part of us 
which appears, are so momentary compared with 
MD the other, the unseen part of us, which spreads 
168 wide, 
.... 
... 
our apparitions, the things you know us by, 
are simply. childish. Beneath it is all dark, 
it is all spreading, it is unfathomably deep; 
TTL but now and again we rise to the surface and 
100 that is what you see us by. 
Just as in. the previous, novel, an, invisible,., spreading 
inner essence-is posited which, it seems, is Mrs., Ramsay 
'herself'. 
This "wedge-shaped core of darkness" overcomes the 
boundaries, of space and time-("Her, horizons seemed to 
her limitless, "- 100), by not issuing in action. In the 
light of what. has been said in Chapter One, it is significant 
that during this reverie it is emphasised that Mrs. Ramsay 
remains. sitting upright in her chair, knitting., The being 
of this. "core of darkness" is therefore put in question: 
tobe is to live a body, subject to the passage of time and 
taking up so much space. If there is something that might 
be called, self, which does not share the modes of being 
so far established for identity, it will. perhaps be 
impossible to actually describe.,., 
I have spoken already of the need, expressed in 
frs Dalloway, for a foundation for individual identity, 
-45- 
and of the'yearning, for unity that-is felt in the character 
of Clarissa. In To the`Lighthouse, Mrs. Ramsay achieves 
a foundation and a unity by detaching herself from identity 
(as Clarissa seemed to when she withdrew from her party 
to the little room on hearing of Septimus Smith's suicide): 
There was freedom, there was peace, there was, 
most welcome of all, a summoning together, 
a resting on a platform of stability. Not as 
oneself did one. find rest ever, in her 
experience 
... 
but as a wedge of darkness. 
TTL Losing personality, one lost the fret, the hurry, 
100 the stir; 
The question remains: what is' left of an individual if 
she is abstracted from all involvements in the shared 
world of human relationships,? Mrs.. Ramsay's moment- 
of solitude has about it an air-of tending towards death; 
she seems to "triumph over life when things came together 
in this peace, this rest, this eternity" (100). However, 
VW was certainly no mystic escaping the world through 
contemplation; once again, her understanding of the fact 
of death is centrally important. 
Mrs. Ramsay is not only looking inward; she looks at 
the beam of the lighthouse, concentrating on it until 
she "became the thing she looked at" (101). In this 
reverie, in which "personality" is lost, control is 
relinquished and the identity of the crowd can creep 
back in, as it does in the religious platitude that so 
annoys Mrs. Ramsay when she utters it: 
- 
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It will come, it will come, when. suddenly 
she added, We are in the hands of the Lord. 
But instantly she was annoyed with herself 
for saying that. Who had said it ? not she; she, 
had been trapped into saying something she did 
101 not mean. 
She is trying'to reach some level of 'security that 
is'not provided by the world in which she lives as mother, 
wife, and protector. A deity is no comfort.. in a world in 
which "there is no reason, order, justice; but suffering, 
death, the poor" (102). In what is, in effect, her 
search for faith, Mrs. Ramsay looks to a world of beauty, 
to be found in nature and "oneself": 
It was odd, she thought, how if one was alone, 
one leant to things; trees, streams, flowers; 
felt they knew one, in a sense were one; felt 
an irrational tenderness thus (she looked at 
101 that long steady light) as for oneself. 
To glance back at Clarissa Dalloway's moment of solitude, 
(MD, 204), it may be that her looking out at the sky 
(which "held something of her own in it"), is an adumbration 
of Mrs Ramsay's act of faith here. What emerges from 
these two novels is a deep distrust of human identity and 
relationships, `and a yearning for something 'secure' 
which is not to be found by escaping from the world, but 
which inheres in it. It may be that the realisation of 
the self in the sense of the person purged of all 
apparitions (identities) is not a general human possibility, 
but the potential only ofthe adherents of what can best 
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be described as a particular religion. Before continuing 
with this examination of the question of identity and self, 
I wish to draw attention to the writer's experience over 
the years from the inception of To the Lighthouse to the 
beginning of The Waves. Later'I will suggest that VW's 
early experience may have led to the deep distrust of 
human life alluded to above,, and to her'search for a-r 
"reality" ! apart from actual human being. 
*** 
UW began to make up To the Lighthouse early in 1925 
(see D. III, e. g. pp. 3,18-19). Towards the end of that 
year her relationship with Vita Sackville-West became 
closer and more intense, and was to continue so for at 
least three years. I wish in particular to draw attention 
to the experiences of two summers at Monk's House, where 
VW lived from 1919, in Rodmell, Sussex. Both were 
recorded in her diary. 
The first, in 1926, echoes that experience of Mrs. 
Ramsay's just discussed: 
These 9 weeks give one a plunge into deep waters 
which is a little alarming, but full of interest. 
All the rest of the year one's (I daresay rightly) 
curbing & controlling this odd immeasurable soul. 
When it expands, though one is frightened & 
bored & gloomy, it is as I say to myself, awfully 
- 
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queer. There is an edge to it which I feel of- 
great importance, once in a way. One goes down 
into the well & nothing protects one from the 
assault of truth. Down there I cant read or 
write; I exist however. I am. Then I ask 
myself what I am ?& get a closer though less 
flattering answer than I should get on the surface - 
D. I; I where, to tell the truth, I get'more praise 
112 than is right. (28.9.1926) 
The invisible, spreading something is given a name here: 
the soul. Two days later she comments an the experience, 
wishing to "add some remarks to this, on the mystical side 
of this solitude". It is interesting that''she"is no 
clearer in her diary (where she might perhaps be'more 
direct) than in the novel (assuming - as I do 
- 
that the 
diary and novel passages concern similar experiences). 
The 'soul' still "despises qualification": ' 
... 
how it is not oneself but something in the 
universe that one's left with. It is this that 
is frightening &'exciting in the midst of my 
profound gloom, depression, boredom, whatever 
it is: One sees a fin passing far out. What 
image can I reach to convey what I mean ? 
Really there is none I think. The interesting 
thing is that in all my feeling and thinking 
I have never come up against this before. 
Life is, soberly and accurately, the oddest 
affair; has in it the essence of reality. I 
used to feel this as a child - couldn't step 
across a puddle once I remember, for thinking, ' 
how strange 
- 
what am I? &c. But by writing I 
dont reach anything. All I *Perhaps The 
mean to make is a note of Waves or moths 
a curious state of mind. (Oct. 1929) 
I hazard the guess that it may be the impulse 
0. III behind another book. At present my mind is 
113 totally blank & virgin of books. * (30.9.1926) 
- 
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The note she has written three years later encourages 
looking at the diary to help understand the novels' 
provenance. It seems strange to. say that"1ife 
... 
has 
in it the essence of reality. " We might suppose "life" 
and "reality", to be synonymous, but evidently reality. was 
something particular to UWE, and what it was must be 
elucidated. 
To the Lighthouse was published in May, 1927, but 
even before then UW conceived Orlando, a book she wrote 
at high speed while The Waves simmered in her mind. Indeed, 
the two books seem to have shared, in a sense, one creative 
impulse (see e. g. a note made in 1933 against the diary. 
entry for 14.3.1927, D. III, 131). In June, '1927, VW 
travelled with Vita Sackville-West and others to observe 
the total eclipse of the sun. (30.6.1927, D. III, 142-4: "We 
had seen the world dead. This was in the power of nature. ") 
an experience which provided elements of Bernard's "world 
seen without a self" in The Waves. Before continuing 
with a discussion of Orlando, I wish to remark on the 
second of those summer diary entries I referred to above. 
Towards the end of the summer of 1928 VW wrote that 
she had had a busy time; it had been "a summer lived almost 
too much in public. " She recalls previous summers spent 
at Monk's House in which she had had a "religious retreat". 
It seems very likely from what follows that she is remembering 
in particular the summer of 1926: 
- 
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Often down here I have entered into a sanctuary; 
a nunnery; had a religious retreat; of great 
agony once; & always some terror: so afraid is 
one of loneliness: of seeing to the bottom of 
the vessel. That is. one of the experiences 
I have had here in some Augusts; & got then to 
a consciousness of what I call 'reality': a 
thing I see before me; something abstract; 
but residing in the downs or sky; beside 
which nothing matters; in which I shall rest 
and continue to exist. Reality I call it. 
And I fancy sometimes this is the most necessary 
thing to me: that which I seek. But who knows - 
once one takes a pen and writes ? How difficult 
not to go making 'reality' this and that, whereas 
it is one thing. Now perhaps this is my gift; 
this perhaps is what distinguishes me from other 
people; I think it may be rare to have so acute 
D. III 'a sense of something like that 
- 
but again, 
196 who knows ?I would like to express it too. (10.9.1928) 
With this entry, that abstract 'something' becomes clearer: 
it is "a thing I'see before me" which resides in'the downs 
or the sky. This at once recalls'the experiences of Clarissa 
Dalloway and Mrs. Ramsay. In this abstract 'reality' 
VW says she will rest - as Mrs. Ramsay wishes to rest (TTL, 
100) 
- 
and continue to exist, as perhaps Clarissa means 
when she says of the "unseen part" that it "might survive" 
(IlD, 168). (It is also worth noting that VW feels distinguished 
from other people by her acute consciousness of this 'reality'. ) 
The question as to whether there is an autonomous 
self apart from identity has led to the potential expressed 
in some of the characters of the novels and by VU herself 
in her diary, for apprehending a 'reality' which has no 
form or name in the world, and which can only be experienced 
in solitude; a 'reality' which overcomes the horizons of 
space and time. This 'reality' 
- 
in VW's own words, "that 
- 
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which I seek" 
-'must become the focus of this study 
as it is theýobject'of her faith, gradually conceived and 
expressed in her novels. 
* 
.* 
John-Graham, 
-writing an 'The "Caricature Value" of 
Parody and Fantasy in Orlando'2, puts well what I believe 
to be-true of Orlando's development of Ws thoughts on 
self, and identity: 
Caricature can explore because it: ignores the-, 
complexity of the total object and isolates 
only its relevant features, thereby allowing 
a sharper focus of attention than is possible in 
a full treatment. In many ways it can function 
for the artist as a refined sort of doodling, in 
which he "feels out" the forms and designs 
345 of his more serious work. 
It-is, nevertheless, generally agreed that Orlando (1926), 
gets increasingly "serious"; -indeed, VW herself felt 
that what had begun as a "joke" did not end as-one. The, 
last chapter is greatly concerned with the heroine's 
identity, and begins by musing on the difficulty of saying 
what "life" is. (Incidentally, it mocks the masculine 
preoccupation with action, and its exclusion of thought 
and imagination in saying-what life is C2413 
.) UW's next 
work, The Waves, is prefigured ät several points, e. g. p. 257: 
- 
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"Life ? Literature ? One to be made into the other ? But 
how monstrously difficult:, ". Followed through to the end; 
the final chapter of Orlando leads into areas as yet 
unprepared for; for now, I will simply refer to the 
analysis of, identity that. is-found in those pages... 
The tone of Orlando allows UW a directness which 
would be awkward in her other works. It should-always 
be remembered in reading, the book that it was an offering 
to Vita, Sackville-West, and that it is "about" Knole and 
the Sackvilles in a much plainer sense than To the, 
Lighthouse is about the Stephens. John Graham seems 
to have forgotten this when he complains that 
By the time Orlando sits down in. the long gallery 
of her home, she has become a distinctly credible 
aristocrat of the present age, down to the 
lavender bags, ropes, and name-cards which 
op. cit. mark the passing of her private heritage 
362 into the public domain 
Orlando has become Vita, a metamorphosis that led to whats 
Vita herself called "a new form of Narcissism. " "I confess, " 
she wrote, "I am in love with Orlando - this is a complication 
I had not foreseen" (letter from V. S-W to VW, 11.10.1928, 
L. III, 574). That+the "Joke" was for Vita above all 
is. demonstrated by the fact that it ends emphatically on 
the twelfth stroke of midnight, Thursday, October 11th, 
1928 
- 
the day Orlando was published and, as Vita's letter 
records, "the day I was to have it. " This is'perhaps a 
way of solving that problem of "Life ? Literature 7 One to 
be made into the other ?" that a serious work (like The Waves) 
- 
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could not achieve. 
Having gone up to London to shop, Orlando is beset 
by memories which dislocate her sense of identity in the 
present. Getting into her car, Orlando, who, it is 
suggested, has "gone a little too far from the present 
moment" (274), 'is vulnerable to a loss of identity 
caused by her failure to synchronise the different - 
times that beat within her. To have an identity, it is 
suggested, there must be, a sense of being in a present; 
also identity appears to Depend on coordinates of space. 
Motoring fast out of London these coordinates of time and 
space are fragmented, and a "chopping up small" of 
identity occurs which, it is said, is like that which 
"precedes unconsciousness and perhaps death itself" (276). 
As when Mrs. Ramsay slips into unconsciousness, there is 
a question as to the status of the person's existence: ' 
if identity is 'chopped up small' where is the person to 
be located 7 The passage suggests that such unconsciousness 
is a different mode of existence altogether from identity 
in the actual world; the approach to death might reveal 
that mode also. 
Once in the country, the continuity of the visual 
impressions Orlando receives gives her a 'base' on which 
to re-establish identity. Identity is, as we have already 
learned, a series of apparitions, and it is apparitions 
that VW refers to by "selves" in this context. Orlando 
is composed of many different "selves", each having 
"attachments elsewhere, sympathies, little constitutions 
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and rights of their own" (277); 
. 
-.. 
how many different people are there not- 
Heaven help us 
- 
all having lodgment at one time 
277- or another in the, human spirit ? 
There is nothing innovative about this view of human 
identity and, as the narrator says, 
everybody can multiply from his own experience 
the different terms which his different selves 
277 have made with him. 
Orlando, however, seeks a particular identity, but,, 
this will not "come"; as she drives, her identities 
change. The problem of who it is that calls "Orlando ?" 
and receives no answer is resolved by the introduction 
of the "conscious self, which is uppermost, and has the 
power to desire" (279). Orlando is calling her "true 
self" which "some people" ("they") say is made up of "all 
the selves we have it in us to be; commanded and locked 
up by the Captain self, the Key self" (279). The "true 
self" of Orlando, then, is an amalgam of all her identities 
(according to "some people"). This at once introduces 
the problem of how unity can be achieved while the person 
lives through time; Orlando escapes the problem by being 
a fantasy. 
It is only when Orlando ceases to call for her 
"true self" that she becomes it, and it is in this that 
I believe the "joke's" serious underthought is glimpsed. 
- 
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In the paragraph describing Orlando's coalescence into 
a "true self" can be detected tenuous similarities with" 
those 'key' moments in both Clarissa Dalloway's and Mrs. 
Ramsay's life, that have been described above: 
The whole of her darkened and settled, as 
when some foil whose addition makes the round 
and solidity of a surface is added to it, 
and the shallow becomes deep and the near distant; 
and all is contained as water is contained by 
the sides of a well. So she was now darkened, 
stilled, and become, with the addition of this 
Orlando, what is called, rightly or wrongly, 
a single self, areal self. And she fell silent. 
For it is probable that when people talk aloud, 
the selves (of which there may be more than 
two thousand) are conscious of disseverment, 
and are trying to communicate, but when communi- 
282 cation is established they fall silent. 
There is a similarity of mood between this moment and 
(particularly) Mrs. Ramsay's moment of sinking down to 
"being oneself". Probably the experiences are quite distinct, 
but it must be admitted that the moment of "being oneself" 
is characterised by solemnity, darkness, and peace. - 
In Orlando the "true self" comes in silence, which suggests 
that it cannot be named. Communication (voices, naming) 
is the mark of apparitions; but in what sense can something 
exist without a name, an actual being in the shared world ? 
From this point on Orlando loses all semblance of being a 
"joke" until the last few lines. I will return to it 
later, but now move on to The Waves (1931) in which the 
significance of silence in the matters under discussion 
may become clearer. 
* 
- 
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"Nothing should be named lest by doing so we change 
it, " says Neville in The Waves (59). It is only by 
naming, however, that anything can be known. The 
problem of knowing what the "real self" 'is' in Orlando 
is explicitly founded in the problem of language. If 
the "real self" that Orlando sought comes only in silence, 
it is presumably outside language, outside naming. The 
idea of emptiness or silence at the heart of life is a 
recurring feature of the novels. It is connected with 
the idea of self so far established, for we have seen that 
if self does exist its mode of existence is not that of 
a named thing in the actual world; there is, perhaps, a 
zone of silence, a preverbal space from which identity, 
arises3. 
The questions raised by the novels, that as readers 
we must attempt to answer for ourselves, stand in opposition 
to such thought as that of the early Wittgenstein, for 
whom "The limits of = language mean the limits of my 
world" (Tractatus, 5.6). The Tractatus (1908) concludes: 
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (7). 
In her novels VU realises that while what is outside 
life is outside language, what is outside language is not 
necessarily outside life. There is a silence at the heart 
of life in her works, but it is not Wittgenstein's silence. 
The fundamental question addressed by the novels is whether 
there can be anything for us outside language; can the self 
be if its mode of discourse is silence ? 
- 
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VW could not pass over in silence that whereof we 
cannot speak, but hovered over it incessantly. She may 
well have taken courage from a writer who, as Allen 
McLaurin has noted, "was so deeply implanted'in her thought 
that his ideas seemed to be her own" (Virginia Woolf, 3). 
In his notebook, Samuel Butler wrote that, 
The highest thought, is ineffable; it must be 
felt from one person to another but cannot be 
articulated. All the most essential and 
thinking part of thought is done without 
words or consciousness. It is not till 
doubt and consciousness enter that words 
become possible. 
, The moment a thing is written, or even can 
be written, and reasoned about, it has changed 
its nature by becoming tangible, and hence 
finite, and hence it, will have an end in, 
disintegration. It has entered into death. 
And yet till it can be thought about and realised 
more or less definitely it has not entered into 
life., Both life and death are necessary factors 
of each other. But our profoundest aný most 
important convictions are unspeakable. 
Writing novels is, we might say, naming, however sophisti- 
cated, and. this might go some way to explaining the sense of 
longing common in the fiction. In a way VW writes against 
herself all the time by adapting a position in which she 
says her task is hopeless,, her goal impossible, but her_ 
effort inevitable. It should, not be thought that this 
is a Beckettian5 pose: VW's work is, on the whole, strongly 
affirmative; yet it may be that she affirms through, 
recognition of nothingness. 
-58- 
`Having arrived at this somewhat Humean view of identity, 
we will do well to look briefly at some of the issues 
it raises, as the deeper concerns of the novels are 
beginning to emerge. To return- to'TheýWaves, Bernard 
is a sort of spokesman for this view°of human being, 
feeling that his life is a series of acts (apparitions): 
They do not understand thatI have to effect 
different transitions; have to cover the entrances 
and exits of several different men who altern- 
55 ately act their parts as Bernard. 
When he invites "poor Simes" to dinner, he thinks he will 
have attributed to him "an admiration which is not mine" 
(55). Bernard says that the admiration inferred is not 
really his, and yet by inviting Simes to dinner one 
apparition makes contact with another. Bernard knows 
only apparitions of Simes; life indeed seems to be a 
mere procession of shadows, as was suggested in Jacob's 
Room. 
Bernard is fascinated by the different apparitions 
he presents to the world, forever turning them around 
in his mind. The private Bernard 
- 
when 'he' speaks to 
'himself' 
- 
is in a sense an internal apparition: "Underneath, 
and, 'at the moment when I am most disparate, I am also 
integrated" (55). 'Bernard' to Bernard is merely the 
voice that speaks in him when he talks (as we all do) to 
himself. To conceive of oneself, in this way is immediately 
to suggest duality 
- 
a''self' regarding a 'self'. We 
can say, then, that this (Bernard to himself) is not the 
- 
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"real self" because once communication is established 
language has always already taken 'self' into its system 
of apparitions. If named, the "true self" would become 
an element of the novel, given a status, a being amongst=- 
others. It seems that there can be no such self in the 
light of what has already been said, because if it is to 
be absolute it escapes the limitations of time and space 
on anything in the world. Only nothing (no-thing) escapes 
those limitations (horizons). 
Yet again and again the novels enshrine privileged 
moments in which a self (or, to be now direct, a soul) is 
posited. What VW only very rarely called 'soul' (e. g. in 
her diary, as referred to above, p. 47), and what I 
(and sometimes she) call 'self' are both terms for that 
invisible "something" that is apart from all apparitions 
that can transcend the horizons of space and time, and 
that has its 'being' in silence. Also, it has appeared 
so far, the self or soul has a special and uncommunicable 
relationship with an abstract 'reality' residing in the 
actual world. 
The self cannot be constructed from identities; to 
Neville's (paradigmatic) question "Who am I ?" (60)9 there 
can be no (single) answer: 
As he approaches I become not myself but Neville 
60 mixed 
... 
with Bernard. 
- 
Likewise, Bernard is "mixed" with Neville: 
- 
60 
- 
Now-that we look at the. tree: together, it has 
a combed look, each branch distinct, and I 
will tell you what I feel, under the compulsion 
60 of your clarity.. 
Others cannot tell us who we are because they see themselves 
in us, who see us in them, and so on; there is such a 
mingling together of different identities that another 
can only give a version of us. Bernard knew this as a 
child: 
"But when we sit together. 
-close, ... we, melt into each other with phrases. We arp, edged 
11 with mist. We make an unsubstantial territory. 
We can only think about ourselves through the medium of 
language; if there is a "real self" it cannot, as Orlando 
stated, be thought about.. 
, 
As Bernard grows up, and the novel-progresses, more 
and more fragments that have 'Bernard' as their signature 
emerge:. he is most himself to himself composed of many 
different parts, nand so there is no one Bernard,. (no 
, 
"what is called, rightly or wrongly" in Orlando "real self"). 
Bringing together his "shabby inmates", Bernard feels whole, 
but this wholeness is merely aggregation, not a divisionless 
synthesis. In Bernard is found an attitude to identity 
unlike any that has so far been described, because he 
welcomes his diversity; unity seems to repel him because 
he sees that wholes are illusions: 
- 
61 
- 
0 
- 
what am ,j? There is no stability in this 
world. Who is to say what meaning there is in 
anything ? Who is to foretell the flight of a 
word ? It is a balloon that sails over tree-tops. 
To speak of knowledge is futile. All is experiment 
84 and adventure. 
Bernard, the writer, sees through the 'veil-of words, " 
but rejoices in their capacity for giving at'least a 
sense of wholeness to a-world in which only apparitions can 
act: 
I feel at once, as I sit down at a table, the 
delicious jostle of confusion, of uncertainty, 
of possibility, of speculation. Images breed 
instantly. I am embarrassed by my own fertility. 
I could describe every chair, table, luncher 
here copiously, freely. My mind hums hither 
84 and thither with its veil of words for everything. 
Words fix as immutable a reality that is constantly 
changing, giving us a foundation for identity. 
In the character of Bernard it is realised that 
identity cannot be fixed by the 'I'; he does not know his 
identity as a unity, but never tires of describing its 
perpetual changes: 
For there is; nothing to lay hold-of. I am made 
and remade continually. Different people 
96 draw different words from me. 
As life continues Bernard becomes increasingly aware of 
how identity depends almost entirely upon circumstances. 
There are moments when a single identity dominates, under 
the influence of a particular event, such as when he has 
-62= 
his"proposal of marriage accepted; 
I, who have been since Monday, charged in 
80 every nerve'with'a sense of identity. 
In the street, in the crowd, he tries to shake off this 
enclosing singularity and let identity sink down, to' 
become "like everybody else", but this is impossible for 
one who'so persistently reflects on his own identity: 
One cannot extinguish that ' persistent smell. 
It steals in through some crack in the structure - 
one's identity. I am not part of the street - no, 
82,1 observe the street. One splits off, therefore. - 
Identity closes off things as they are, for everything 
is experienced by a particular identity. Thus the world 
appears as an enormously complicated assembly of reflections, 
in which 'V exist only as the result of influences 
co-lour. ed_ by other 'I's, which in their turn are formed by 
reflection. Identity as a single, firmly grasped unity 
called 'I' no longer exists: 
To be myself (I note) I need the illumination 
of other people's eyes, and therefore cannot 
83 be entirely sure what is myself. 
From this fascinating doubt Bernard becomes yet another 'I', 
the 'I' of his soliloquies, observing all the others. The 
world for Bernard becomes so familiar that eventually he 
no longer questions it, seeming to accept that 'I' is 
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never fixed: 
We are all swept on by the torrent of things 
grown so familiar that they cast no shade; we 
make no comparisons; think scarcely ever of I 
153 or you. 
To "explain to you the meaning of my life" (168), 
Bernard can only continue to tell stories, but "none of 
them are true". (169). Talking of his friends, Bernard 
tells his guest (who must listen for all of us) how 
they have contributed, to him, made him what he is (196,199). 
As he tells his story, he emphasises that he is merely 
fabricating (as already noted, VW often seems to, write 
against herself): 
Let us again pretend that life is a solid 
substance, shaped like a globe, which we turn 
about in our fingers. Let us pretend that we 
can make out a plain and logical story, so that 
when one matter is despatched - love for 
instance 
- 
we go on, in an orderly manner, 
178 to the next. 
To do anything but merely exist (like a tree) we 
must make up stories; as soon as we dip into the great 
bran-pie we alter it for ever, but we pretend we have 
left it just as it was. Again the nothingness of an 
absolute self is implied. Bernard echoes the others' 
soliloquies in the smallest details, showing that what is 
Bernard himself is indistinguishable from what is Louis, 
finny, Susan, Neville, or Rhoda, those others whose lives 
The Waves traces. Nevertheless, "if there are no stories, 
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what end can there be, or what beginning ?" (189). Bernard 
incessantly spins out words, because 
It is the effort and the struggle, it is the 
perpetual warfare, it is the shattering and 
piecing together 
- 
this is the daily battle, 
191 defeat or victory, the absorbing pursuit. 
Even as he says this he sees through his "veil of wards": 
"The true order of things 
- 
this is our perpetual illusion - 
is now apparent" (193). 
Bernard's experience of the "world seen without a 
self" is an attempt to be in the world without any 
apparitions: to experience a moment of being from the 
position of the nothing that it has been implied 'is' 
the self: 
"But how describe the world seen without a self 7 
There are no words. Blue, red 
- 
even they 
distract, even they hide with thickness instead 
204 of letting the light through. 
Again, it is language that comes between knowledge and 
experience: only an apparition can speak'to us, and 
only words can tell the story of the "world seen without 
a self", which puts it among apparitions and so denies 
as it affirms. 
* 
The Waves exposes a gulf between language and reality 
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that is rarely faced in fiction. This, and the wider 
question it implies of the relationship between life and 
art, will be returned to in a later discussion of The 
Waves (see below, Ch. 4: ii). Before that consideration, 
however, I wish to describe further the context of We 
enquiry. 
f 
- 
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Notes to-Chapter Two 
1. ' (p. 49) An interesting comment on VW's idea of "reality" 
is found in A Room of One's Own (1929), written straight 
after Orlando: 
What is meant by "reality",? It would seem to 
be something very erratic, very undependable - now 
to be found in a dusty road, ' now in a 
. 
scrap of 
newspaper in the street, now a daffodil in the 
sun. It lights up a group-in a room and stamps 
some casual saying. It overwhelms ane walking 
home beneath the stars and makes the silent 
world more real than the world of snee, ch - and, 
then there it is again'in an omnibus in the 
uproar of Piccadilly. Sometimes, too, it seems 
to dwell'in shapes-too far away for us to discern 
what their nature is. But whatever it touches, 
it fixes and makes permanent. That is what 
remains over when the skin of'the day; has'=been 
cast into the hedge;, that is what is left of 
past time and of our loves and hates. Now"the 
writer, as. I think, has the chance to live more 
than other people in the presence of this 
reality. It is his business to find it and 
165-6 
-collect it and communicate to the rest of us. 
(my italics) 
2. (p. 51) University of Toronto Quarterly,. xxx, 4, July, 
1961: 
-pp. '345-365 
3.. (p. 56) of. 'Walter Sickert' (1934): 
Yet it may be, they went on, that thereis a, 
CE'II', zone of silence in. the middle of every art. 
Z36 The artists themselves live init. 
4.: (57)' Samuel Butler, The Note-Books of Samuel Butler, 
-selections arranged and edited by 
H. F. Jones, (1912; 
Cape, 1921), p. 93; 'quoted by 
-A. McLaurin,. Virginia Woolf 9 p. 8 
5. (p. 57)In conversation with Georges Dethuit, Samuel 
Beckett said-he felt, 
67 
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Chapter Three 
Relationship and Communication 
To be is to be with others, just as it is to, be.., in 
time,, andto 'live' a body. It is.. in relationships with 
others that the possibilities and limitations of human 
being are realised, and it is against the background 
of others that, individual identity stands out. 
-The most 
typical relationships of VW's novels are between two. 
people-only; there, isv of course, interest in the,, 'party 
consciousness', but the most frequent relationship is 
between two: husband-and wife, parent and. childv lovers, 
friends, meeting with a stranger, an old and a young 
person, male and female - these are the most common foci... 
All VW's work is, concerned with. knowledge,, or, theimpossibility 
of, knowledge;,. in relationships, knowledge can only be 
gained. from-communication,. and it is this aspect of- 
relating, to others that is featured most prominently. 
, 
"Communication is health; communication is happiness, ", (MD, 
104) but it is also deeply unsatisfactory. 
The Voyage Out, VW's first novel, 
- 
written in the, 
period. of her courtship by various suitors, including.. 
Leonard Woolf, and her eventual marriage to him 
- 
treats 
largely of engagement and marriage, as does her second 
book, Night and Day. This, relationship,. as presented in 
these novels, is fundamentally joyless. The characters 
involved display atrophied feelings and existential 
unsuitability for one another., Although this perspective 
- 
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varies throughout the novels, the-idea that conventional 
love between men and women leads to isolation is prevalent 
in all of them. In The Voyage Out and Night and ý the 
conventions within which such love is forced to operate 
are explored and shown to constrain individual inclinations. 
In The Voyage Out VW shows up, by contrast with the 
vital new language of her perceptions, the fragmented, 
empty noises people make merely to cover over silence. 
Often in the novel, silence between people is shown as 
uneasy, and yet speech too is an "awkwardness" (36). 
When two old acquaintances meet on a ship they do not 
really converse. Ridley Ambrose and Mr. Pepper repeat 
a formula perfected3n a Cambridge common-room - "Jenkinson 
of Peterhouse ? 
... 
Jenkinson of Cats ? 
... 
" 
- 
an exchange 
that leaves them disgruntled, conscious of their hollowness. 
The hopeless distance between people is felt when, over 
six or seven pages, The Times is the centre of an aimless 
group who clutch at it to save themselves from having to 
speak to each other. The newspaper ends on the floor, 
surrounded by ladies, reduced to a Babel of voices. The 
'conversation' over these pages is a fragmentary caco- 
phony of newspaper clippings: 
"It's not gone well ?" asked his wife solicitously. 
Hewet picked up one sheet and read, "A lady was 
walking yesterday in the streets of Westminster 
when she perceived a famished cat-in the window 
of a deserted house. The famished animal 
-" 
"I'shall be out of it anyway, " Mr. Thornbury 
interrupted peevishly. 
- 
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"Cats are often forgotten, " Miss Allan remarked. 
"Remember, William, the Prime Minister has 
reserved his answer, " said Mrs. Thornbury. 
132 "At the age of eighty, Mr. Joshua Harris 
.... 
Words have become merely shapes to fill a lack in people's 
lives, devoid of any meaningful relations. 
Many of the characters who populate the hotel on the 
island of Santa Marina, where most of the navel is sat, 
are concerned with engagement and marriage. Susan Warrington, 
having just become engaged, repeats over and over to herself, 
"I'm happy, " as if by chanting the words she can enforce 
the actuality they should represent: now that she is to 
be married she must be happy, for there is no other hope 
of happiness offered to her by the prevailing conventions. 
Marriage is seen as putting astop to an individual's 
ambitions, worse for women than for men, in Terence Hewet's 
view (though he does say of Susan and her fiance, Arthur, 
"Well, we may take it for granted that they're engaged. 
D'you think he'll ever fly, or will she put a stop to- 
that V' [63ý. 
Marriage as a convention inextricably ingrained in 
the life of the crowd is introduced early in the novel. 
Helen and Rachel's first conversation is immediately 
suggestive of a world in which the whole tendency of a 
young girl's life must be towards marriage: 
"She is afraid you will spoil your forearms 
if you insist upon so much practising. " 
"The muscles of the forearm 
- 
and then one 
won't marry ?" 
"She didn't put it quite like that, " replied 
13 Ihrs. Ambrose 
- 
71 
- 
It is a, significant mark of how deeply ingrained the 
conventions are that this acceptance of roles is 
displayed in conversation. between women; it. is expressed 
again further on: 
But how you will enjoy it 
- 
someday! 
"I shall enjoy walking with a man - is that 
what you. mean V' said Rachel. 
... 
"I wasn't thinking of a man particularly, " 
said Clarissa. "But you will. " 
"No. I shall never marry, " Rachel determined. 
64 "I shouldn't be so sure of that, " said Clarissa. 
Rachel is unconvinced by these assurances that she will 
some day join the hallowed company of married women. 
The "prosperous matrons" (6D) make her indignant, feel 
excluded and "motherless" (an indication, perhaps, of how 
Rachel's, own mother's death has made her feel apart from 
the world at large). 
Dalloway's violent forced kiss deepens her confusion, 
leading her to feel she lives with (or in) a constant 
invitation to men to ravish her 
-a feeling that first 
becomes clear in the nightmare that follows.. 
Physical expressions of love (or lust) are usually 
associated with pain and fear in The Voyage Out. Evelyn,.. 
M. relates to Rachel a kiss that is a faint copy of Dalloway's: 
And then he caught me and kissed me 
- 
the 
disgusting brute 
-I can still feel his nasty 
301 hairy face just there 
- 
When Arthur proposes to Susan his speech is "positively 
- 
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painful" to her; Susan '' ry 
lay back upon the ground, with her eyes shut 
and an absorbed look upon her face, as though 
she were not altogether conscious. Nor could 
you tell from her expression whether she was 
163 happy, or had suffered something. 
When Rachel and Terence declare their love, this'pain is 
intense: 
"Terrible 
- 
terrible, " she murmured, after another 
pause, but in saying this she was thinking as= 
much of the persistent churning of the water 
as of her own feeling. On and on it went 
in the distance, the senseless and cruel 
churning of the water. She observed that the 
332 tears were running down Terence's cheeks. 
When Rachel and Terence become more intimate it is 
unsurprising'that Rachel's'sensations at the start'"häd' 
no name". 'Her experience is so totally-new to her that. 
she cannot fit it into any of the conventions she knows. 
When they eventually declare their love for one another 
there is a sense of overwhelming struggle, of 'a great 
labour to bring to birth some new feeling; their words 
are heavy with the effort of attempting to charge language 
deadened by convention with their own vitality. The 
setting is suitably prehistoric -4 a jungle - "Silence 
seemed to have fallen upon the world" :" 
""We love each other, " said Terence. 
332 "We love each other, " she replied. 
- 
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Resignation dominates here; they have seen how "love" is 
depersonalising, leading to sacrifice and complacency, 
and above all they must overcome the great weight of 
convention that is rooted in the very language with which 
they express their feelings. It is noteworthy that1 this 
exchange appears not so much"as an expression of love 
( as 'I love you' would be), as a report of a state of 
affairs that must bO accepted for better or worse. The 
world of convention, represented by such as Arthur and 
Susan, exerts a strong pressure, on Rachel in particular: 
"Terrible 
- 
terrible, " she murmurs, thinking perhaps of 
the awful world of-aimlessness and cruelty she found at 
the hotel. 7- 
A telling support for Rachel's fears is that Terence 
begins, with the prospect of a wife, to speak in a language 
which has been shown earlier in the novel tobe essentially 
male, and which we could earlier have expected him to 
abhor: 
"But you'll never see it! " he exclaimed; "because 
with all your virtues you don't, and you never 
will, care with every fibre of your being for 
the pursuit of truth! You've no respect for 
361 facts, Rachel; you're essentially feminine. " 
The masculine domination 
,. 
of. the female in We novels is 
a common feature. From the start, the female world-view 
is smothered and undermined by the sterile arrogance of 
men. In every one of the novels this antithesis and conflict 
is prominent, and as the fiction progresses it becomes 
- 
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clear that this is not merely a 'feminist' position 
(although the novels certainly propound the idea that the 
only truly radical politics is sexual politics), but 
suggests a basic difference in the way men and women 
perceive and experience the world. In The Voyage Out 
the gulf between Rachel's perceptions and the prevailing 
conventions is extremely deep. 
* 
Night and Day is also about love and marriage. It 
is concerned with the question of how we can know feelings 
for others are 'real'. In a letter to Janet Case, VW 
wrote of her intentions in the book: 
... 
and then there's the whole question, which 
interested me, again too much for the book's 
sake, I daresay, of the things one doesn't 
say; what effect does that have ? and how 
-far do our feelings take their colour from 
L. II the dive underground, I mean, what is the 
400 
- 
reality of any feeling ? (19.11.1919) 
The novel's heroine, Katharine Hilbery, inherits 
Terence Hewet's view of marriage as a prison in which 
the couple is walled-up in a warm firelit room. Katharine's 
deeply pessimistic conclusion is that, "after all 
... 
what 
is-, love" if, not the mute acceptance of convention: 
But waking, she-was able to contemplate a 
perfectly loveless marriage as the thing one 
did actually in real life, for possibly the 
- 
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people who dream thus are those who do the most 
108 prosaic things. 
Ironically, even as she condemns the "undeniable prose" 
of life Katharine surrenders to it, continuing a relation- 
ship 
- 
even reviving it after having once escaped - with 
someone whom she finds herself almost totally out of sympathy 
with: William Rodney. Katharine's view that marriage can 
only be a sham is corroborated by her mother, who tells 
her the story of how a harsh Hilbery ancestor forced a 
young girl to marry: 
But that old tyrant never repented. She used 
to say that she had given them three perfect 
months, and no one had the right to more; and- 
I sometimes think, Katharine, that's true, 
-you know. It's more than most. of us have, only 
119 we have to pretend, 
... 
As was seen in The °Vo ae Out, convention also dictates 
to men. 
- 
Ralph Denham, who is involved in a triangular 
relationship with Katharine and Mary Datchet,, would like 
to believe in there being 'something more' to life, but 
his experience insists that he think otherwise, even though 
this strongly opposes a feeling within him: 
- 
... 
with the pessimism which his lot forced upon 
him, Ralph had made up his mind that there was 
no use for what, contemptuously enough, he 
129 called dreams, in the world which we inhabit. 
- 
It is his experience of the conventional, the actual world 
of the crowd, that makes Ralph the mixture he is, confused 
- 
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and belligerent. Againras in'the preceding work, the 
fault does not lie with the individual, insofar as he 
or-she'is conditioned by the prevailing world-view that 
comes into being through complacency, - insecurity, and the 
failure to make the effort required tooachieve individual 
identity. St. John Hirst, in the earlier work, is as much 
a victim of a single-visioned, narrow system as Rachel 
Vinrace. 
Ralph Denham's rigid device of dividing his mind 
into compartments makes him unpopular at his office, and 
inept in relations outside it: his dreams are a bitter 
reaction to the constraints of everyday life, and he 
remains always conscious of the antagonism between the 
two. Acceptance of life 'as it is' leads to empty silence 
and the perpetuation of that state of things because 
communication is thereby denied. Mary Datchet and Ralph 
each believe there is no point in talking to the other of 
their affections, and so those affections peter out (134); 
Katharine believes Ralph and Mary to have an uncomplicated 
relationship which prevents them from seeing the difficulties 
she undergoes living with her parents. An overall sense 
of the inadequcy of human relations pervades VW's first 
two novels; there seems no possibility of intimacy or 
knowledge between people. 
To get away from the pressure of what she sees as her 
inevitable union with William Rodney, Katharine falls into 
"a dream state, in which she became another person, and the 
whole world seemed changed'. ' (144). This'mauvaise foi 
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is observed in-many characters in situations they feel 
threatened by. Katharine's dreamworld has no contact with 
the actual; Ralph, on the other hand, must always be in 
control, always be careful to "prevent too painful a 
collision between what he dreamt of her and what she was" 
(150). Ralph's dreams are clearly delusions, as Katharine 
bluntly tells him: 
Being yourself very inexperienced and very 
emotional, -you go home and invent a story about 
me, and-now you can't separate me from the-person 
you've imagined me to be. You call that, 
I suppose, being in love; as a matter of fact 
404 it's being in delusion. 
Deeper than this, it is implied that love can only be this 
sort of delusion because we can only tell, 
-stories-about, 
others; if there is no absolute identity, but only 
apparitions, ýhow can it, be said that we know another ? 
At the moment when Katharine tries to overcome illusions 
and compromise, and tells William that she cannot marry 
him, her security is assaulted by the powerful conventions 
she-seeks to escape. William immediately demands an 
'explanation'-for her preposterous-statement, and there 
comes a familiar sense-of frustration at not being able 
to communicate, to another the feeling that there is 
'something more' to life than these dull processes: 
Why indeed ?A moment of pessimism, a sudden 
conviction of the undeniable prose of life, a 
lapse of the illusion which sustains youth 
midway between heaven and earth, a desperate 
- 
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attempt to reconcile herself with facts 
she could only recall a moment, as of 
waking from a dream, which now seemed to her 
a moment of surrender. But who could give 
reasons such as these for doing what she had 
244-5 done ? She shook her head very sadly. 
Faced with the view that she "couldn't" have said she would 
marry him if she-had not loved him, 'Katharine begins to 
give in: 
What'were his'faults in'comparison with the- 
fact that he cared for her ? What were her 
virtues in comparison with'the fact that she did 
not care for him ? In a flash the conviction 
that not to care is the uttermost sin'of all, 
stamped itself upon her inmost thoughts; and she 
255 felt herself branded forever. 
This is the constraint that convention puts upon relation- 
ship, and upon communication: not to love within the 
structure imposed on life by the crowd is to be an outcast. 
Katharine agrees to marry William because she is 
overcome with guilt'at not caring for him and upsetting 
he who cares for her so much (she believes). Almost 
as ä parallel to this, 'Ralph asks Mary to marry him, 
firstly because he has lost Katharine-; 'and then 
because he feels so ashamed of his behaviour towards 
Mary. ' The links between the two proposals are reinforced 
by a verbal similarity in the description of Katharine and 
Ralph's attitude to love: Katharine feels that- 
'" to marry someone with whom you are not in love' 
is an inevitable step in a world where the existence 
- 
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of passion is only a traveller's story brought 
from the heart of deep forests and told so 
rarely that wise people doubt whether the 
226 story can be true. 
Of love Ralph says: 
It's only a story one makes up in one's mind 
about another person, and one knows all the 
265 time it isn't true. 
A remark of Ralph's 
- 
"... it seems to me that the risk 
of marrying a person you're in love with is something 
colossal" 
- 
seems to focus on the profound sense of the 
futility of relationships in Night and Day. Ralph, who 
divides his mind into compartments, who lives by the light 
of-reason, comes up against a world that does not fit into 
his plan, and his reaction is a confused and impotent 
anger. ' The man of reason has no means to cope with an 
unreasonable world: "He was trapped by the illogicality- 
of human life. " His sister Joan's vision of him as "the 
victim of one of those terrible theories of right and wrong 
which were current at., the time" (128) seems accurate. In 
drawing such distinctions between men and women it can 
be understood that VW is making a 'philosophical' point: 
the rational male view excludes much of the experience 
of human being available to the intuitive, non-discursive 
female view, and yet it. -asserts itself as the more compre-- 
hensive understanding of the world. 
Language is important in the matter of the conventions 
that dictate the form of relationships, for it is in words 
- 
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that convention is enshrined. For the most part, the 
characters of VW's second novel are very careful in 
what they say to each other: Ralph's division between 
what can and can not be discussed with Mary Datchet 
typifies this caution. Discussion of great English poets 
seems frequently to be the nearest possible approach to 
intimacy (e. g. 190). The question of what 'love' is 
vexes several characters, and the difficulties that the 
attempt to define love causes (and, indeed, the attempt 
itself) are symptomatic of the rigid convention. The 
"love that results in engagement and marriage" is viewed 
rather cynically, and this cynicism often dominates in 
the question of the nature of love: 
If love is a devastating fire which melts the 
whole being into one mountain torrent, Mary was 
no more in love with Denham than she was in 
love with her poker or her tongs. But probably 
these extremes of passion are very rare; and 
the state of mind thus depicted belongs to the 
very last stages of love, when the power to 
resist has been eaten away, week by week or 
136-7 day by day. 
For Mary, the word 'love' seems to matter very little, its 
force having been dissipated through being so long applied 
to illusions: 
It seemed a mere toss-up whether she said "I 
love you, " or whether she said "I love the beech- 
230 trees, " or only "Ilove 
-I love. " 
- 
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It is, though, between Katharine and William that the 
language of affection looms largest as a problem, and that 
it is a serious problem is demonstrated in the crucial 
eighteenth chapter: 
"And ife, I say. that I care foryouu, don't you 
believe me ?" 
"Say it, Katharine! Say it as if you meant it! 
Make me feel that you care for me. " 
253 She could not force herself to speak a word. 
Language will not come to William's rescue, nor to Katharines, 
for, as will be seen below, her idea of love is not cloaked 
in language. 'Love' imposes a_painful confinement on 
Katharine and William: I 
As to the psychological problem, " he continued, 
as if the question interested, him in a detached 
way, "there's no doubt, I think, that either of 
us is capable of feeling what, for reasons of 
simplicity, I call romance for a third person - 
302 at least, I've little doubt in my own case 
The state of their love and the question of the lease on 
a new house are approached by William on a single level, 
appallingly ignorant of the woman he professes to care so 
much for. This scene continues with a feeble discussion 
about the nature of this "romance for a third person, " 
contrasting sharply with Katharine's struggling instinct 
that there is something more: 
Ah, but her romance wasn't that romance. It was 
a desire, an echo, a sound; she could drape it in 
colour, hear it in music, but not in words; no, 
- 
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never in words. She sighed, teased by desires 
303 so incoherent, so incommunicable 
Ralph stumbles on the word 'love' to encapsulate his 
feelings almost by accident, the idea of asking Mary to 
marry him seeming to emerge, from a background of 
"disconnected ramblings" at the inn where they are lunching. 
When he labels his feelings for Katharine with the 
conventional term his confusion is dispelled: 
It was the first time he had used the word "love" 
to describe his feeling; madness, romance, 
hallucination 
-. 
he had called it by these names, 
before; but having, apparently, by accident, 
stumbled upon the word "love" he repeated it 
again and again with a sense of revelation.... 
His feelings were justified and needed no further 
409 explanation. 
However, when he tells Mary of, his discovery the word is 
already losing its revelatory magic: 
He spoke the word, but as he spoke it, it seemed 
413 robbed of substance. 
He now begins to think his feelings do not fit the word 
after all; 'love' has been sent out into the actual world as 
soon as Ralph utters its and as such it immediately 
enters the system of ineluctable convention enshrined in 
language. His suspicions are confirmed when he actually 
tells Katharine that he loves her: 
- 
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Some roundness or warmth essential to that 
448 statement was absent from his voice. 
As with Katharine and William, the definition of love 
proves impossible, exposing their futility: but "what other 
word describes the state we're in ?" 
Relationship, it appears, is bound by language, 
unable to be realised except through the conventional 
modes language dictates. In her role as Fool Mrs. Hilbery 
has a telling comment: 
Names aren't everything; it's what we feel that's 
508 everything. 
Feelings have become unreal to Ralph, however; like 
Katharine early in the novel, he seems resigned to a life 
in which illusion is the only "reality": 
You can force me to talk as if this feeling 
for you were an hallucination, but all our 
feelings are that. The best of them are 
316 half illusions. 
As he asks elsewhere, if others do not believe in the 
feelings we hold closest to us, "What reality is left us ?" 
The world that emerges from the first two novels is one 
in which any relationship that is not an illusion seems 
quite impossible: 
"In what can one trust ? Not in men and'wcmen. 
Not in one's dreams about them. There's 
- 
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163 nothing- 'nothing; nothing left at all. 
* 
There is not a broad spectrum or variety of types 
of relationship in We novels. The inward-looking tendency 
of most of the characters precludes any view of society, 
at large, but to'write of that would, in any case, be'to 
write of the crowd. Relationships presented in the novels 
are often deeply flawed, marked by a strong sense of the 
inadequacy of communicaticn'andýthe hopelessness of love. 
Against this, as we might expect, is a coünter=movemgnt: `- 
life is endlessly exciting, offering fresh possibilities 
ät"every moment: 
Every time the door opened and fresh people 
., 
came in, those already in the room shifted 
slightly; those who were standing looked over 
their shoulders; those who were sitting stopped 
in the middle of sentences. What with the light, 
the wine, the strumming of a guitar, something 
JR exciting happened each time the door opened. 
109 Who was coming in ?. 
The characters of Jacob's Room, as Leonard Woolf 
noticed, are all ghosts; their contacts form "spiritual 
shapes" that shift and splinter, never enduring. A mood 
UW recorded in her diary seems to dominate the novel: 
"Why is life so tragic; so like a little strip of pavement 
over an abyss" (D. II, 72; 25.10.1920). The diary mood is 
- 
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directly reflected in the novel: 
What does one fear ?- the human eye. At-once 
80 the pavement narrows, the chasm deepens. 
I have said above, that apparitions are all that can 
be known in the actual world. In this novel, the effect 
of this on human relations is pervasive: 
Nobody sees anyone as hb is 
... 
They see a whole - 
28-9 they see all sorts of things 
- 
they see themselves... 
Life surrounds us as a network of "wires and tubes"; 
letters pass, telephones ring, visits are made 
- 
as they- 
are throughout all the novels 
- 
but all this communication 
serves to cover the emptiness of being unable to know:, 
others as 'I'. Language contaminates: for example, Jacob 
must not say that he loves Clara Durrant: "No, nog no,... 
don't break 
- 
don't spoil' 
- 
what ? Something infinitely 
wonderful" (70); and, we may add, unnameable. 
Jacob's Room reflects the "blowing this way and that" 
of life; relationships are fleeting, observed obliquely 
by the shifting narrator. Relationship is marked by a 
longing for unspoken intimacy, not that silent understanding 
that grows up between a husband and wife from habit, that 
VW alluded to as early as The Voyage Out, but a more 
perfect knowledge of others. Jacob's encounter in Greece 
with Sandra Wentworth Williams is an image of the nature 
of relationships: 
- 
86 
- 
For she could not stop until she had told him 
- 
or heard him say 
- 
or was it some action on 
his part that. she required ? Far away on the 
158 horizon she discerned it and could not rest. 
The horizon moves perpetually as one moves towards its 
and so it is. in relationships: they are characterised 
by a yearning for an impossible consummation. This part 
of Jacob's Room 
- 
his trip to. Greece 
- 
is heavy with the 
sense of life's transience and a thought felt throughout 
Ws works that nothing remains of relationships. The 
'metaphysical' desire to escape the bounds of physical 
life is implied in Jacob's gift to Sandra of the poems 
of Donne: 
They had vanished. There was the Acropolis; 
but had they reached it ? The columns and the 
Temple remain; the emotion of the living 
breaks fresh onthem year after year; and of 
that what-remains? 
As for reaching the Acropolis who shall say 
that we ever do its or that when Jacob woke 
next morning he found anything hard and durable 
160 to keep forever ? 
* 
The failure of relationships, specifically of love, to 
"make of the moment something permanent" continues to be 
an important. theme in Mrs. Dalloway. One of Clarissa's 
most vivid memories is of her youthful passion for her 
- 
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friend Sally Seton, and an occasion on which Sally kissed 
her. This special moment is significantly imaged by 
Clarissa as the receiving of something tangible: 
And she felt that she had been given a present, 
wrapped up, and told just to keep it, not to 
look at it 
-a diamond, something infinitely 
precious, wrapped up, which, as they walked (up and down, up and down), she uncovered, 
or the radiance burnt through, the revelation, 
40 the religious feeling! 
- 
This "religious feeling" is a momentary experience of that 
perfection of relationship that is longed-for in the 
novels. It cannot persist in the actual world, but passes 
as all moments do. The feeling does, however, remain in 
Clarissa's memory, a mode of being that overcomes 
spatio-temporal horizons. The diamond is a symbol of 
unity (not just in this novel); it is recalled when 
Clarissa 'points' herself at her mirror (42). The moment 
with Sally is destroyed when Peter Walsh intrudes. It is, 
though, the source of Clarissa's longing for a perfect 
union. Possessed by that wonder at simply being at all 
that is a feature of all the novels, Clarissa wishes to 
combine people, in an effort to create a whole she can 
only imagine: 
Here was So-and-so in South Kensington; some 
one up in Bayswater; and `somebody else, say, 
in Mayfair. And she felt quite continuously 
a sense of their existence; and she felt what's 
waste; and she felt what a pity; and she felt 
if only they could be brought together; so she 
0 
- 
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-did-it. And it was an offering; to combine, 
134-5 to create; but to whom ? 
Her judgements remain "superficial 
... 
fragmentary", yet 
if she can put the fragments together she feels a gestalt 
may be formed. 
The desire to combine with others is not confined 
to Clarissa; the provincial diners at Pater Walsh's 
hotel have a "desire, pulsing in them, tugging at them 
subterraneously, somehow to establish connections" (175). 
Peter Walsh, taken into the little world of the Morris 
family for a moment, feels contentment in the seeming 
wholeness of their relationships. The family is a system 
that sustains life over the "abyss". Similar to it is 
"that network of visiting, leaving cards, being kind to 
people" (86) that is Clarissa's way of sustaining life, 
of creating a complex over the emptiness she feels lies 
at the heart of things. Such complexes form, break 
and reform perpetually: strangers glance at one another, 
or are united by perceptions (as in the episodes of the 
mysterious car and the skywriting aeroplane), but only 
momentarily. The horizon of time prevents wholes from 
forming, prevents the perfection of relationship because 
identity is always in a state of flux 
To Rezia Warren Smith love "makes one solitary" (27), 
and to Clarissa love is a "monster"; and yet love combines, 
and in the first flush of passion seems to transcend the 
reflecting apparitions of everyday life. Clarissa scoffs 
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at Peter being "sucked under in his little bow-tie", 
but "in her heart she felt, all the same; he is in love. 
He has that, she felt; he is in love" (50). Whatever 
its status, love has the power of widening the pavement 
over the abyss, but only for a moment. Marriage weaves 
a cocoon round Clarissa in which she can "crouch like a 
bird and gradually revive" (203). She understands that 
Richard wishes to tell her that he loves her without his 
speaking (although his bunch of roses operates in the same 
way as words [ 303 ), but in their silence Richard and Clarissa 
are closed to each other. 
Whether we feel that we know nothing about others 
(as Sally Seton feels), or that we know everything (as 
Peter), relationships are characterised by a lack, by 
a pointing-up of our ultimate aloneness. Mrs. Dalloway 
is greatly concerned with communication and with relation- 
ships through time; memory affects present relationships 
and alters those of the past. As in Jacob's Room, there 
inheres in the book a longing to make a definite statement 
about a life that seems so amorphous. 
Clarissa has an inherent desire to combine, in the 
hope of somehow discovering a revelatory order to the world. 
As this hope is perpetually defeated, the combinative 
instinct doubles on itself: her parties become "An offering 
for the sake of offering, perhaps. " Peter wonders why 
he does as he does (58); there are no answers for him, 
only a drive to combine. Left too long in solitude, 
one's sense of individual identity begins to slip. The 
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urge to combine, then, is in order to, see one's 'own' 
reflection, basing one's own identity on the fact that 
one is with others. At the close of the novel Clarissa 
cannot bear solitude in the little room for long: "But 
she must go back. She must assemble. " (205, my italics)... 
* 
As a theme, relationship in To the Lighthouse is 
complex, although a sharply delineated pattern, with Mrs. 
Ramsay at the centre, is discernible. The relationship 
between Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay is 
, 
largely, unarticulated, 
and yet it is in a way the source of the moods and rhythms 
of the novel. Mrs. Ramsay is the prime exemplar of the 
female's combining powers and influence; more, even, than 
Clarissa, she has "that woman's gift, ofmaking a 
, 
world 
of, her own wherever she happened to be" (MD, 84-5). 
In the Ramsay's marriage is seen once more-the 
impossibility of reaching, another's solitude: Mr. Ramsay 
wants to protect his wife, but "he could not reach her, 
he could do nothing, to, help. her" (104). Men standing in 
a mysterious accord with "the, laws of the universe", Mrs. 
Ramsay accepts that her husband's "great mind" must feed 
on hers, shadowing it as if his mind were a giant hand 
blotting out the sun:,. 
So boasting of her capacity to surround and 
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protect, there was scarcely a shell of herself 63 left for her to know herself by. 
The seventh section of 'The Window' is almost entirely 
concerned with Mrs. Ramsay's sense of "the inadequacy 
of human relationships, that the most perfect was flawed. " 
Her solitude is broken into by the effort of combining, 
leaving her depleted and dejected, uncertain of her own 
being. Aware of this, she must still create, combine and 
offer, making matches because she sees potential in the 
union of two people for something whole and lasting. 
Marriage still is an unsatisfactory compromise in 
which one person 
- 
invariably the woman 
- 
must sacrifice 
her own wishes to serve her partners shortcomings. The 
remoteness of. firs. Ramsay's-reverie "pains" her husband 
because he feels that she does not need him. 
-He is 
mistaken, however, for she wishes upon herself his draining 
demands: "That was what she wanted 
- 
the asperity in 
his voice, 
-reproving her. " For anyone to-see that he 
needed her would upset Mrs. Ramsay's idea of how the world 
is, a concept against which her children quietly rebel. 
That-love cannot overcome human separateness is 
emphasised by lily's desire to-"make her and Mrs. Ramsay- 
one. " Lily Briscoe unifies the Ramsays witha label: 
So that is marriage, Lily thought, a man and-a 
114 woman looking at a girl throwing a ball. 
Near the end of the book Lily thinks back on her previous 
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visit (305) and realises that there can be no way of 
simplifying their relationship. It is in her memory of 
Mrs. Ramsay's silence that Lily comes to understand the 
imperfection of human relationships. Silence is not 
passive in VW's work; it questions language; silence 
'communicates' in its own mode. 
Mrs. Ramsay sat silent. She was glad, Lily 
thought, to rest in silence, uncommunicative; 
to, rest in the extreme obscurity of human 
relationships. Who knows what we are, what we 
feel ? Who knows even at the moment of 
intimacy, This is knowledge ? Aren't things 
spoilt then, Mrs. Ramsay may have asked (it 
seemed to have happened so often, this silence 
by her side) by saying them ? Aren't we more 
264-5 expressive thus ? 
Families, as is seen in the earlier novels, produce 
tensions of loyalty in their members. Ralph Denham, in 
Night and Day, has to wrest every moment of his privacy 
from the grasp of the family system; a desire to be alone 
is regarded with suspicion. Mr. Ramsay arouses extremes 
of passion in his children; their loyalties are divided 
not only between their mother and father but between 
each other and their parents. While Cam, sailing to 
the lighthouse with James and their father, loves him for 
all his eccentricity, she also hates his tyranny, which 
"poisoned her childhood. " Her affection finds no voice 
because her detestation of his insouciance always rises 
up to counter it. Cam is in a'position similar to"that 
Lily experienced with regard to William Bankes: how can 
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one ever say it is liking or disliking one feels if opinions 
about a single person so conflict ? James, too, hates 
"the twang and twitter of his father's emotion" for it 
"disturbs the perfect simplicity and good sense of his 
relations with his mother" (61). 
Despite this, Mr. Ramsay is a heroic figure, even for 
James. On the journey to the lighthouse James sees him 
as a personification of "that loneliness; which was for 
both of them the truth about things" (311). The ultimate 
solitude of individual being is once again realised in 
silence. There is a constant yearning for communication - 
when James is praised by his father, Cam sees immediately 
that his indifference is only feigned 
- 
but when contact 
is made, nothing endures; the moment passes to reassert 
essential loneliness: 
What do you want ? they both wanted to ask. 
They böth wanted to say, Ask us anything and 
we will give it you. But he did not ask them 
318 anything. 
Lily's opinion of marriage is familiar from the 
preceding novels: 
... 
she need not marry, thank Heaven: she need 
not undergo that degradation. She was saved 
159 from that dilution. 
And yet, despite this feeling that "there is nothing more 
tedious, puerile and inhumane than, love, " and that women 
-'94'- 
are worse off for it than men, most people, especially, 
thinks Lily, most women, see love as-"beautiful and necessary! '. 
This tension characterises the attitude to love in'the 
novels. Without love "life will run upon the rocks, "`" 
but with it "She would never know him. He would never 
know her. " Combination and creation wreathe an illusion 
around the emptiness at the heart of people, but without 
that there would be no life. - Only the mind speaking the 
novel sees the emptiness within: 
All of them bending themselves to listen thought, 
"Pray heaven that the inside of my mind may not 
be exposed, " for each thought, "The others 
are feeling this. They are outraged and indignant 
with the government about the fishermen. 
146 Whereas, I feel nothing at all. " 
*** 
It would be surprising if UW had not written about 
human relationships in her diary, and indeed those books 
are filled with speculations on people's characters and 
their interactions with her. There are two passages that 
I wish to examine, both of which can be related convincingly 
to the mood of Mrs. Galloway, although they were written 
some years later. That sense of something tangible 
I 
-95 - 
that Clarissa felt she received in Sally Seton's kiss 
is yearned for throughout the,. fiction. Lily Briscoe, 
in To the Lighthouse, longs for Mrs. Ramsay after her 
death, feeling that perhaps if she could demand it with 
enough force, 
beauty would roll itself up; the space would 
fill; those empty flourishes would form into 
277 shape: 
As I have said, human relationships are characterised 
by a lack, a sense that the longed-for knowledge of another 
can never be achieved. UW records this feeling in her 
diary: 
Eddy has just gone, leaving me the usual feeling: 
why is not human intercourse more definite, more 
tangible: why aren't I left holding a small 
round substance, say of the size of a pea, 
D. III in my hand; something I can put in a box and 
188 look at ? There is so little left. (8.8.1928) 
The sense of life's transience so prevalent in. the fiction 
evidently stems from VW's own experience. This long 
I 
reflection in her diary, for example, expounds thoughts 
that are familiar from as early as The Voyage Out (where 
Rachel Vinrace feels people may be patches of light crossing 
the surface of. the world, TVO, 358), and which become 
more and more central from Jacob's Room onwards. 
-96- 
Yet these people one sees are fabric only made 
once in the world; these contacts we have are. 
unique; & if Eddy were, say killed tonight-, 
nothing definite would happen to me; yet his 
substance is never again to be repeated. 
... 
it recurs with sadness to my mind: how little 
our relationships matter; and yet they are so 
important: in him, in me, something to him, to 
me, infinitely sentient, of the highest vividnass, 
reality. But if I died tonight, he too would 
continue. Something illusory then enters into 
all that part of life. I am so important to 
D. III myself: yet of no importance to other people: 
188 like the shadow passing over the downs. (8.8.1928) 
The vision of human relationships as a series of 
apparitions, each reflecting others, is familiar in the 
fiction. It is the fact of living through time, being 
thrown into a life that tends only towards death, that 
gives VW her sense that other people are ephemeral and 
unknown, and yet that they are the only hope of covering 
over the emptiness at the heart of life. To survive '" 
through time, a relationship must live in the memory, 
but there it will be altered, given a shape other than 
that which it has in the actual world because the modes 
of being in memory cannot be bound by time in the same 
way as those of life in the 'present'. This, too, VW 
records: 
And what remains of Eddy is now in some ways 
more vivid, though more transparent, all of him 
composing itself in my mind, all I could get 
D. III of him, and making a landscape appropriate to 
189 it; making a work of art for itself. (8.8.1928) 
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A work of art 
- 
especially a novel - is the creation of 
a world within' the actual world, a revelation of the 
possibility of a mode of existence not bound by the 
spatio-temporal horizons of actual life. 
Almost a year later, VW again writes in her diary of 
life's empty centre, seen. in moments when the illusion 
of relationship fails. There is an exact homology between 
the entry in the diary and a passage in Mrs. Dall oway where 
Peter Walsh suddenly feels that his-life is unreal. 
Standing alone in London (54 f. ). he is overcome by a 
sense that because Clarissa refused him his life has been 
meaningless, merely a habit forced on him by the flow 
of time. 
As a cloud crosses the sun, silence falls on 
London; and falls on the mind. Effort ceases. 
Time flaps on the mast. There we stop; there 
we stand. Rigid, the skeleton of habit alone 
upholds the human frame. Where there is nothing, 
Peter Walsh said to himself; feeling hollowed 
out, utterly empty within. Clarissa refused me, 
MD he thought. He stood there thinking, Clarissa 
55 refused me. 
Peter's "looking rather drearily into the glassy depths" (55) 
is exactly recalled in VW's diary in an entry made on 
returning from a: '-trip to France in 1929: 
And a sense of nothingness rolls about the 
house; what I call the sense of "Where there is 
nothing. " This is due to the fact that we came 
back from France last night & are not going 
round in the mill yet Time flaps on the mast 
- 
my own phrase I think 
. ... 
Time flaps on the 
mast. And then I see through everything. Perhaps 
the image ought to have been one that gives an 
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D. III idea of a stream becoming thin: of seeing to 
233 the bottom. 
.1 (15.6.1929) 
To live (in a positive, transitive sense) is a matter 
of effort in VW's eyes. Identity is formed in relating 
with others, and thereby a sense of purpose is bestowed 
an life; relationship widens the strip of pavement over 
the abyss. However, the shadows that we grasp at are 
known to be illusory, in the sense that they are impermanent 
and cannot share in the individual 'I' of each human being: 
Now time must not flap on the mast any more. 
Now I must brew another decoction of illusion. 
Well, if the human interest flags 
- 
if its that 
that worries me, I must not sit thinking about 
it here. I must make human illusion 
- 
ask 
someone in tomorrow after dinner; and begin that 
astonishing adventure with the souls of others 
D. III again 
- 
about which I know so little. Is it 
234 affection that prompts ? (15.6.1929) 
If identity in solitude fails so abruptly, something 
must be found to 'anchor' oneself in the world. It is 
from the ambivalence of her attitude to human relationships 
that arises the need in VW to find a faith'in something 
apart from those apparitions. This faith, though, is not 
always available, and at such times despair at the ultimate 
nothingness of existence, unrelieved by philosophical or 
religious comforts, takes over. 
*** 
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As in all the novels, in The Years (1937) the door 
keeps opening and people keep coming in. If we stop to 
wonder why we bother to combine and create, to talk and 
smile with strangers or loved ones, to feel jealousy or 
hatred, it seems it is to deny the loneliness and intensity 
of solitude, to diminish the forces of life: 
But one wants somebody to laugh with, she thought. 
Pleasure is increased by sharing it. Does the 
same hold good of pain ? she mused. Is that 
the reason why we all talk*so much of ill-health - 
because sharing things lessens things ? Give 
TY pain, give pleasure. an outer body, and by 
379 increasing the surface, diminish them. 
... 
Such sharing, though, is "a bit of a farce", as Peggy 
Pargiter realises when she talks with a young stranger 
at the family party that concludes the novel: 
She had heard it all before, I0I, I 
- 
he went 
on. 
... 
But why let him ? she thought, as he 
went an talking. For what do I care about his 
"I, I, I" ? Or his poetry ? Let me shake him off 
then, she said to herself, 
... 
She paused. He 
noted her lack of sympathy. He thought her 
stupid, she supposed. 
"I'm tired, " she apologised. "I've been up 
all night, " she explained. "I'm a doctor 
-" 
The fire went out of his face when she said "I". 
That's done it 
- 
now he'll go, she thought. 
He can't be "you" 
- 
he must be "I". She smiled. 
389 For up he got and off he went. 
The fault of the failula does not lie entirely with the 
young man, nor with Peggy, but with the structures of 
convention within which their contact is made; these 
structures are enshrined in language. Silence is forbidden 
--P1oo- 
by convention, but as has been seen earlier, silence 
can not become the covering over that language is. When 
silence gapes 
- 
"the immense vacancy of the primeval maw" 
- 
we must rush to fill the gap: "somebody has to say 
something or human society would cease" (408). Communi- 
cation is used not to reveal but to conceal-the abyss, 
dispelling silence but preserving the illusion of 
relationships: 
It's no go, North thought. He can't say what 
he wants to say; he's afraid. They're all 
afraid; afraid of being laughed. at; afraid of 
ivin themselves away. 
... 
We're all afraid 
of each other, he thought; afraid of what ? 
Of criticism; of laughter; of people who think 
differently. 
... ... 
That's what separates us; 
447 fear, he thought. 
(my italics) 
Relationships with others reveal the horizons within 
which life must inevitably go forward: the limitations 
of embodiment, of living in time. From the deep 
dissatisfaction with relationship that is so evident 
in the novels comes a drive to find meaning in solitude. 
Solitude, however, as is repeatedly seen, reveals the 
nothingness of the possibility of non-being. To find 
meaning in life in the novels is, then, an insoluble 
problem, at least in the context of the actual world of 
time and death. If there is any possibility of 
transcendence it will be realised in a mode of being totally 
other than that of the actual world. The movement towards 
such transcendence, however, begins in a radical questioning 
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of actual life: 
She was alone with Eleanor in the cab. And 
they were passing houses. Where does she 
begin, and where do I end ? she thought. 
... On they drove. They were two living people, 
driving across London; two sparks of life 
enclosed in two separate bodies;, and those 
sparks of life enclosed in two separate bodies 
are at this moment, she thought, driving past 
a picture palace. But what is this moment; 
and what are we ? The puzzle was too difficult 
360 for her to solve it. She sighed. 
Despite this apparently profound pessimism, it is 
true to say that We work is generally affirmative in 
character. For a counterbalance to that inadequacy 
of human relationships felt in the fiction, we must look 
to VW's view of the positive creative potential of art. 
***)E X 
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Notes to Chapter Three 
1. (p. 88) Cf. W. Iser,, The Implied Reader,, where he, 
writes the following in his chapter on 'Self-reduction': 
... 
past and present can never be. completely 
synthesised. Every incipient systematization 
is refuted by time, which as a new present 
exposes, the ephemeral nature of any such 
synthesis. But it is only through subjectivity 
itself that time takes'on its form of past, 
present, and future; the self is not the passive 
object of this process, but actually conditions 
it. With which of its states, 'then, is the 
self to be identified,? Is it that which 
existed in the. 'circumstances of the past, is 
it that which it is at'this moment in the present, 
or is it simply that force which constantly 
creates new connections and time relations 
but which, at the same time, constantly plunges 
every one of its visible manifestations'into 
the'maelstrom of. change ? The self is essentially 
incapable of completion, and this fact accounts 
both for its inadequacy and its richness, The 
knowledge that it can never be completely in 
possession of itself is'the hallmark of its 
144-5. consciousness. 
2: (p. 97) See also D. II, '72:, '25.10.1920: "I dont like 
time, to flap'. round me. " 
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Chapter' Four 
Art 
(i) Success 
VW wrote no lengthy manifesto of her artistic., 
principles, nor would she have claimed to be a theoretician, 
but she lived at a time of great upheaval in art, and was 
herself influenced by and a major force in the shift in 
the way we perceive the world that became apparent from 
the 1880's onwards. Even had she not been born a writer 
she could not have avoided thinking about the nature and 
purpose of art, surrounded as she was by the "great men" 
of the nineteenth and many iconoclasts of the twentieth 
centuries. Ideas have a way of influencing even those 
who have no direct contact with them; new thoughts 
seep into language, spreading far beyond those who experience 
their first formulations. In We work, for example, 
can be seen a concern with the relations between different 
arts, and with the possibilities of synaesthesia. 
Although England was perhaps rather isolated, cut off 
from the modernist movements of France and Germany by 
its relatively poor tradition of visual art, these 
movements did have some effect. One point of origin 
for the general shift in vision might be found in 
Richard Wagner's dream of a Gessamkunstwerke, an idea 
which finds expression in varying forms amongst artists 
from the late nineteenth century onwards. The widespread 
experimentation with colour and shapelto express sensations 
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and perceptions, was a movement towards a synaesthetic 
art. In the early part of the twentieth century, Wassily 
Kandinsky and other artists of the Blaue Reiter group in 
Munich were engaged in the search for a common spiritual 
basis in the arts. Kandinsky, in Concerning the Spiritual 
in Art (1911), wrote of the psychological effect of colour: 
Generally speaking, colour directly influences 
the soul. Colour is the keyboard, the eyes are 
the hammers,. the soul is the piano with many 
strings. The artist'is the hand that plays, 
touching one key or another purposively, to 
cause vibrations in the soul. 
It is evident therefore that colour harmony 
must rest ultimately on purposive playing 
upon the human soul: this is one1 of the uidin 
principles of internal necessity. 
Nearly thirty years later, Kandinsky was still thinking 
of a unity of all the arts: 
All the arts derive from the same and unique 
root. 
Consequently, all the arts are identical. 
But the mysterious and precious fact is that 
the 'fruits' produced by the same trunk are 
different2. 
Even had UW never heard the names of, say, Cezanne, 
Kandinsky, Platisse, Debussy, Scriabin, Mallarme, their 
influence would have touched her deeply. In fact she was 
in an excellent position to view the sweeping changes 
wrought by the European modernist movement. There were 
many routes by which she could receive the traffic of 
ideas from Europe. In 1904 Clive Bell was in touch with 
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the Nabis, Post-Impressionists, Gauguin and Cezanne in 
Paris; in 1919 he met Derain, Braque, Cocteau at al.. 
Although hampered by a rather formal, classical training 
and the general English reaction. against German symbolist 
painting and music, Duncan Grant and Vanessa Bell were 
much in sympathy with their European counterparts; the 
influence of Fauvism and Cubism on the Omega Workshop 
is evident, and the former can be discerned in the 
tropical setting of The Voyage Out. Scriabin was well- 
publicised when he visited London before the war; 
Duncan Grant was partly inspired by the announcement of 
a concert of his music (to be accompanied by changing 
coloured lights) to paint a roll, 
nearly fifteen feet in length, eleven inches 
high and composed of seventeen sections of 
pasted paper shapes, with paint sometimes over- 
lapping the papers, sometimes simply surrounding 
them. It was intended to be seen through the 
aperture of a box as the roll passed through 
slots at the back at a pace dictated by a slow 
movement from a work by Bach. There was also 
to be lighting inside the box. 3 
Saxon Sydney-Turner, an early influence on We musical 
tastes, praised Prometheus, Scriabin's 1910 'Poem of Fire' 
in which he used a colour organ4. The current of ideas 
flowed widely and freely: Gertrude, Stein's Composition 
as Explanation, for example, accepted for publication 
by Ws Hogarth Press in 1926, is comparable to the 
work of Cezanne, Matisse or Picasso in terms of its attempt 
to maintain a "continuous present". To close what could be 
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a very long list, I add a comment of Max Beckmann's 
On Painting (. 1938) which seems pertinent to VW's work: 
My aim is always to get hold of the magic of 
reality and to transfer this reality into 
painting 
- 
to make the invisible, visible through 
reality. It may sound paradoxical, but it is, 
in fact, realiýy, which forms the mystery of 
our existence. 
* 
VW had a Coleridgean ability to see her mind as a 
thinking instrument and . frequently pondered on the creative 
process, and the artistic realignments of her lifetime, 
as well as her relation to her contemporaries and to 
tradition. She seems to me, however, to stand a little 
apart from the vehemence and passionate concern with the 
actual world which is frequently the characteristic of 
the work of her contemporaries in England, and, more 
markedly, Europe. While she was concerned with political 
issues 
- 
most famously, feminism , there is a definite 
absence. of the sensual, tactile world that is so much a 
part of, say, 'Joyce or Lawrence, and the technological 
world that inspired flarinetti and the Futurists, the 
Dynamists, and to some extent the Expressionists. The 
actual world, of course, takes a large part in her work, 
but she seems always to be seeking to express a perception 
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öf the numinous. There exists throughout her work a 
tension between Kantian`'transcendental' knowledge, which 
shapes the world, and the sense of something beneath or' 
beyond the shapes. 
In her essays and fiction, VW's concern with art 
is primarily with the writing of novels, but she has much 
to say of music and painting also, and draws careful 
"analogies between different'artistic modes. As her 
writing career progresses her deep and perpetual concern 
shifts from art to the artist To the Lighthouse marking 
a definite change of perspective). 
VW, as we will see, believed writing to be her life. 
In an essay, 'Reading' (1919? ), she wrote that "Somewhere, 
everywhere, now hidden, now apparent in whatever is written 
down is the form of a human being. " The human being in 
We writing is elusive, but never more apparent than when 
she writes about creating. I should say here that"I 
am concerned not with Ws 'art as a novelist', but with 
the thinking on art and its relation to life found in 
her novels. 
Having had the advantage of no formal education6 
and a wide-ranging literary experience in her youth, UW was 
acutely aware of tradition. Her novels are laced throughout 
with quotations and allusions which are never merely 
decorative, but always apposite and enriching, often 
applying one more light touch, one more angle of vision, 
to the picture she is composing. Sometimes such a reference 
will be used as a motif, gathering associations to itself 
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as the novel progresses, recognition of which induces 
many links and memories. An example is the 'Fear no more 
the heat o' the sun' of Mrs. Dallowey, that gently beats 
in Clarissa's mind from the time she. actually reads the 
line in Hatchard's window, to its absorption.. by her towards 
the end of the book; that the same words come to Septimus 
is a mirroring effect that should not go unnoticed. 
Apart from forming one bridge between Septimus and Clarissa, 
the lines from Cymbeline broaden that Shelleyan idea in 
the novel of death as a gentle release from the awful 
difficulties of life; the dirge is calming, an image of 
death not unlike Terence Hewet's representation in The 
Voyage Out of death as being just like sleep (TVO, 170). 
Such careful choice of allusion has been noted operating 
very subtly: 
At the height of one of Mr. Ramsay's panics 
... 
Mrs. Ramsey is disclosed reading a fairy story 
to her son James. It is the Grimms' tale of 
'The Fisherman and His Wife', and through 
twenty-odd pages of the novel Virginia Woolf 
marvellously counterpoints their story with hers: 
the coastline setting, the clash of temperaments, 
the lessons of acceptance, and the ominous 
undertow of insatiable demands.? 
Music, for the tyro, seems best suited of all the 
arts to exemplify thoughts on the way art 'works'. It 
does not confine, does not dictate, and because it does 
not directly refer to anything it is perhaps the least 
demanding of the arts for the uninformed perceiver. It 
is tempting to see music as the 'substance' of art in 
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its least altered state, bringing to mind Peter's dictum 
that "All art constantly aspires towards the condition 
of music". Because it is., non-representational it comes 
closest to a "direct contemplation in thought and feeling, 
which could dispense with all symbolism and mediation"8. 
The nature of the structure of music was described 
"with remarkable foresight" by Rousseau in'his Essai 
sur l'origine des langues: 
... 
for-us each sound is a relative entity. No 
sound by itself possesses absolute attributes 
that allow us to identify it: it is high or 
low, loud or soft with respect to another sound 
only. By itself it has none of these properties. 
In a harmonic system, a given sound is nothing 
by natural right. It is neither tonic, nor 
dominant, harmonic or fundamental. All these 
properties exist as relationships, only and since 
the entire system can vary from bass to treble, 
each sound changes in rank and place as the 
system changes in degree. 9 
The young VW was excited by music: 
The only thing in. the world is music; music and 
books and one or two pictures. I am going to 
found a colony where there shall be no marrying 
- 
unless you happen to fall in love with a symphony 
of Beethoven 
- 
no human element at all, except ý" I what comes through Art, - nothing but ideal peace 
41-2 and endless meditation. (to Emma Vaughan, 23.4.1901) 
Happily, she soon moved away, from this youthful 
Byzantium, but music continued to be an important factor 
in the development of her thoughts on art: 
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I have been having a debauch of music arid hearing 
certain notes to which I could be wed 
- 
pure, 
simple-notes - smooth from all passion and- 
frailty, and flawless as gems. That means so 
much to me and so little to you: Now-do you 
L. I know that sound has shape and colour and texture 
263-4 as well ? (to Violet Dickinson, 
16.12.1906) 
In Art (1914) Clive Bell wrote of his appreciation of 
music as 'pure farm'; VW having met Bell six years prior 
to writing the letter quoted above, it is not far-fetched 
to presume that such ideas were'current in conversations 
amongst her friends. The hint of an idea of synaesthesia 
will turn up again'and again in her writing. 
Strains of these thoughts are heard in 1909 when 
(probably 
under the influence of Saxon Sydney-Turner10) 
VW attended the great Wagner festival at Bayreuth. In 
an article written for The Times11 she attempts some sort 
of music criticism, "admitting that she is only gluing the 
impressions of an amateur. As with all her writing the 
article is lively and interesting (despite its strained, 
almost euphuistic style), and her perceptions are noteworthy. 
She sees that music can express non-verbal feeling, and 
that it has a power over people which seems to stem from 
its lending form to people's emotions: 
It may be that these exalted emotions, which 
belong to the essence of our being, and are 
rarely expressed, are those that are best 
translated by music; so that a satisfaction, 
or whatever one may call that sense of answer 
ap which the finest. art supplies to its own question, 
19 is constantly conveyed here. 
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This article anticipates her lifelong concern with the 
attempt at wording "those exalted emotions, which belong 
to the essence, of our being. " She was aware of the dangers 
of the literary judgment of music, but she trusted her 
ear, and with good reason as the following shows: 
Apart from the difficulty of changing a musical 
impression into a literary one, and the tendency 
to appeal to the literary sense because of the 
associations of words, there is thetfurther. 
difficulty in the case of music that its scope 
is much less clearly defined than the scope of 
the other arts. The more beautiful a phrase of 
music the richer its burden of suggestion, 
and if we understand the form but slightly, 
we are little restrained in our interpretation. 
We are led an to connect the beautiful sound 
with some experience of our own, or make it 
symbolize some conception of a general nature. 
Perhaps music owes something of its astonishing 
power over us to this lack of definite articulation; 
BP its statements have all the majesty of a general- 
21 isation, and yet contain our private emotions. 
In her sensuous, impressionistic article VW comes at 
once to a conclusion similar to that reached methodically 
by Susanne K. Langer in her theory of music: "Music is a 
tonal analogue of emotive life"12. At the end of the 
article, VW again makes reference - in vague, romantic 
expression 
- 
to an idea of synaesthesia: 
... 
here at Bayreuth, where the music fades into 
the open air 
... 
and sound melts into colour, 
and colour calls out for words, where, in short, 
we are lifted out of the ordinary world and 
allowed merely to breathe and see - it is here 
that we realise how thin are the walls between 
one emotion and another; and how fused our 
BP impressions ate with the elements which we 
22 may not attempt to separate. 
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When she wrote the. Times article VW had been working 
at 'Melymbrosia' for about two years; it was another six 
before this was published as The Voyage Out. In her first 
novel the question of the value and nature of art. is often 
raised, and music 
-a preoccupation of the book's. main 
character 
- 
is the mode most frequently used in VW's 
explorations of this question. It is interesting to turn 
again to Langer, who writes: 
-A great many considerations and puzzles that one 
meets sooner or later in all the arts find their 
clearest expression and therefore their most 
tangible form, in connection with music. 13 
The atmosphere of discussion, of Thursday 'evenings' 
and Cambridge friends, finds its way into, The Voyage Out, 
where Rachel is often seen perplexed by the relation 
between her music and the life she experiences. Early in 
the novel she frets over the great difficulty of adequate 
communication, and comes to the conclusion that "It was 
far better to play the piano and forget all the rest" (35). 
Music is seen here as an easy escape from the difficulties 
of relations with others and with the world, a view which 
finds repeated expression in the novel. Susan Warrington 
- 
not a character noted for her intelligence - says to Rachel 
that music "just seems to say all the things one can't 
say oneself" (197); she is perhaps the sort of person Mrs. 
Dalloway has earlier criticised for going "into attitudes" 
over Wagner (49), (although she confesses to having been 
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moved to tears the first time she saw Parsifal). This 
passive, thoughtless attitude is disparaged throughout 
The Voyage Out, for although a work of fiction, Ws first, 
novel does offer critical concepts; again, we could turn 
to Langer for a formal articulation of'the sort of idea 
that is felt in We writing: "the function of music is 
not stimulation of feeling, but expression of it"14. 
Another early question that receives attention in 
The Vo ae Out is that of the nature of the structure of 
music, and its power to express non-verbal states of 
mind. VW evidently believed. 'in the possibility of such 
states from the very start of her career in fiction; in 
the novels of her maturity this idea comes to be more 
and more important. The non-verbal imagination must be 
felt in the reader's mind; the books must be read actively 
to half-create from intimations their non-verbal origins. 
Rachel, thinking of the purpose of music, and depresseda 
by her inability to communicate, thinks of music in terms 
which suggest a system similar to that described by Rousseau: 
It appeared that nobody ever said a thing they 
meant, or ever talked of a feeling they felt, 
but that was what music was for. Reality 
dwelling in what one saw and felt, but did not 
talk about, one could accept a system in which 
things went round and round quite satisfactorily 
to other people, without often troubling to 
think about it, except as something superficially 
35 strange. 
An art which expresses meaning and -feeling about reality 
without having to use signs which refer directly to 
- 
114 
- 
something substantial would obviously appeal'to a writer 
wishing to convey her sense of'the numinous. 15 
Having thought about this'system, Rachel falls asleep, 
and as the chapter ends, VW lightly reinforces the point 
just made when Helen Ambrose quietly withdraws from Rachel's 
room "lest the sleeper should waken and there should be, 
the awkwardness of speech-between them" (36, my italics). 
These'lines indicate an early deep concern with communication 
and relationships. Musical 
, 
composition gives the-"illusion 
of an indivisible whole"16 and it is this wholeness of 
music that appeals to Rachel: music "goes straight for 
things. It says all there is to say at once" (251). 
What Rachel does not go on to expound, but what implicitly 
underlies her thoughts, is that-conception of music as a 
"system in which things went round and. round quite 
satisfactorily" a system unhampered by external relations. 
VW's interest in music in The Voyage Out is clearly from 
the point of view of a writer; she has already begun 
her search for a suitable form through "which to communicate 
her perception of the world, and in her first explorations 
she was concerned with music, for reasons already noted. 
Against music as the art of expressing the 
verbally inexpressible we should perhaps place Terence 
Hewet's projected novel "about Silence. " While VW conceived 
of a fundamental unity in the various modes of art, she 
was much concerned with ineffable areas of experience, and 
realised early in her career that words, for instance, could 
not have an effect always commensurable with that of music. 
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Towards the end of the novel, Terence reads to Rachel 
from Comus, and seems to. wish Milton's. poetry to act like 
music. He suggests that the words can be listened to for 
their sound alone, but of course the meaning obtrudes 
because words must relate to something other. The point- 
is doubly made as the lines Terence reads (pp. 398,399) 
have a special significance for Rachel, who is just beginning 
to experience the physical symptoms of the illness that 
culminates in her death. Music, then, does not have 
'meaning' but it can express feelings that are beyond 
words. In The Vo a e. Out VW, through Rachel, acknowledges 
the great difficulty of creating music, and criticises 
the passive attentiveness of those listeners who "go into 
attitudes". Music is seen in terms of its structure, 
usually by architectural analogy. 
By the end of the book music is established as an 
individual art, dealing with aspects of experience that 
are not within-the reach of words. -Langer's formal 
articulations are useful in encapsulating the ideas which 
can be drawn from Ws first novel, and the basic-concept 
of music that emerges is very similar to that expressed 
in her special theory of music as an 
articulate but non-discursive form having 
import without conventional reference 
... 
presenting itself 
... 
as a 'significant form', in 
which the factor of significance is not logically 
discriminated but is felt as a quality rather 
than recognised as a function. 17 
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It is the logical discrimination of symbols which prevents 
language from sharing this quality with music. VW 
recognises this and I think her idea of the novel "about 
Silence" probably underwent a change as a result of her 
understanding. To have continued with the idea of language 
being able somehow to achieve the non-verbal communication 
of music would have resulted in actual silence. The novels 
are about silence, an empty space at the heart of life, but 
they can only point to it, imply it, shape round it. The 
space is ineffable and impossible to construct, for 
construction or words would mean filling the space; the f 
space must come to be felt in the reader's mind. 
* 
In Night and Day the emphasis of artistic interest 
shifts from music to literature: architectural metaphors 
now apply to structures composed of words rather than notes; 
criticism of those who attitucfnized over Wagner is now 
directed at those who do the same over Shakespeare. VW 
even feels confident enough for comment on her friends' 
aesthetic theories: Mary Datchet, looking at the Elgin 
Marbles, is "borne upon some wave of exaltation and 
emotion, " but perhaps her emotions were "not purely 
aesthetic" (80), for she finds herself thinking'of her 
love for Ralph. Mary is here guilty of that sentimentalism 
VW condemned in her previous novel. There is, perhaps, 
implicit questioning of the 'aesthetic emotion' Clive Bell 
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wrote of in Art, for this state of pure contemplation 
is an unrealistic aspiration: the personality of the 
perceiver cannot be evaded. In Night and, Day VW sets 
out a view of the established forms of literature which, 
in Jacob's Room, she says must be done away with. 
Literature is shown as the opiate of an intellectual elite 
who consider it their birthright, to guard and interpret. 
In The Voyage Out, and throughout her essays, VW emphasises 
that life must be the source of art and art must be life- 
enhancing; in Night and Day she show's the result of ignoring 
this dictum. 
Katharine Hilbery tries to get her parents interested 
in modern novels, but even their appearance disturbs them; 
they prefer their reading to look as it is, portly and 
solid. Literature is viewed by the older generation as 
a vessel for private emotions which has enough generality 
to raise them to a plane above the individual. The works 
of literature do their thinking for them; they transfer 
their joys and sorrows to those of the heroes and heroines. 
This generation has made a religion of literature: their 
responses are dogma, the editor of an "esteemed review" 
is a "minister of literature" (369); they have a certain 
idea of what literature is and what it should not be. It 
was this dogmatism that VW saw as deadening and restrictive. 
Even Ihrs. Hilbery, who is so passionate about ". My William", 
seems to have things the wrong way around: the wonder is 
not that life continues as it does despite Shakespeare, but 
that Shakespeare continues despite life (an idea found in 
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Jacob's Room, 108-9). Mr. Hilbery, in using the work 
of Scott as a pacifying homily to his daughter, typifies 
the smug attitude against which VW rebelled; at the end 
of the book is a telling description of this attitude: 
The power of literature, which had temporarily 
deserted Mr. Hilbery, now came back to him, 
pouring over the raw ugliness of human affairs 
its soothing balm, and providing a form into 
which such passions as he had felt so painfully 
the night before could be moulded so that they 
fell roundly from the tongue in shapely phrases, 
528-9 hurting nobody. 
This intellectual elite has stifled the spirit of literature, 
and lost the ability to read creatively. The children 
of this coterie do not escape its influence: Cassandra 
mocks William with cliquish complacency for not having 
read Dostoevski (368), and Katharine assures her mother that 
clerks do not read poetry "as we read it" (99). 
* 
Jacob's-Room exhorts us to break the repressions 
Of Night and Day, but it seems that Jacob himself will 
not prove to be a liberating influence, for he is sometimes 
as didactic as Katharine's Aunt Eleanor: 
For the moderns were futile; painting the 
least respectable of the arts; and why read 
anything but Marlowe and Shakespeare, Jacob 
121 said, and Fielding if you must read novels. 
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Jacob is caught at a period of transition, at the moment 
after the breaking of the old moulds and before the 
formation of the new, and thus is full of youthful 
self-assertiveness but fundamentally confused. This 
is a feeling VW herself sometimes exhibits: 
For my own part I wish we could skip a 
generation 
- 
skip Edith and Gertrude and Tom 
and Joyce and Virginia and come out into the 
open again, when everything has been restarted, 
L. III and runs full tilt, instead of trickling and 
209 teasing in this irritating way. (to Roger Fry, 16.9.1925) 
Whether or not Jacob is successful, the message remains: 
"there will be no form in the world, " for Jacob (or anybody) 
unless he "makes one for himself" (34). 
In this novel, VW begins to turn her attention 
to the creative artist, but her main concern is still 
with form. Jacob (106) seems to consider himself one of 
the six young men upon whom "the flesh. and blood of the 
future depends; " the cry "Detest your own age.. Build a 
better one" is taken to heart by him, but the savagery and 
pedantry of youth obscures from him the fact that he 
becomes as stuffy and as narrow as "Shaw and Wells and 
the serious sixpenny weeklies! " (33). The existing forms, 
once broken, must be wholly superseded, not just refashioned 
with new materials. 
*** 
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Two months after the publication of Jacob's Room, 
VW wrote to Gerald Brenan of that sense of breaking and 
renewing, of being stuck in a period of transition that 
characterises the novel as very much her own feeling about 
herself as a writer. She feels, on Christmas Day, 1922, 
that the "human soul" is undergoing one of its periodic 
reorientations. For those artists unfortunate enough 
to live at such a time, nothing is whole: 
nothing is going to be achieved by us. Fragments - ý" II paragraphs 
-a page perhaps: but no more. 
598 Joyce seems to me strewn with disaster. 
She and her contemporaries are denied a sight of whole 
human soul, but she feels the glimpses they can catch 
are more valuable than 
to it down with Hugh Walpole, Wells, etc., ý" II etc. and make large oil paintings of fabulous 
598 fleshy monsters complete from top to toe. 
Having just published the first novel which speaks with 
her distinctive voice VW is engrossed with her own creation; 
indeed, she says to Brenan, "I am only scribbling, more 
to amuse myself than you, who may never read, or under- 
stand. " She feels herself a microcosm of the world, 
suffering "every ten years" a reorientation of her own 
soul to match the larger one she sees occurring in the 
human race; and these reorientations are agonies, explicitly 
connected in this letter, and in many other places, with 
her attempts at suicide and the deep imbalance of her mind: 
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life must be broken in order to be renewed. 
Looking back, she says when she first, tried to write, 
she found that she could'not, for what she had to write 
about (life) was "too near, too vast. " This is certainly 
borne out by the impression of being overwhelmed, and the 
syhaesthetic perception already noted in the young VW, and 
in Rachel Vinrace. With Jacob's Room she begins to give 
form to the incoherent experience of being; to do this 
she must first recede from the object. The letter ends 
with a postscript in which she returns to the original 
matter, raised by Brenan, of renunciation. VW here fixes 
on a central paradox of her art when she says that beauty 
is achieved in the failure to achieve it, in other words, 
in the effort. This recalls the idea of non-verbal 
thought, formed somewhere between reader and writer: 
by "grinding all the flints together" the whole that cannot 
be communicated directly is formed in the intersubjective 
relationship between the book and the reader. 
Are we not always hoping ? and though we fail 
every time, surely we do not fail so completely 
as we should have failed if we were not in the 
beginning, prepared to attackthe whole. One 
L" II must renounce, when the book is finished; but 
599-600 not before it is begun. 
* 
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By the time-she came to write To the Lighthouse VU 
was an experienced writer with proven consummate-control 
of the form-she had worked out for herself. In this 
novel is seen a consideration of the artist at work, 
which adheres closely to the problems posed by Lily 
Briscoe's picture. The novel is not an exploration of 
whether painting and literature. are commensurable, as 
The Vo ae Out explored that question with regard to 
music and language. VW uses pictorial art to shed a 
light on literary creation, significantly, to see her' 
specific problems as a novelist in a fresh way. She knows 
well where the line comes between the two modes, and uses 
painting to distance herself from literature so that she 
may not be too close to her own difficulties to see them 
clearly. 
Lily finds William Bankes's scrutiny of her canvas 
an "awful trial", for her work is not just representation,. 
but contains the 
residue of her thirty-three years, the deposit of 
each day's living, mixed with something more 
secret than she had ever spoken or. shown in 
84 the course of all those days. 
Three years after the publication of To the Lighthouse, 
VW wrote in the introduction to a catalogue of an exhibition 
of Vanessa Bell's paintings, 
that they yield their full meaning only to 
those who 'can tunnel their way behind the 
canvas into masses and passages and relations 
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and values, of which we know nothing 
-18 
It seems to me that--in these two instances 
- 
one fictional, 
one (f)actual 
- 
VW is making a definite statement to the 
effect that an artist's life must be inextricably mingled 
with his or her created work. She sees a novelist as 
even less able to conceal actual experience in a work 
of art: "One defies a novelist to keep his life through 
twenty-seven volumes of fiction safe from our scrutiny"18. 
Here 
- 
and on many other occasions 
- 
she explicitly says 
that the writer's life is unavoidably intervolved with his 
or her fiction (see epigraphs to this study, headed Life 
and Art). 
Lily's struggle for unity, her attempt to realise 
her vision wholly, is an articulation of the basic problem 
for any artist. The passage from conception to realisation 
imposes a change, 
-for all visions must be mediated: 
She could see it all so clearly, so commandingly, 
when she looked; it was when she took her brush 
34 in her hand that the whole thing changed. 
At the beginning of To the Lighthouse Lily understands 
that her problem has to do mainly with relation: 
if there, in that corner, it was bright, here, 
85 in this, she felt the need of darkness. 
She cannot explain what-she wishes to make of the scene 
before her; she only feels it within her, and here we have 
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the problem: how to bring one's personal world into the 
shared world in such a way that others can understand it. 
This was VW's problem as it is Lily's: 
... 
I shall here write the first pages of the 
greatest book in the world. That is what the 
book would be that was made entirely solely 
and with integrity of one's thoughts. Suppose 
one could catch them before they became 'works 
0. III of art' ? Catch them hot and sudden as they 
102 rise in the mind 
- (1926) 
This, again, is a reference to the non-verbal source of 
Ms art. 
The problem remains, with Lily; ten years pass, ten 
years of experience, of perceiving, of having visions; and 
she returns to the house. 
The question was of the relation between 
those masses. She had borne it in her mind all 
229 these years. 
And it would seem that a decade has brought Lily new 
understanding: "It seemed as if the solution had come to 
her: she knew now what she wanted to do" (229). However, 
the gap still exists between conception and realisation, 
and although the struggle to create may now be more equal 
it is no less fierce 
19, 
as Lily discovers when she again 
approaches her easel: 
But there was all the difference in the world 
between this planning airily away from the 
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canvas, and actually taking her brush and making 
243 the first mark. 
Section 3 of 'The Lighthouse' marks the beginning 
of a concentration on lily's picture (concurrent with the 
voyage out to the lighthouse) which is, at this point, 
a framed 'space against the landscape, which must be filled: 
She saw her canvas as if it had floated up and 
placed itself white and uncompromising directly 
242 before her. 
If we glance back at the last diary entry referred to above, 
the correlation between the problems of Lily and VW is 
again made clear: "Then, there is the form of the sentence, 
soliciting one to fill it" (D. III9 102). Other writings 
of the period of Lighthouse's composition are also 
concerned with the problems in verbal art that Lily has 
with painting. Writing in the Time Literary Supplement 
on De Quincey ('Impassioned Prose', 16.9.1926), VW 
expresses those ideas that Lily found she could not put 
across to William Bankes (see TTL, 84-7): 
Then it is not the actual sight or sound itself, 
that matters, but the reverberations that it 
makes as it travels through our minds. These 
are often to be found far away, strangely trans- 
formed; but it is only by gathering up and CE I putting together these echoes and fragments 
172 that we arrive at the true nature of our experience. 
Again, as in the letter to Brenan, VW says that the 
only hope for wholeness is to put together the fragments 
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of our experience, not to go directly for it. In 1925 she 
wrote in her diary that she had 
an idea that I will invent a new name for my 
D. III books to supplant 'novel'. A new 
- 
by Virginia 
34 Woolf. But what ? Elegy ? (27.6.1925) 
In 1927, in 'The Narrow Bridge of Art', she described- 
some aspects of this new form: 
In the first place, one may guess that it 
will differ from the novel as we know it now 
chiefly in that it will stand back from life. 
It will give, as poetry does, the outline rather 
than the detail. 
... 
So, then, this unnamed variety of the novel 
be written standing back from life, because 
CI EU in that way a larger view is to be obtained 
zz't$zig of some important features of it. 
In the novel, this form can be seen applied to relationships: 
I 
But this was one way of knowing people, she 
thought; to know the outline, not tie detail, 
to sit in one's garden and look at the slopes 
of a hill running purple down into the distant 
299 heather. 
The same conditions can be seen to apply to Lily's picture: 
before beginning, she must draw back from life, and subdue the 
impertinences and, irrelevances that plucked 
her attention and made her remember how she 
she was such and such a person, and had such 
293 and such relations to people. 
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This is why she cannot communicate her vision directly to-, 
William Bankes: 
She could not show him what she wished to make 
of it [the scene in frort of her] , could not 
see it even herself, without a brush in her hand. 
She took up once more her old painting position 
with the dim eyes and the absent-minded manner, 
subduing all her impressions as a woman to 
something much more general; becoming once 
more under the power of that vision which she 
had seen clearly once and must now grope for 
among hedges and houses and mothers and children 
86 her picture. 
Overcoming the difficulty of beginning, Lily falls 
into a rhythm of marking the canvas and pausing ("The 
most characteristic principle of vital activity is rhythm, " 
Langer, Feeling and Form, 126). A letter to Vita Sackville- 
West, written early in 1926, indicates VW's belief in this 
principle of rhythm, providing a further detail of the 
analogy between Lily's painting and the novel: 
Style is a 
rhythm.... 
rhythm is, 
L. III A sight, ai 
247 mind, long 
very simple matter; it is all 
Now this is very profound, what 
and goes far deeper than words. 
i emotion, creates this wave in the 
before it makes words to fit it; (16.3.1926) 
The work of art begins with a preverbal rhythm; again and 
again VW comes back to this aspect of creation. Lily's 
rhythmic dabbing at the canvas presents a new problem, 
however, for her marks define a new space; "what could be 
more formidable than that space? " (244). In the light 
of what VW has already said about creation, Lily's 
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experience as-she begins her picture can be taken confidently 
as the author's in writing her novel: 
Here she was again, she thought, stepping back 
to look at it, drawn out of gossip, out of 
living, out of community with people into the 
presence of this formidable ancient enemy of 
hers 
- 
this other thing, this truth, this reality, 
which suddenly laid hands on her, emerged 
stark at the back of appearances and commanded 
244-5 her attention. 
The arresting phrase "ancient enemy" emphasises VW's 
conception of creation as a struggle. In a holograph 
manuscript of the novel20 the stress of this moment for 
Lily, and the sense of artistic creation being beyond 
mere "human relations", is emphasised in a long monologue 
in which she speaks of art reaching "some more acute 
reality where it can rest. " This description recalls 
what I have suggested was Ws idea of the soul or self: 
it was as a "wedge-shaped core of darkness" that Mrs. 
Ramsay found rest (see above, p. 45) and a communion with a 
'reality' apart from the actual. In writing of 'reality' 
in her diary, we have noted that VW felt it was that in 
which she would "rest and continue to exist" (see above, p. 50). 
There is also a remarkable similarity (the significance of 
which will be fully realised in discussing Between the Acts) 
between the states in which Mrs. Ramsay becomes a, "wedge 
. 
of darkness" and in which Lily paints to achieve her 
"vision"; the most salient feature common to both states 
is the loss of personality (cf. TTL, 100 & 246). It may 
also be noteworthy, 'as further evidence of a connection 
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IF 
between the mode of being of self, or soul, and the 
creation of art, that Mrs. Ramsay's "wedge" shape is 
endorsed by the purple triangle as which she is represented 
in Lily's painting. 
In the published version of the novel, VW seems to 
have realised that Lily's doctrine is unconvincing 
because it comes at the problem so directly; the 
hyperbole obstructs the active readei's imagination, and it 
is therefore excised. The draft is significant, nevertheless, 
because it explicitly connects artistic creation with 
transcendence of the actual and revelation of the soul. 
Lily, in the draft, is seen as "extended and freed" while 
painting: 
she enjoyed that intensity and freedom of 
life which for a few seconds after the death 
of the body, one imagines the souls of the 
dead to enjoy. 
Jane Novak quotes a passage (The Razor Edge of Balance, 60-61) 
in which Lily experiences a transcendence of time and 
death through art: 
It was attended, too, with an emotion which 
could be compared only with the gratification 
of bodily love, so unhesitatingly, without fear 
or reserve, at some point of culmination, when 
all separation is over, except that delight of 
separation which is that it has consciousness 
of mixing 
- 
the bodies unite, human love has 
its gratification. But that even was less 
complete than this, for who can deny it ? Even 
when the arms are locked, or the sentence 
married in the air with complete understanding, 
a cloud moves across the sky and each lover knows 
but cannot confess his knowledge of the transience 
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of love; the mutability of love; how tomorrow 
comes, 
-how words and their kisses are only 
tossed together and nothing survives. Bute 
here, since the lover was the horrible 
formidable enemy 
- 
their union, could it be 
achieved, was immortal, no Death came between 
them.. It was an awful marriage, forever. 
The space which Lily has created is more awful than 
the original space of the canvas for it is "truth 
... 
reality 
... 
'1; it is the space at the heart of life so 
often felt in the novels; the emptiness that can only 
be felt and never directly communicated: nothingness. 
The overwhelming difficulty that this space presents is 
that it demands to be filled, but can never be filled 
for then it would no longer be space: 
but this form, were it only the shape of a 
white lamp-shade looming on a wicker table, 
roused one to perpetual combat, challenged one 
245 to a fight in which one was bound to be worsted. 
The space in the painting corresponds to one side of that 
tension between meaning and nothingness that is felt 
throughout all VW's writing. The artist, in her mind, 
is closest to 'reality' 
21 
, 
and is constantly torn 
between the antinomies of emptiness at the centre and the 
possibility of creation. This division in human being 
is acute for the artist because she perceives it more 
clearly than others. Art can "make of the moment something 
permanent" (249); perhaps it can even fill the space, but 
only for-an instant, and not in the shared world of 
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common reality. In her essays and diaries VW often refers 
to the unconscious reverie in which artistic creation 
takes place, and on p. 246 of To the Lighthouse we 
find a definite statement of the basis in the unconscious 
of art; Lily feels part of 
some thythm which was dictated to her (she 
kept looking at the hedge, at the canvas) 
by what she saw, so that while her hand quivered 
with life, this rhythm was strong enough to 
bear her along with it on its current. Certainly 
she was losing consciousness of outer things, 
her name and her personality and her appearance, 
... 
her mind kept throwing up from its depths, 
scenes, and names, and sayings, and memories 
and ideas, like a fountain spurting over that 
glaring, hideously difficult white space, while 
she modelled at it with greens and blues. 
As Lily comes to grips with the difficulties of her 
painting, she solves problems of shape and mass by use 
of colour. A painter's use of colour is active, vital, 
UW knew; coloursare alive in a painting, elements 
determined by their environment. Allen McLaurin devotes 
a chapter of his Virginia Woolf: The Echoes Enslaved to 
colour, and I do not wish to repeat his excellent analysis 
and minute observation of VW's use of colour. The 
essay 'Walter Sickert' (1933) to which NcLaurin refers 
is extremely interesting with regard to VW's view of a 
basic unity in the arts, and again of the areas of exper- 
ience which are beyond words: the "silent kingdom" of 
paint holds many lessons for the writer, but their 
ways must eventually part. 
- 
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When we consider the atmosphere of discursive 
rationalism, that VW lived in, it is surprising to. see 
the consistency with which her work shapes non-discursive, 
intuitive perceptions. Her essay on Sickert is typical 
in its intimate awareness of tradition; she sees that 
great writers are "great colourists, just as they are 
musicians into the bargain. " McLaurin's attention to 
her use of colour in The Waves makes clear that VW learnt 
all she could from the painters; the expressiveness of 
colour and line, seized upon as of paramount importance 
by the Symbolist painters of the early twentieth century, 
is reflected in words by VW22 
The limitations of language, in the psychological use 
of colour, enunciated by licLaurin, were completely 
understood by VW by the time she had finished To the 
Lighthouse. She uses colours in relational sequences, 
solving Lily's problems of relation, modelling into the 
hollows of experience by causing words to suggest shapes 
beyond themselves. Lily, having mastered the skillful 
employment of colour to-establish "psychological volumes" 
(cf. Charles Mauron, Roger Fry) comes to have a surer 
grasp of the form her work must take,. and this conception 
we can take, 
-again with confidence, as analogous to Ws 
literary work, noting especially its paradoxical nature: 
Beautiful and bright it should be on the 
surface, feathery and evanescent, one colour 
melting into another like colours on a 
butterfly's wing; but beneath the fabric must 
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be clamped together with bolts of iron. It 
was to be a thing you could ruffle with your 
breath; and a thing you could not dislodge with 
264 a team of horses. 
Early in the novel it was made clear that the 
artist's life had an integral influence on her work. 
As the book and Lily's picture draw near completion, it 
is increasingly emphasised that Lily mixes memory and 
desire with her vision; the past and her-wish to regain 
her experience of Mrs. Ramsay's influence becomes worked 
into her painting as a definite shaping element: 
And as she dipped into the blue paint, she 
265 dipped too into the past there. 
Still something is lacking, for Lily's problem of balance, 
of relation, persists; and, as she shows in her diary, 
. 
VW shares the difficulty of getting hold of "the thing 
itself before it has been made anything" (TTL, 297). In 
view of this, that the novel ends with Lily triumphant 
("I have had my vision"; the tense is significant) may 
at first be confusing. If Lily has realised her vision 
an her canvas, it is not a static realisation, but a 
moment of creation which must be recreated by each 
perceiver. Lily's 'vision' takes place within her: the 
moment at which she completes her picture is the closing 
of the circle of the journey to the lighthouse, and thus 
the vision is VW's too. For a moment she (Lily) holds 
her vision, her past and her present in synthesis. It 
t 
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is such a 'moment of being' that VW strove to give the 
opportunity for in her novels; the moment should be 
recreated by each reader. To the Lighthouse constitutes, 
her most extensive statement on her understanding of art; 
that she manages to expound and exemplify her insights 
simultaneously is an adequate mark of her, genius. 
ýý 
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(ii) Failure 
That question of the complex nature of the relation- ` 
ship between life and literature that Orlando flirts 
with is the focus of The Waves. The Waves is often 
regarded as a 'classic text' of modernism; and indeed 
the work is useful as a storehouse of typical ideas, 
but not much more than this. It is a kind of warehouse 
in which are found the materials from which novels such 
as To the Lighthouse or Between the Acts may be constructed. 
Early on in the work's construction VW herself felt that 
"I am only accumulating notes for a book" (D. III, 268; 
30.11.1929). The Waves never gets beyond this state, 
and yet there are many who would disagree. Critics have 
found The Waves a work in which form and content are 
"so'closely bound together to form one substance" (Fleishman, 
Virginia Woolf, 157), a work in which is displayed "the 
artist's ability to create unity" (van Buren Kelley, The 
Novels of Virginia Woolf, 198). The book's reputation 
as a classic text of modernism owes much to its abstruseness; 
its hostility to "common reading" seems to qualify it for 
a special prominence among notoriously 'difficult' works 
of modern art. 
The Waves is an anti-novel which yields very little 
to the processes of assimilation, memory and comparison 
which constitute reading; it is not strong enough to forge 
its own conventions, in the way that, say, To the Lighthouse 
is (see above, 122-134). It is particularly significant 
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that in its conception and development, 
, 
VW was far more 
it 
concerned with the shape of the book than anything else, 
In the process of writing other novels she had been inter- 
ested in the characters, their movements and relations, 
but a reading of the entries which refer to The Waves 
in A Writer's Diary shows very different prevalent concerns: 
Why not invent a new kind of play (21.2.1927)... 
All the time I shall attack this angular shape 
in my mind (28.3.1929)... Altogether the shape 
of the book wants considering (10.9.1929)... 
Also, never in my life did I attack such a vague 
yet elaborate design; (11.10.1929)... anyhow 
no other form of fiction suggests itself 
except as repetition at the moment (26.1.1930)... 
felt the pressure of the form 
- 
the splendour, 
the greatness 
- 
as, perhaps, I have never felt 
them (28.3.1930)... The abandonment of Orlando 
and To the Lighthouse is much checked by the 
extreme difficulty of the form (9.4.1930)... 
this hideous shaping and moulding (23.4.1930)... 
I suspect the structure is wrong (29.4.1930) 
Abstraction is the dominant note in entries about the new 
work. 
As so often, the genesis and development of a new 
work of fiction are recorded in the diary. The first 
stirrings of what would become The Waves. - are interesting 
in that VW is concerned with her own "process" of. creation 
("I 
want to watch and see how the idea at first occurs. I 
want to trace my own process. " D. III, 113;. 30.9.1926). A 
month later she was still watching carefully: 
At intervals, I begin to think (I note this, as 
I am going to watch for the advent of a book) of 
a solitary woman musing D) a book of ideas about 
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life. This has intruded only once or twice, 
and very vaguely: it is a dramatisation of my mood 
at Rodmell. It is to be an endeavour at something 
D. III mystical, spiritual; the thing that exists when 
114 we aren't there. (30.10.1926) 
This was written during the revision of To the Lighthouse 
and brings to mind the sense of "something that exists 
when we aren't there" that 'Time Passes' achieves (see 
below, Ch. 6). It will be seen in discussing that 
central section of To the Lighthouse that mysticism is 
firmly rejected by the earlier novel. Bearing this in 
mind, and also that basic tenet of VW's aesthetic - 
that the way to achieve beauty or wholeness was not to 
come at the thing directly, but to'communicate indirectly - 
it is strange that in The Waves she seems to abandon 
the lessons of earlier works and to approach directly 
that empty centre of acute 'reality' which is apparently 
the soul's domain. 
The "mood at Rodmell" (to which some attention has 
already been given; see above, pp. 47-51) is given central 
importance by the writer (3. W. Graham notes that she 
refers to it, "in a ritual gesture, " at the end of each 
draft over four and a half years), and so, intensely 
private though it is, I repeat its description here as 
it might throw some light on the intentions of The Waves. 
The vision is described in. two diary entries written just 
after VW had finished To the Lighthouse: 
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I 
Intense depression: Ihave to confess that this 
has overcome me several times since September 
6th 
... 
It is'so strange to me that I cannot 
get it right 
- 
the depression, I mean, which does 
not come from sömething definite, but from' 
nothing. "Where there is nothing" the phrase 
came 4ýack-Plto me, - as I sat at the table in the 
drawing room. 
... 
All the rest of the year 
one's (Idaresay rightly) curbing and controlling 
this odd immeasurable soul. When it expands, 
though one is frightened & bored & gloomy, 
it is as I say to myself, awfully queer. There 
is an edge to it which I feel of great importance, 
once in a way. One goes down into the well & 
nothing protects one from the assault of truth. 
D. III Down there I cant write or read; I exist however. 
112 I am. (28.9.1926) 
I wished to add some remarks to this, on the 
mystical side of solitude# how it is not oneself 
but something in the universe that one's left 
with. It is this that%is frightening & exciting 
in the midst of my profound gloom, depression, 
boredom, whatever it is: One sees a fin passing 
far out. What image can I reach to convey 
what I mean 7 Really there is none I think. 
The interesting thing is that in all, my feeling 
and thinking I have never come up against this 
before. Life is, soberly and accurately, the 
oddest affair; has in it the essence of reality. 
I used to feel this as a child 
- 
couldn't step 
across a puddle once I remember, for thinking, 
how strange - what am I? &c. But by writing 
I dont reach anything. All I mean to make is 
a note of a curious state of mind. I hazard 
D. III the guess that it may be the impulse behind 
113 another book. (30.9.1926) 
It is revealing that VW treats this as a new experience, 
for it bears the characteristics of a fundamental 
experience of several characters in the preceding novels. 
Clarissa Dalloway, for example, 'is seen to undergo precisely 
this sense of wonder at simply being at all, and to feel the 
'presence' of nothing, which at once fascinates and depresses 
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her. 
Perhaps it is because the creation of earlier novels 
was 'unconscious' 
- 
in the sense that VW felt artistic 
creation to be predominantly unconscious. (Cf. above, p. 131) 
- 
that she finds the experience "new" when she tries actually 
to write it out directly. It is this directness: that flaws 
The Waves, and it is surprising that she even made the 
attempt in the light of what has already been said. As 
she began to work on the book she wrote in her diary of 
the futility of such an endeavour: 
But who knows 
-. 
once one takes a pen and writes ? 
D. III How difficult. not to go making 'reality' this 
196 & that, whereas it is one thing. (10.9.1928) 
Bernard seeks "the one true phrase" that will sum up 
life; he feels that all his stories are ancillary to 
the "true story" or "final statement" which will fix the 
elusive "reality" of life23. It is in a way ironic that 
the diary entry just quoted should explain why The Waves 
must fail: 'reality' is a 'no-thing', but writing is naming, 
an attempt to substantize, to give a form to that which 
has no form. This might seem to suggest that all the 
novels are equally failures as I have stressed that they 
are concerned to give a form to this formless 'reality'. 
Their triumph, however, is in entering into a communion 
with the reader: reading is a dynamic experience, analogous 
to other events in human life, in which the reader creates 
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a 'virtual form of actual life, and is enabled to enact 
experience (to re-create it) on`the terms of the novel24. 
The Waves is anti-reading in this respect: it does 
not allow for the participation of the reader, but continually 
dictates through a highly self-conscious structure. 
Wolfgang Iser refers to a comment VW made on the novels 
of Jane Austen (The Act of Reading, 168) in which she 
speaks of Austen stimulating the reader "to supply what 
is not there" (CR I, 174). Isar writes: 
The 'enduring form of life' which Virginia Woolf 
speaks of is not manifested on the printed page; 
it is a product arising out of the interaction 
168 between text and reader. 
What I contend is the prime reason for The Waves' failure 
is the avoidance of what Isar calls "the structured blanks 
of the text", which "stimulate the process of ideation to 
be performed by the reader on terms set by the text" (Act, 169). 
Turning again to the diary, it is clear that VW herself was 
aware of the dangers which the form she was developing 
was open to: 
Who thinks it ? And am I outside the thinker ? 
One wants some'device which is not a trick. (25.9.1929)... In particular is there some 
radical fault in my scheme ? (11.10.1929)... 
Is there some falsity of method, somewhere 7 
Something tricky ? (2.11.1929)... But how to 
pull it together, how to comport it 
- 
press 
it into one 
-I do not'know; (26.1.1930)... 
it may miss fire somewhere (9.4.1930)... 
I think this is the greatest opportunity I 
have yet been able to give myself; therefore 
I suppose the most complete failure. Yet I 
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respect myself for writing this bock 
- 
yes 
- 
even though it exhibits my congenital faults. (20.8.1930)... I imagine that the hookedness 
may be so great that it will be a failure from 
a reader's point of view. (2.2.1931) 
When published the reviews were favourable, which of course 
pleased the author. Nevertheless, she writes-, in her diary 
that the book has not been understood: The Times praised 
her characters "when I meant to have none"; the book was 
"an adventure which I go on alone" (AWD, 175; 5.10.1931). 
The Waves is hostile to reading, and yet has nearly 
always been read as a complete, harmonious work of art. It 
is, though, a product of crisis and reflects this in its 
form. 
In two insightful articles 
25, J. W. Graham documents 
We growing distaste for 'psychology' and her search for 
voiceless, characterless expression. In the introduction 
to his edition of the two holograph drafts of the book, 
Graham explores the background to its conception as seen 
in the diary and essays written between 1927 and 1930. 
In contemporary modes of fiction VW saw an excessive 
concern with psychology. In 'The Narrow Bridge of Art' 
(1927) 
she says that writers have been too much taken up 
with personal relations: 
We have come to forget that a large and important 
part of life consists in our emotions towards 
such things as roses and nightingales, the dawn, 
the sunset, life, death, and fate; we forget that 
we spend much time sleeping, dreaming, thinking, 
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reading, alone; we are not entirely occupied-in 
CE II personal relations; all our energies are not 
Zz5 absorbed in making our livings. 
In 'Phases of Fiction', two years later, she wrote of 
just that aesthetic she had achieved in novels like To 
the Lighthouse, but which is largely abandoned in The Waves: 
As the pages are turned, something is built up 
which is not the story itself. And this power, 
if it accentuates and concentrates and gives 
the fluidity of the novel endurance and strength, 
so that no novel can survive even a few years 
without it, is also a danger. For the most 
characteristic qualities of the novel - that 
it registers the slow growth and development 
of feeling, that it follows many lives and 
traces their unions and fortunes over a long 
CE II stretch of time 
- 
are the very qualities that 
jol are most incompatible with design and order. 
Here she has stated exactly the danger to which The Waves 
falls prey. The passage continues by saying that the two 
forces must be balanced; the "most complete novelist" is 
the one who can achieve a balance of the powers, so that 
"the one enhances the other". 
It is evident that The Waves was intended to give 
a sense of "life itself going on" (D. III9 229; 28.5.1929); 
among early working titles were "the life of anybody" and 
"life in general". This universal scope is not new in 
the fiction: Rachel Vinrace wished to be told "everything" 
and Lily Briscoe is overwhelmed by no less a question 
than "What is the meaning of life? " The Waves 
- 
explicitly in the final episode 
- 
attempts to answer this 
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question directly, attempts to map life completely with 
art. 
At this point we might make a 'useful excursus to 
examine a sketch of 1920 which adumbrates Bernard's project 
of summing up life in a story 
- 
'An Unwritten Novel'. 
The narrator is on a train, sitting opposite a woman whom 
the narrator 'reads', believing that she is trying to 
tell her something simply by the way she sits, moves, looks: 
AHH I read her message, deciphered her secret, 
14 reading it beneath-her gaze. 
The unreliability of such 'reading' is demonstrated when 
the unknown woman gets off at her destination and shows 
that her life has nothing in common with the narrator's 
interpretation; the narrator is bewildered: 
Well, my world's done for! What do I stand on ? 
What do'I. know ? That's not Minnie. There 
AHH never was-Moggridge. Who am I? Life's bare 
23 as bone. 
That life is impoverished because it does not tally with 
a reading is a characteristic feeling of Bernard's: he 
makes up scenes (stories) and expects life to fit them. 
For example, he goes to visit Louis and Rhoda, imagining 
Rhoda murmuring poetry, Louis filling a saucer with milk 
for a cat, but neither of them are even there: he feels 
at once that life is poor affair (TW, 195). In the sketch, 
the similar sense of loss gives way almost immediately 
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to a euphoric celebration of`life's richness and variety: 
Oh, how it whirls and surges 
- 
floats me afresh! 
I start after them. People drive this way and 
that. The white'light splutters and pours. 
... 
Wherever I go, mysterious figures, I see you, 
turning the corner, mothers and sons; you, you,,, 
you. 
... 
If I fall on my knees, if I go through 
the ritual, the ancient antics, it's you, unknown 
figures, you I adore; if I open my arms, it's 
AHH you I embrace, you I draw to me 
- 
adorable 
23 world! 
The Waves was intended to express "life itself", 
to "give the moment", and yet it is more about art than 
life. It is an intensely self-regarding work, and its 
failure is partly due to this inwardness. In Beyond 
E otism, Robert Kiely remarks that Neville's comment that 
"our friends are not able to finish their stories" 
is not merely an idle criticism of Bernard's 
inability to hold an audience but a deeply 
serious, and universally applicable expression 
of life's refusal to conform to narrative 
convention. Friends cannot finish their stories 
because their audiences and their subjects are 
173-4 forever dispersing. 
Life will not conform to stories, a recalcitrance that 
prevents Bernard from ever realising the integrated 
"selfhood" that some critics (e. g. Harvena Richter, Alice 
van Buren Kelley) claim for him, and reduces his own 
experience to mere phrases. 
In The Act of Reading Isar writes that 
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Events are a paradigm of reality in that they 
designate a process, and are not merely a 
68 'discrete entity' 
He continues this theme with a theoretical formulation 
which could be taken as parallel in a way to that important 
image in The Waves (which also appears in VW's diary) of 
a fin turning in a waste of water: 
k 
Each event represents the intersecting point of 
a variety of circumstances, but circumstances 
also change the event as soon as it has taken 
on a shape. As a shape, it marks off certain 
borderlines, so that these may then be transcended 
in the continuous process of realisation that 
constitutes reality. In literature, where the 
reader is constantly feeding back reactions 
as he obtains new information, there is just 
such a continual process of realisation, and 
so reading itself 'happens' like an event, in 
the sense that what we read takes on the 
character of an open-ended situation, at one, and 
68 the same time concrete and yet fluid. 
We may say, then, that literature complements reality in 
that it provides a perspective on the world, through 
symbols, which is not available to the world of actual 
experience26. Fiction is described by Iser as "the 
pragmatically conditioned gestalt of the imaginary"27. 
He writes that 
it appears to be a halfway house between the 
imaginary and the real. It shares with the 
real the determinateness of its form, and with 
the imaginary its nature of an "as if"28. 
Crucial in the failure of The Waves as a work of literature 
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that can be successfully and frutifully read is Bernard's 
failure to distinguish between story-telling and life, and 
VW's failure to harmonise design and content. In the 
summing-up 
- 
Bernard's ul'timate story 
- 
the reasons for 
the book's failure are focused on. 
I 
The summing-up is distinguished from the eight 
preceding episodes in a number of ways, most significantly 
by its narrative voice. The predominant tense (like that 
of the interludes) is not the pure present of the other 
episodes 
-a tense which, J. W. Graham notes, necessitates 
repetition of 'I', as there is no helpful copula like the 
'am' of the progressive present: ' The "phantom dinner party" 
mirrors the situation of text and reader. It is not a 
normal social situation: the silent, unnamed guest is 
a 'reader' of Bernard's story (see Iser, Act, 166 f. ). 
In the second holograph draft (1930) the final episode 
begins: 
"There are times, " said Bernard, "which seem 
to be no time: & places which are no particular 
Graham place, just as you, if you will pardon me, are 
656 not efly pee ee-la-p person. in particular 
This is the situation of a literary work as regards the 
reader. The impression of timelessness is also indicated 
by the possibility that the summing-up is largely a dream, 
something that is only very slightly hinted at in the 
published text. At the end of episode eight Bernard is 
sleeping on a train: 
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But what is odd is that I still clasp the 
return half of, my ticket to Waterloo firmly 
between the fingers of my right hand, even 
167 now, even sleeping. 
The draft 
- 
as we might by now expect 
- 
is more explicit 
about the dream state: a note written as a reminder of 
what has still to be composed reads: 
(he goes in to be shaved, & sees the wind in 
looking glasses 
- 
regularity of the man's hand 
Graham like the gardeners broom 
-& the 
360 dream) 
(April 12th) 
1930 
Another plan for the section reads: 
The walk (after arriving at Waterloo) 
hairdresser (sc] 
Then the loss of identity. 
Then the return 
The wave falls. 
He wakes. 
Graham Death 
766 0 Solitude. 
While the status of draft material cannot be taken for 
granted in reading the published text, it is of particular 
help in reading The Waves as revisions are nearly always 
contractions or deletions. One further plan reads: 
Then the phantom dinner party when et others 
are not present; but only Bernard, & 
he sums up all their lives; & Graham becomes part of them. 
757 Then the general death. 
-148- 
The conception jotted down in drafts and notebooks, 
of Bernard summing up "all their lives", is not realised 
in the book itself, and indeed could not be realised. 
Bernard's summing-up is not a uniting of the characters; 
it does not create that single human being he says they 
saw laid out before them on the restaurant table at their 
reunion dinner (196). The conclusion is merely one more 
story in the repertoire of The Waves. The book is not 
an "ars poetica for fiction" (Fleishman, op. cit., 152), 
but a sketchpad for an unwritten'novel. 
** 
The wish to put ourselves in an unmediated 
relation to whatever "really" is, to know 
something absolutely, 'means a desire to be 
defined totally: marked or named once and 
for all, fixed in or by a word, and so - 
97 paradoxically 
- 
made indifferent. (Geoffrey Hartman, Saving 
the Text) 
Bernard's intention to "explain to you the meaning 
of my life" (TW, 168) can be read as VW's intention to 
explain the 'meaning' of The Waves. The summing-up is 
not just the conclusion to Bernard's life, it is the 
author's way 
- 
as she states in her notebooks and diaries 
- 
of drawing together the various elements of the book, 
rounding it off and making some'Pinal statement" about 
- 
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all the characters. Bernard himself alternates between 
extolling the power of art to express life in this way, ' 
and denigrating its poverty. The real problem, however, ` 
lies in his inability to distinguish between life and art, 
and, as we shall sea, in his refusal of the distinctions 
of identity and difference. 
The first difficulty he encounters is the politics 
of experience: "the globe full of figures" as which Bernard 
images his life, his companion can not see. "You see me... 
opposite you, " says Bernard, but whose, or which, "me" 
is this ? The problem of voice, that is never solved in 
The Waves, is most particularly Bernard's, a confusion that 
leads to inextricably complicated identifications. In 
evidence of this we might take Bernard's recollection 
of his reaction to Percival's death: 
I said 'Give him (myself) another moment's 
187 respite' as I went downstairs. 
The three pronouns exemplify the confusion of voices 
in the work, a confusion that stems from the attempt to 
fix what is impossible to fix. A further note of Samuel 
Butler's is apposite here: 
Besides what is the self of which we say that 
we are self-conscious ? No one can say what it 
is that we are conscious of. This is one of 
the things which lie altogether outside the 
sphere of words. 2'9 
- 
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Bernard attempts to discover a grammar, of life, to, 
reduce experience absolutely. to language, but there is a 
disjunction between the two, felt even in the discrepancy 
experienced by Bernard between himself and his name. 
This discrepancy is explained by J. Hillis Miller: 
All proper names, as linguists and ethnologists 
have recognised, are metaphors. They alienate 
the person named from his unspeakable individuality 
and assimilate him. into a system of language. 
They label him. in terms of something other 
than himself, in one form of the stepping aside 
which is the essence of language. To name 
someone is to alienate him from himself by 
making him part of a family. 30 
As already noted (see above, p. 59) the self cannot be 
named; what Hartman calls the "nomen numen" is extralinguistic. 
Bernard's assertions of identity-(e. g. "I rose and walked 
away 
- 
I, I, I; 
... 
It Bernard") are repeatedly undercut 
by his uncertainty as to how much others have contributed 
to that identity. Ultimately, Bernard is trying to 
verbally reduce the 'I' that is his identity, to "sum up" 
his life and speak his self (or soul) into being in the 
actual world. "In a sense that cuts much deeper than 
semantics, " writes George Steiner, "our identity is a 
first-person pronoun" 
31. Bernard wishes to go beyond this 
semantically, verbally. His desire (and VW's) to reduce 
life to art, to fix the movement of identity by speaking 
into the world his secret name, leads eventually to the 
strange concept of "A man without a self. " 
- 
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One day, Bernard tells his guest, he did not answer 
the call of 'I'; he experienced a world drained of all 
colour, devoid of all features. However, while he can 
still say "I am dead" (202), he is still living, voicing 
his identity, still in the world he says he has transcended. 
If Bernard is "A dead man", who speaks ? As Bernard says 
that he has dissolved all difference, resolved all 
identities into one, the biblical allusions of his 'Last 
Supper' take on a greater ' import. "Take it. This is my 
life. " says Bernard at the beginning of the last episode, 
echoing Corinthians 1,11: 24. He believes he has "summed 
up" all the others in this communion, forming one body, 
one being: % 
And now I ask, 'Who am I ?'I have been talking 
of Bernard, Neville, Jinny, Susan, Rhoda and Louis. 
Am I all of them 7 Am I one and distinct ?I 
do not know. We sat here together. But now 
Percival is dead, and Rhoda is dead; we are 
divided; we are not here. Yet I cannot find 
any obstacle separating us. There is no 
division between me and them. As I talked I 
felt 'I am you. ' This difference we make so 
much of, this identity we so feverishly cherish, 
205 was overcome. 
This dislocation of identity reflects the crisis the 
book generates. Throughout, Bernard has questioned the 
nature of his own being in an empirical fashion quite 
unlike any other of VW's characters. The limits of 
subjectivity (what James Naremore, who also believes the 
book to be a failure 
- 
"though a highly interesting one" 
- 
calls the "ultimate refinement") are reached as Bernard 
J. 
- 
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tries to undo-the tautological knot of identity, 
enshrined, as Steiner says, in monotheistic religion's 
"I am that I am" (Extraterritorial, 64). Distinction 
between one and other is dissolved in this quasi- 
religious self-glorification of Bernard's. He is 
claiming universal knowledge (which denies death) by 
what he imagines is a summing-up in an instant of his 
entire being; he claims access to "the mystery of things" 
(207), to being one of God's spies. 
The illusion that Bernard expresses was shattered 
(as we will see below, Ch. 6) in the 'Time Passes' section 
of To the Lighthouse, and it is perhaps a mark of the 
rigour of the writer's mind that Bernard is returned to 
consciousness of his actual identity by the (Sartrian) 
look of his dinner companion: 
You look, eat, smile, are, bored, pleased, annoyed 
- 
that is all I know. Yet this shadow which has 
sat by me for an hour or two, this mask from 
which peep two eyes, has power to drive me 
back, to pinion me down among all those other 
faces, to shut me in a-hot room; to send me 
208 dashing like a moth from candle to candle. 
From his self-apotheosis Bernard is returned to simple 
identity 
- 
'I'. Perhaps an echo of that tautological 
irreducibility is heard in his wish to be left alone, 
"myself being myself" (210). The failure of Bernard, 
and consequently of The Waves, to make the promised 
"final statement" is perhaps admitted a few pages earlier: 
- 
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What does the central shadow hold ? Something ? 
207 Nothing 71 do not know. 
Indeed, the summing-up has acknowledged its own failure 
even before this, when Bernard says that 
i 
Life is not susceptible perhaps to the 
189 treatment we give it when we try to tell it. 
I 
Such an admission is irreconcilable with the sense of 
transcendence of all limits, the dissolution of identity 
and difference that Bernard, professes, and is an example 
of those unresolved tensions that fragment The Waves. 
Beyond the nominal pronoun, language cannot go in representing 
self. R. D. Laing has expressed the catch succinctly: 
The Life I am trying to grasp is the me that 
156 is trying to grasp it. (The Bird of Paradise) 
Bernard 
- 
and VW 
- 
try to transpose the problem into 
other-worldly terms, but the argument remains strictly 
earthbound. 
Before the truly Victorian melodrama of the ending's 
memorial to Thoby Stephen is perhaps an admission of 
defeat: 
However beat and done with it all I am, I 
must haul myself up, 
... 
I, I, I 
... 
must take 
210 myself off and catch'some last train. 
- 
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The 'I' here contains the triumph and humiliation of human 
being, what Buber termed "the sublime melancholy of our 
lot" (I and Thou, 68). Severely flawed though it is,.., 
The Waves must not be rejected; it continues to develop 
and expound the perennial themes of VW's fiction. It is 
also important as evidence of a conflict which points 
towards the last and most difficult novel, Between the Acts. 
(1941). In that work's fusion of design and substance, 
in its dazzling play of voices, is conveyed that sense of 
something there when we are not that The Waves attempted. 
Before approaching that novel, however, we must explore,,, 
VW's sense of the numinous;, a sense that at once disturbed 
and enthralled her. 
r ". 
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Chapter Five 
'Reality' 
Thus far I have been concerned rather with the 
actual context within which We sense of a special 
'reality' is felt than'with the nature of that 'reality', 
itself. The apprehension of a numinous 'reality' has 
usually manifested itself as a yearning for transcendence 
of the world of time and death on the part of a particular 
character, or a suggestion in the narrative structure of 
an abstract 'gap' in actual life that cannot be directly 
referred to in language, but is'certainly a potential 
experience of human being. 'Reality' was something 
particular to VW that she felt she (and other writers) 
could better apprehend than most people. Her solitary 
experiences in Sussex were religious in character ("The 
country is like a convent. The soul swims to the top. " 
D. II1 308; 2.8.1924). In this, and the following 
two chapters, the nature of UW's sense of 'something more' 
to life will be elucidated. 
In the fiction, and in numerous essays and sketches 
VW vacillates between faith in a meaningful world and a 
sense of life's absurdity, of a world in which human beings 
are blown aimlessly about. This tension in the work has 
been noted already several times; it is mapped in great 
variety in all her writing, in imagery, thought, form, 
theme and conception. There is a desire to be 'lyrical', 
- 
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to find and interpret meaning-(in the sense of finding 
some 'base' on which life can. stand), to answer the 
questions repeated by many characters with an affirmation 
of purpose; against this works a profound pessimism that 
believes human effort to be a,, sham, a pretence that saves 
us from an abyss of nothingness, bottomlessness. Another 
of those summer diary entries, made at Rodmell, illuminates 
the two sides of the conflict in We thinking: 
And so I pitched into my great lake of melancholy. 
Lord how deep it is! What a born melancholiac 
I am! The only way I keep afloat is by working. 
... 
Directly I stop working I feel that I am 
sinking down, down., And as usual, I feel that 
if I sink further 
.I shall reach the truth. 
That is the only mitigation; a kind of nobility. 
Solemnity. I shall make myself face the fact 
that there is nothing. 
- 
nothing for any of us. 
Work, reading, writing are all disguises; 
& relations with people. Yes, even having 
children would be useless. 
... 
Well all this [workj is of course the 'real' 
D. III life; and nothingness only comes in the absence 
235-6 of this. (23.6.1929) 
The struggle between faith and despair is the heart of 
We thought, the impulse behind her fiction: it arises 
from the question of the nature of "human centrality" 
which, Georges Poulet writes, is "essentially religious". 
"By conviction an atheist perhaps, he is taken by 
surprise with moments of extraordinary exaltation" (MD, 63). 
There is the sense in VW's work (the work of an avowed 
atheist, 'scornful of Christianity) of an immanent beyond. 
Pressing on the world of the novels is a mystery, glimpsed 
- 
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only in fleeting moments, in solitude. Although she 
describes the endless modalities of human being, it seems 
to me that VW's effort is at the same time to express her 
perception of a 'reality' that at once transcends all 
modalities and gives them. their being. This abstract 
'reality' 
- 
as I have already said 
- 
is not bound by the 
spatio-temporal horizons of actual human life. What 
distinguishes VW's conception from mysticism is its 
rootedness in actual experience. As James Hafley has written, 
What Virginia Woolf did was dramatize the truth 
of the relative and mutable with the authority 
of the absolute unquestionable. There is only 
one consciousness defining itself 
, 
by inventing 
order out of the chaotic suggestiveness of a 
maze of facts; but that one consciousness seems 
to be consciousness itself 
.1 
Her ideas of 'reality' and the soul can, though, readily 
be construed as. theological; indeed, it is difficult to 
speak of the import of the novels if words such as 
'spirit', 'visionary' and 'mystery' are not secularised 
(which requiresa considerable mental effort). In those 
extracts from her diary kept at Rodmell that have already 
been quoted, a religious tone that is unavoidable when she 
writes of 'reality' and the soul is very evident (see 
above, e. g. p. 50). 
There is an opposition in VW's thinking between the 
symbolical, inclusive, intuitive, and non-discursive mode 
of thought that is particularly female, and the masculine 
- 
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style of rationality and logic, which tends to exclude.., 
It is this counterbalancing-that prevents her thought from 
being merely mystical, rooting it firmly in actual experience. 
The roots of this fundamental opposition may be found in 
her early life. Leslie Stephen, who married into the 
heart of the Clapham Sect, was one of the leading agnostic 
thinkers of his time 
-a time when agnosticism was a widely- 
held position, supported by Darwin! s theories. VW later 
wrote of her frustration at the lack of "imagination" in 
her father and his agnostic friends. This dryness was 
inherited by the young men of her own circle of friends; 
"the fourth generation of the Clapham Sect", as Noäl Annan 
calls them, did, though, reject the moral code of their 
forebears. 
In 'Old Bloomsbury' (c. 1922) VW wrote that "Moore's 
book had set us all discussing philosophy, art, religion" 
(Moments of Bein 
, 
168). In The Voyage Out, Helen Ambrose 
takes Princioia Ethica on the, Euphrosyne, reading as she 
embroiders "a sentence about the Reality of Matter or the 
Nature of Good. " Despite the mockery of Apostolic 
fervour in her first novel, VW's Cambridge friends were an 
important early influence on her. The significance of 
G. E. Moore to those who surrounded VW in the years following 
her father's death can be assessed from the following remarks: 
The tremendous influence of Moore and his book 
upon us came from the fact that they suddenly 
removed from our eyes an obscuring accumulation 
of scales, cobwebs and curtains, revealing for 
- 
164 
- 
the first time to us, so it seemed, the nature 
of truth and reality, of good and evil and 
character and conduct, substituting for the 
religions and philosophical nightmares, delusions 
and hallucinations in which Jehovah, Christ, and 
St. Paul, Plato, Kant, and Hegel had entangled 
us, the fresh air and pure light of plain" 
93 common-sense. 
Leonard Woolf, An Autobiography, 
Vol. 1 
... 
it was exciting, exhilirating, the beginning 
of a renaissance, the opening of a new heaven 
Rosen- on a new earth, we were the forerunners of a 
baum, 52 new dispensation, 'we were not afraid of anything. (J. Maynard Keynes, My. 
Early Beliefs) 
Keynes also provides a. clue as to why VW may have been 
repelled by Moore's ethics: I 
Like any other. branch of science, it was nothing 
more than the application of logic and rational 
analysis-to the material presented as sense- 
data. Our apprehension of good was exactly 
the same as our apprehension of green. 
... 
... 
If it appeared under cross-examination 
Rosen- that you did not mean exactly anything, 
baum you lay under a strong suspicion of meaning 
54,56 nothing whatever. 
Bishop Butler provides Moore's epigraph to Principie 
Ethica: "Everything is what it is, and not another thing. " 
As an epigraph to what I understand as VW's "philosophy", 
and against Moores, we might set this: 
So that was the Lighthouse was it ? 
No, the other was also the Lighthouse. For 
TTL 
-nothing was simply one thing. The other was 
2B6 the Lighthouse too. 
165 
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The 1oorean universe, endorsed by such as Russell and 
Keynes, is continually questioned by the novels. The 
actual world is the context in which apprehension of the 
numinous occurs, suggesting that reality 
-*the nature of 
which was plain enough to Leonard Woolf 
- 
is to be 
questioned deeply. Moore's system 
, 
to VW9 was one more 
attempt to cover over the emptiness at the heart of life. 
Philosophies and religions for the most part attempt to 
order life; they do not explore it as her art does, with 
recognition of the nothingness that human being opposes 
and yet ultimately succumbs to. From her perspective on 
human experience, VW quickly arrives at the paradoxical 
character of human being that inspires the invention of 
unifying systems. From The Vo ä"e Out onwards she sees 
religion as a deadening restriction that cuts people off 
from the very "invisible presences" (MD, 138) it pretends 
to reach. In an early essay she lamented the enclosure of 
thought by faith in an external deity: 
What, one asks, as considerations accumulate, 
is ever to stop the course of such a mind, 
unroofed and open to the sky ? Unfortunately, 
there was the Deity. His faith shut'in his 
horizon. Sir Thomas himself resolutely drew 
that blind. Bis desire for knowledge, his 
eager ingenuity, his anticipations of truth, 
must submit, shut their eyes, and go to sleep. 
Doubts he calls them. "More of these no man 
hath known than myself; which I confess I 
conquered not in a martial posture, but on CE II my knees. " So lively a curiosity deserved 
Ze a better fate. ('Reading', 1919? ) 
- 
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A God makes the world one and indivisible, 
"but 
denies 
the curious antinomies of. the actual experience of human 
being, falsely reconciling them, and providing a means of 
escape from the ultimate horizon of death through the 
consolation of eternal life. 
Pascal wrote of the human situation as being like that 
of a man who wakes on a desert island, not knowing where- 
or when he is (Pensees, 88). This man, Georges Poulet 
remarks, is "not without. a tragic resemblance to the 
Heideggerian or Sartrian being, " and the moment is mirrored* 
also, at the: beginning of Proust's, A La Recherche du Temps 
Perdu (Metamorphoses of the Circle, 33). The fading. away 
of the sense of individual identity' is a familiar experience 
in the novels (see above, Ch. 
-. 
2,. e. g. pp. 35-6). Wonder 
at simply being at all is the starting point of VW's 
exploration of the human situation: 
She was next overcome by the unspeakable 
queerness of the fact that she should be sitting 
in an arm-chair, in the morning, in the middle 
of the world. Who were the people moving in 
the house 
- 
moving things from one place to 
another ? And life, what was that ? 
... 
She 
TUO was overcome with awe that things should exist 
145 at all. 
Thrown into the world like dice (MD, 15) each individual 
must somehow come to terms with the fact of being: 
Then (she had felt it only this morning) 
there was the terror; the overwhelming 
incapacity, one's parents giving it into 
one's hands, this life, to be lived to the end, 
MD to be walked with serenely; there was in the 
203 depths of her heart an awful fear. 
- 
167-- 
The radical astonishment at simply being that many of 
VW's characters display is also recorded in the author's 
diary at several points. It is in Mrs. Dalloway that the 
apprehension of an abstract 'reality' is first strongly 
felt. The entire day of the novel is circumscribed by 
an aura of mystery that promises a revelation that will 
console Clarissa (in particular) in her perception of 
the "emptiness about the heart of life (35)2. The "inner 
meaning" is'only almost expressed-, but it' is enough to 
sustain Clarissa's faith in life and renew her efforts 
to find a solid purpose init. VW, as I have suggested. 
(p. 161), is in the position of, the "solitary traveller" 
of Peter Walsh's dream. Despite our inability to know 
anything absolutely or to reach, any. resting-place in our 
actual lives, we continue. to-hover at the entrance to the 
cavern of mystery, making up the stories that become 
religions and philosophies. 
There is an entry in the diary 
- 
made early 
in the composition of To the Lighthouse 
- 
in which VW 
records her own wonder at being, and also writes very 
directly about her special sense of 'reality'. It is 
particularly interesting in the light of what was said 
in Chapter 2 about Clarissa and Mrs. Ramsay's experiences 
of the soul, to note that 'reality' is apparently synonymous 
with "beauty": 
As for the soul: why did I say I would leave it 
out ?I forget.. And the truth is, one can't 
write directly about the soul. Looked at, it 
vanishes: but look at the ceiling, at Grizzle, 
- 
168 
- 
at the cheaper beasts in the Zoo which are 
exposed to walkers in Regents Park, & the soul 
slips in. It slipped in this afternoon. I 
will write that I said, staring at the bison: 
answering L. absentmindedly; but what was I 
going to write ? 
... 
I enjoy almost everything. Yet I have 
some, restless searcher in me. Why is there not- 
a discovery in life ? Something one can lay 
hands on & say "This is it? " My depression is 
a harrassed feeling 
- 
I'm looking; but that's 
not it 
- 
that's not it. What is it ? And shall 
I die before I find it ? Then (as I was walking 
through Russell Sqre last night) I see mountains 
in the sky: the great clouds; & the moon which 
is risen over Persia; I have a great & astonishing 
sense of something there, which is 'it' - 
It is not exactly beauty that-I mean. It is 
that the thing is in, itself enough: satisfactory; 
achieved. A sense. of my own strangeness, walking 
on the earth is there too: of the infinite oddity 
of the human position; trotting along Russell 
Sqre with the moon up there, & those mountain 
clouds. Who am I, what am I, & so on: these 
questions are always. floating about in me; and 
then I bump against some exact fact -a letter, 
a person, & come to them again with. a great sense 
of freshness. And so it goes on. But, on this 
showing which is true, I think, I do fairly 
D. III frequently come upon this 'it'; & then feel 
62-3 quite at rest. (27.2.1926) 
This entry brings to mind, both Clarissa's tending to the 
sky above her house (MD, 204) and Mrs. Ramsay's seeking a 
world of beauty in nature (TTL, 101). 
There is also an echo here of an essay on 'Montaigne' 
which was written during the composition of Mrs. Dalloway 
(in 1924). The mystery of life seems intimately bound 
up with the mystery of self as an absolute, conclusive 
centre. In the essay UW writes of the soul, saying it 
is "all laced about with nerves and sympathies which affect 
her every action; " none, however, know 
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how she works or what she is except that of 
all things she is the most mysterious, and one's 
CR I self the greatest monster and miracle in the 
96 world. 
Behind this rather playful essayist's tone can be detected 
the overriding concern of the novels, which surfaces at 
the essay's conclusion: 
But, as we watch with absorbed interest the 
enthralling spectacle of a soul'living openly 
beneath our eyes, the question frames itself, 
Is pleasure the end of all ? Whence this 
overwhelming interest in the nature of the soul 7 
Why this overmastering desire to communicate 
with others ? Is the beauty of the world enough, 
or is there, elsewhere, some explanation of the 
mystery ? To this what answer can there be ? 
CR I There is none., There is only one more question: 
97 "Que scais-Je ?" 
"Movement and change are the essence of our being" she 
wrote in the same essay (CR I, 90); the circular movement 
of the conclusion is typical also of the novels. The 
circle, as Poulet amply demonstrates, is the form under 
which thinking about self (as absolute) or God inevitably 
takes place (see Appendix, where self frequently appears 
as a 'centre! ). 
* 
An unobtrusive moment in To the lighthouse reveals-. 
the scope of UW's thought and exemplifies most of what 
has been discussed so far; it can be taken as a paradigm 
of the movement between centre and circumference as which 
- 
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the tension between faith and despair can, be imaged. 
One of Mrs. Ramsay's children, Nancy, broods alone 
over a rock-pool, then raises her eyes to look across 
the sea to the horizon (118-9). Her sense of vastness 
and littleness recalls an important fragment of Pascal's 
entitled Disproportion of Man. The contrast between 
man and nature has been given significance from The 
Vo ae Out onwards (especially noticeable in that first 
novel are the shifts of horizon and perspective occasioned 
by the setting). In that contrast Pascal finds the 
medium by which one can, in the words of his chapter's 
title, make the "transition from knowledge of man to 
knowledge of God" (Pensees, 87). To understand the 
human situation, says Pascal, is to despair; to escape 
from this despair we must pass to'knowledge of God. 
Nature is an infinite sphere whose centre 
is everywhere and circumference nowhere. In 
short it is the greatest perceptible mark of 
Pensges God's omnipotence that our imagination should 
89 lose itself in that thought. 
UW does not roof in Nancy's thought with a similar recourse 
to a deity, but faces the conception of all human being 
reduced to nothingness when set against infinity. Nancy 
is "bound hand and foot" between the two extremes, and, ' 
as Pascal writes, trembles at being suspended between 
"these two abysses of infinity and nothingness" (90). 
Still following Pascal, Nancy contemplates these marvels 
in silence: "So listening to the. waves, crouched over the 
pool, she brooded. " 
- 
171 
- 
For, 
-after all, what is man lin nature? A 
nothing compared'to the infinite, a whole 
compared to-the nothing, a middle point between 
all and nothing, ` infinitely remote from an 
understanding of the extremes; the and of things 
and their principles are unnattainably hidden` 
from him in impenetrable secrecy. 
Equally incapable of seeing the nothingness 
Pensees from which he emerges and the infinity in which 
90 he is engulfed. 
The ineffable meeting-point of the two extremes, 
of centre and circumference, is for Pascal God: God, 
then, is a sign for the unattainable. VW cannot reconcile 
the opposites to a unity in this way; she acknowledges 
the tension, but does not seek the easy resting-place 
of a deity. "God", to her, is a convenient way of 
leaping over the limits of language and thought, 
an imagined transcendence that does away with the 
anguish and rapture of the search for 'reality'. 
She is at once close to and far away from a thinker like 
Pascal: the movement is identical but at the crucial 
moment she refuses to place her trust in a mystery, to 
leap out of human being into mystical faith; her 
thought explodes in tension, does not rest in faith in 
a supernatural agency. Pascal, again, voices the 
fundamental concerns of VW's art: 
Such is our true state. That is what makes us 
incapable of certain knowledge or absolute 
ignorance. We are floating in a medium of 
vast extent, always drifting uncertainly, blown 
to and fro; whenever we think we have a fixed 
point to which we can cling and make fast, it 
shifts and leaves us behind; if we follow it, 
it eludes our grasp, slips away, and flees 
eternally before us. Nothing stands still 
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for us. This is our, natural state and yet the 
state most contrary to our inclinations. We 
burn with desire to find afirm footing, an 
ultimate, lasting base on which to build a 
tower rising up to infinity, but our 
Pensees whole foundation cracks and the earth opens up 
92 into the depths-of the abyss. 
Pascalian anguish is countered in the novels by the 
thought that it is this very hopelessness that makes 
human being so exhilirating and unique; it is the 
journey over the abyss that gives life purpose, the restless 
seeking after 'reality'. While Pascal stays on the human 
plane, his thought and that of the novels exactly correspond; 
he is, as most are, lured away'from`the human by the 
"essentially religious" character of human centrality. 
The mind that speaks the novels allows itself no resting- 
place from which to view human being, and thus the basic 
question is restated by the very form of the art. The 
free-spinning mind can never conclude, can never create 
a whole because wholeness can arise only from a fixed 
point: there can be no centre to infinity or nothingness 
and so all wholes are illusory. Pascal writes that man 
can never know the whole of which he is a part; he 
assumes there is a whole because he has faith in his God; 
VW is not so sure. 
The moments of "rest" that she records in her diary, 
and that such characters as Mrs. Ramsay experience, are 
but brief glimpses of the rich potential of human 
imagination that cannot be sustained in the actual world. 
The novels (and diary) display Pascalian dread in the face 
of an irresolvable problem, but they never give in entirely 
- 
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or permanently to that dread: their joy is in being able 
to achieve that state of dread or anxiety. In the 
movement to despair, hope is renewed; 
-a wavelike rhythm 
that informs all the novels. 
* 
That 'philosophy' with which VW is engaged in Mrs. 
Dalloav and To the Lighthouse is extremely abstruse. 
However, in Orlando its lineaments can, be discerned with 
a clarity which, while lacking'the poetic force of the 
other works, is helpful in unravelling their more 
complex moments. Orlando shares Clarissa Dalloway's 
feeling of surviving after death by absorption in the 
"ebb and flow of things" (MD, 11): 
She, who believed in no immortality, could 
not help feeling that her soul would come 
0 and go forever with the reds on the panels 
285 and the greens on the sofa. 
This soul, then, bears no resemblance to the Christian 
idea of the immortal breath of God informing human life. 
It is what might be described as the 'faculty' which 
apprehends beauty in the world (which, it was noted above, 
is almost synonymous with 'reality'). 
Towards the end of the book, Orlando looks down the 
long tunnel of time that her life has been, but the shock 
of realising herself in the present moment, as the clock 
strikes, instantly dissolves her memories. She is 
- 
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suddenly gripped by tension, for "whenever the gulf of 
time gaped and let a second through some unknown danger 
might come with it" (287-8). From that moment when 
"the whole of her darkened and settled" (282) we should 
understand that she is "one and entire" (288) and for the 
first time experiencing time as a passage towards death. 
It is clear from what follows that the abstract 'reality' 
VW records her experience of, that Clarissa senses in the 
sky, and that Mrs. Ramsay gleans from nature, is intimately 
related to the effort of overcoming the shock of the 
present experienced as a passage to inevitable death. 
Blinking her eyes in a moment of faintness, Orlando 
shuts off the visible, and "in that moment's darkness 
... 
was relieved of the pressure of the present" (289): 
There was something strange in the shadow 
that the flicker'of her'-eyes cast, something 
which (as anyone can test for himself by 
looking now at the sue) is always absent from 
the present 
- 
whence its terror, its nondescript 
character 
- 
something one trembles to pin through 
the body with a name, and call beauty, for it has 
no body, is as a shadow without substance or 
quality of its own, yet has the power to change 
289 whatever it adds itself to. (my italics) 
Here are seen elements which are now familiar: this abstract, 
insubstantial "shadow" (or beauty, or 'reality') is 
nameless; it is a quality absent from the present like 
that apprehended in the sky (cf. MD, 204) in which the 
soul finds rest; i. e. a transcendence of, the passage 
of time. This "beauty" is an ordering quality, giving shape 
to experience, composing what Orlando has seen into 
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"something tolerable, comprehensible" (289), or, it might 
be said, into pattern. 
In the darkness of the mind in solitude is a pool 
"where things dwell in darkness so deep that what they 
are we scarcely know", (290)., ', The style of Orlando (see 
above, pp. 51-2) enables'VW`to'come directly at ideas in 
a way that would seem strained in another work. It is in 
this "part furthest from sight" where things are unnamed 
(290) that the "shadow" of-beauty is received, becoming 
a pool which reflects all that is seen. What she describes 
is a sort of psychic sight that apprehends. not objects 
but their "beauty": the thing itself, the beauty of the 
world which cannot be fixed'with a name. In this state, 
of the apprehension of the numinous, art and religion 
arise; those efforts to overcome life in time. - The actual 
objects of the visible world'remind Orlando of the present, 
and thus, 'a tension is introduced' between the actual, 
and the transcendent world of beauty. This tension is 
necessary if mysticism is to be avoided: the danger. of 
the tendency to mysticism is described in Mrs. Galloway, 
in the passage about the "solitary traveller": 
Such are the visions which ceaselessly float 
up, pace beside, put their faces in front of, 
the actual thing: often overpowering the 
solitary traveller and taking away from him 
MD the sense of the earth, the wish to return, 
64 and giving him for substitute a general peace, 
The complacent contemplation of nature and the dangerous 
I 
mysticism it can lead to will be the focus of my next 
- 
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chapter. Orlando experiences brief moments in which she 
seems to live her memory, but she is constantly anchored 
in the actual world of time 
. 
by, the, visible world around 
her (291). 
In darkness, when the myriad details of actual life 
are obscured, it is easier to Isee, 
where things shape themselves and to see in'the 
pool of the mind now Shakespeare, now a girl 
294 in Russian trousers,,... 
'Reality' is not bound by the particular, named world, 
and yet inheres in that world. The possibility of 
transcendence that VW advocates is not an actual 
possibility, in. the sense that it cannot share the modes 
of being established for identities in the, actual world., 
The being of that abstract 'reality' that Orlando perceives 
in darkness, that Clarissa felt in the sky, and Mrs. Ramsay 
tended to in nature, is evidently intimately bound up 
with the question of the temporality of human being, to 
which we must now turn. 
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Notes to Chapter'Five 
1. (p. 162) James Hafley,. 'Virginia Woolf's Narrators 
and the Art of "Life Itself"', 'in R. Freedman ad., 
- 
Virginia Woolf, 43 
2. (p. 167) 
Like a nun withdrawing, or, a child exploring a 
tower, she went upstairs, paused at the window, 
came to the bathroom. There was the green 
linoleum and a tap dripping. There was an 
MD emptiness about the heart of life; an attic 
35 room. 
3. (p. 167) 
Only for a moment; but it-was enough. It was" 
a sudden revelation, a tinge like a blush which 
one tried to"check, and then, as it spread, one 
yielded to its expansion, and rushed to the 
farthest 'verge and there quivered and felt 
--the world come closer, swollen with some astonishing 
significance, some pressure of rapture, which 
split its, thin skin and gushed and poured with 
an extraordinary alleviation over the cracks" 
and sores. Then, for that moment, she had seen,, 
an illumination; a match burning in, a crocus; 
an, inner meaning almost expressed. 
- 
But the 
MD ' close withdrew; the hard softened. It was over - 
36 the moment. 
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Chapter Six 
A Reading of 'Time Passes' 
Before moving to'theýquestion of temporality in the 
novels generally, it will be useful'to look at what many 
readers have found tobe a'gratuitously'obscure and. eccentric 
piece of writing: the central 'Time Passes' section of 
To the Lighthouse.. Ostensibly, it is intended as a repres- 
entation of the passage of time, and if this were its 
only function it might justifiably be said that VW has 
lost control of her pen here. However, 'Time Passes' 
contributes significantly to'the 'philosophy' implicit in 
the novels. What are'seen as its excesses can be explained 
as VW's efforts to'find some-means of expressing what 
(in several diary passages)-she acknowledges is`beyond 
language. Her method in 'Time Passes' is to state what 
'reality' is not. 
"As anýinfinite circumference, " writes Georges 
Poulet, 
eternity ... is the vastest possible-circle 
of duration; as the centre of this circumference 
it is the fixed point, and unique moment, which 
is. simultaneously in harmony with all the 
circumferential points of this duration. ' 
To the Liohthouse-(which VW felt`had "fetched its circle 
pretty completely") partakes of such double infinity, 
embodying a movement at once towards centre and circumference. 
., 
- 
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Intimations of this movement occur early on: 
'... both of them-looked at the dunes far away, 
and instead of merriment felt come over them 
some sadness 
- 
because-the thing was completed 
partly, and partly because distant views seem 
to outlast by a million years (Lily thought) 
the gazer and to be communing already with a 
36-7 sky which beholds an earth entirely at rest. 
In her diary on September 5th,, 1926, VW wrote: 
The lyric portions of-To the L. are collected 
D. III in the 10 year lapse, and dont interfere with 
106-7 the text so much as usual. 
The "lyric portions" do, 'nevertheless, connect with the 
"text" as they reiterate Lily-Briscoe's'questions and 
raise matters already seenýto be of paramount importance 
in the conception of the world of the novels in general. 
That theme discussed above (pp. 169 f. ) of the 'disprop- 
ortion of man' returns in 'Time Passes', but embedded 
less accessibly in a symbolic poetry which attempts a 
pure abstraction. In her diary and working notes VW 
frequently emphasised the experimental nature of the 
middle section of the novel, and felt at a loss as to 
how to approach it: 
I can't make it out 
- 
here is the most difficult 
abstract piece of writing 
-I have to give an 
empty house, no people's characters, the passage 
D. III of time, all eyeless and featureless with 
76 nothing to cling to: ` (30.4.1926) 
- 
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When she dashed off a couple of-pages, however, she felt 
that "This is not made' up: it, is, the literal fact" (30.4. 
1926). Writing to Vita Sackville-West a week after 
Lighthouse's publication, she admits that she once thought 
'Time Passes' "impossible as prose" Q. III, 374) 
- 
an 
indication, perhaps, of how-it should be approached. 
The actual passage of time is fairly directly conveyed, 
by the description of the house's decay, the encroachment 
of nature, and phrases, telling the reader that time is 
indeed passing, e. g.:.,! 'Night, however, succeeds to night, " 
"Now, day after day, " "Night after night, summer and 
winter. " This section of the novel has an import beyond 
its functional message of a ten year "lapse". In her 
working notes, VW seems to, emphasise her deeper concerns. 
It is worth setting down, her plan for the-section, as 
from this it is clear that she, intended to encompass and 
probe themes prevalent in all her fiction, not just 
interpolate a piece of 'poetic prose': 
To the Lighthouse 
Now the question of the ten years 
The Seasons 
The Skull 
The gradual dissolution of everything; 
This,. is to be contrasted with the permanence of 
-? 
Sun, moon, stars 
Hopeless gulfs of misery 
Cruelty 
The War 
Change 
Cleaning Oblivion 
- 
human vitality 
- 
Old Woman 
She hopped up, valorous, as if a principle 
Human life [1 word illegible) projected 
We are handed on by our children 
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Shawls and shooting capes, 
The devouringness of nature 
But all the time this frame, accumulates 
Darkness 
The welling wind and water" 
What then is the medium through which we regard, 
human beings 72'° 
The last lines I believe refer to that vision of the 
"emptiness about the heart of life" which VW, experiences 
in the passing of time, ' a vision that emerges with 
far greater clarity and directness in her last novel 
and the writings contemporary with it. 
-ý 
As 'Time Passes' begins, the horizon between sea and 
sky almost disappears: night falls. This night adumbrates 
the ten years of abandonment and yet is only an "ordinary! ' 
night. A quasi-religious note is sounded almost immediately, 
an indication of the broader import of this section: 
"divine, goodness" responds to "human penitence" by giving 
a glimpse of noumena, the "thing beneath the semblance 
of the thing" (TW, 116): 
It seemed'now as if, touched by human penitence 
and all its toil, divine goodness had parted the 
curtain and displayed behind it, single, distinct, 
the hare erect; the wave falling; the boat TTL rocking, which, did we deserve them, should be 
198 ours always. 
Religious terms and ideal forms persist in 'Time Passes': 
-182- 
"divine promptitude", "light, bent-to its own image in. 
adoration", "tokens of-divine bounty", "dreamt holily"; 
"the-shape of loveliness itself", . '. 'persistency itself", 
"some absolute good". The 'deity'. allows only a glimpse 
of perfection: the "drench of-hail". that shrouds the 
world's treasures. makes it seem impossible 
that we should ever compose from'their fragments 
a perfect whole or read in the littered pieces 
199 the clear words. of truth. 
Here, certainly, Lily's aspirations are recalled, and the 
idea of a whole (or. the "true nature of our experience", 
as it is termed in the contemporaneous 'Impassioned 
Prose' 
- 
see above,, p.. 125)-. arising from gathered 
fragments links 'Time Passes' to the wider thought of 
the novels. There can, also be seen a close association 
between religion and art. The momentary visions of a 
'reality' apart from actual reality are the typical 
concerns of VW's artists, that which they seek to capture 
and convey. The tendency to a transcendental 'beyond' 
in religious faith, it is suggested, shares the form 
of artistic perception and creation. The difference between 
the two yearnings lies in-the willingness of art 
- 
at 
least UW's art 
- 
to accept defeat and negation as part of 
the experience, never to wish-to be "blown to nothingness" 
(MD, 64) in a mystical transcendence of the actual. 
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In 'Time Passes', the beach, 
-. 
which can certainly be 
taken in one sense as that beach. upon. which the Ramsay, 
children walk and play is-the scene of many questionings. 
of-life's purpose. This, of course, anticipates. Lily, 's 
longing to find "the meaning of life! ' in the third section 
of the novel ('The Lighthouse'). Before an answer can 
be approached, however, the questioners must learn the 
honesty VW's art propounds. 
The first seeker, after an answer is a solitary, 
sleeper who seeks on the beach "what, and why, and wherefore" 
(199), a typical Romantic, looking to nature - and partic- 
ularly the sea 
- 
for an explanation of life and himself. 
His desire to make the-world "reflect the compass of the 
soul" (199) is disappointed: 
Here there is the place, the moment, there 
an indistinct immensity. How to establish 
33 a proportion ? (Poulet, Metamorphoses of 
the Circle) 
Once again, the text is following the path of Pascal's 
"unaided knowledge". Standing an the ambiguous beach 
(so because it is at once part of the land and part of the 
sea), the sleeper is mocked by the bellowing wind for 
his vain attempt. Mrs. Ramsay's death appears as an impassive 
fact, contrasted with the ethereal quest of the solitary 
sleeper: it is a fact of life the meaning of which is 
not to be found in nature. 
r 
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The empty house is, "seen" by the "nameless spirit" 
around which We thoughts were`to-revolve so incessantly 
as she wrote Between the Acts. As distance between perceiver 
and perceived is annihilated, in the vacancy arises pure 
form: "the shape-of loveliness itself" (201). Such 
form is not in the actual world, and so not in time; 
lifeless and solitary, the form 'is' in eternity. 
- 
Without 
the distancing, distorting, shaping and namin of human 
being, there is nothing: "pure form" is one of the myriad 
(false) names of nothingness (n. b. "a form from which 
life had parted", 201). Such form may, it. is suggested, 
be glimpsed ("seen from a , train window, vanishing so 
quickly"). It shares this characteristic with 'reality' 
and the notion of self or soul. Stillness is the key to 
the ideal; movement is essential to life; stasis is death. 
This shape of loveliness iss then, a form of. death (the 
jugs and chairs are suitably shrouded). Qualities (like 
the beauty of the Acropolis in Jacob's Room, 147-8) do 
not share the modes of being of actual human life; only 
by human perception are they brought into the actual 
world3. The sounds of the world are folded into silence; 
only with the return of human life (218) do those sounds 
again become the fragments of a sought-after pattern. 
As VW noted in her diary, her intentions in 'Time Passes' 
were impossible to realise if come at directly. The meaning 
can only emerge as part of its overall context; by shaping 
round what is unsayable, it is 'said' in the act of reading. 
- 
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Mrs. McNab 
- 
the "principle'!, 
-"human vitality" - 
has moments of. light in her darkness. Despite the :::, 
quotidian rhythms of her existence, there is something 
in her that makes her smile and sing, a fundamental 
humanity; inarticulate, but sufficient to motivate life. 
The answer that is "vouchsafed" the beach-walking mystic 
and visionary (implying a'resting in transcendence). 
- 
is-, -not to be shared. The-sense-here is that the inward- 
looking visionaries have little to offer human life. 
It is to the world of being with others, to the shared 
experience of actual human being that VW would direct our 
thoughts, illuminating the "incorrigible hope" that twines 
about even the most apparently desolate aspects of life. 
The third walkers on the beach are "the wakeful, the 
hopeful" (204): they see a commensurability betweeýinature 
and man, a comforting assurance that "goad triumphs, 
happiness prevails, order rules" (205).. The wakeful and 
hopeful assemble elements of nature in the belief that 
they thus bring together the fragments of an inner vision. 
Nature "declares" the truth of this vision, but if 
questioned, the vision at once evaporates. What seems to 
be implied here is that it is only the apparent order 
and unity of nature that impels man to seek a commensurate 
unity within himself. The passage is dotted with indications 
that such a project is to be rejected: the minds of men 
are mirrors in which clouds and shadows form; the season 
of the wakeful and hopeful is "acquiescent" spring, the 
- 
186 
- 
significance of which is soon revealed. 
The wakeful and, hopeful seek universal knowledge which, 
as Pascal knew, is hopeless: 
If, as, Descartes. believed, the first question 
. 
°ý 
is to know oneself, the very act of-the knowledge 
of self, contrary to what Descartes held, leads 
us at once, either-to despair through the 
comprehension'of our misery, or else to catastrophe 
by making obligatory the-impossible, that is to 
35-6 say, universal knowledge. (Poulet, Metamorphoses) 
Death again starkly controverts all hope of security; 
the "diamond in the sand which would render the possessor 
secure" (205) is unattainable. 'Time Passes' is 
implicitly concerned with the urge to fix an absolute 
self, for it is time that proves always to be the downfall 
of the attempt to compose self. In this section of the 
novel VW is not so much attempting to render the experience 
of time, as time 'itself', the time of nature and eternity 
in which all human being appears as but a spark. This 
concern will loom larger in her last novel, but the notion 
is really impossible to grasp unless put in terms of 
human being. Poulet, writing about one of We favourite 
authors 
- 
Montaigne 
- 
draws attention to the inextricable 
relation of time and self, using an image familar in We 
writing: 
The instant is the kingdom of the imperceptible. 
It is the home of what Leibnitz was later to 
call the infinitely small entities. It is an 
- 
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instant which-, is; an. instant, of: passage, "and. which 
therefore is less an instant than the passage 
from instant-to, instant; 
-there is,, soýto speak, 
an infinity of microscopic changes in all the 
shades of being. - It is a. wagertto attempt. to, 
"choose and lay hold of so many nimble little 
motions", [Iiontaign, to hope; to disentangle 
"a thing so mixed, so slender, and so fortuitous. " 
It is all theýmoreýso"because: the. incommensurable 
volubility of tenuous elements, which makes 
up the mind, is-volubility. of. the thinking act 
as well as of its thoughts. Thus the self is ' 
dissolved, rnot only from instant to instant but 
even in the middle of the instant-passage, 
in a prfgms 
. 
ic,, plsy`], jkZ that $ spray ; Lt 
45 water. 4 1 (Studies in Human'"Time, 
- 
my italics) 
War ultimately demonstrates the illusion that a 
commensurability between man and nature is. "Those" 
who go down to the beach to seek answers in sea and sky 
are finally shaken out of complacency by the evidence of 
war. How does the image of an ashen-coloured ship reflect 
their benevolent deity-:? The tone is deeply mocking of 
that "scene calculated to stir the most sublime reflections 
and lead to the most comfortable conclusions" (207), 
setting itself firmly against the visions of divine 
harmony the Romantics (in particular) found in the 
5 
contemplation of natures. This intrusion of an image of 
man-made death forces the beach-walker to a new honesty: 
nature is entirely indifferent to man6. 
That dream, then, of sharing, completing, finding 
in solitude on the beach an answer, was but a 
reflection in a mirror, and the mirror itself 
was but the surface glassiness which forms 
in quiescence when the nobler powers sleep 
208 beneath ? 
- 
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The question-mark is surprising, but expressive`of the-` 
movement towards the conclusion that "the mirror was 
broken" (208). By`onlyýlooking-outwards'to nature, away 
from his own being, by making no'effort, 'man simply 
reflects the nature he is thrown into, 'denying his actual 
being by losing it in theäuniversal7. In support of this 
idea we can turn to a most significant entry in We 
diary, made on October 11th, 1929, in which the word 
"acquiescence" forms a direct link with the novel; the 
concerns of Between the Acts"it might also be noted, are 
once more adumbrated: 
'I 
... 
and for all this,, there is a vacancy and 
silence somewhere in the machine. On the 
whole I do not much mind; because what I like 
is to flash and dash from side to side., goaded 
on by what I call reality. If I never felt 
these extraordinarily'pervasive strains - of 
unrest or rest or', happiness or discomfort - 
I should float down into acquiescence. Here 
is something to fight; and when I wake early 
I say to myself Fight', fight. If I could 
catch the feeling, I would; the feeling of the 
singing of the real world, as one is driven by 
loneliness and silence from the habitable world; 
the sense that comes to me now of being bound 
upon an adventure; 
... 
But anything is possible. 
And this curious steed, life, is genuine. Does 
any of this convey what I want to say ? But I 
D. III have not rgally laid hands on the emptiness 
260 after all. (11.10.1929) 
The import of this passage evidently spreads far beyond 
the immediate concerns. The approach to understanding 
VW's thought must, I feel, lie in such concatenation of 
passages, a gathering of fragments. With the mirror of 
0 
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complacency broken, ' nature and man are, divorced: art, in; 
the form of Mr. Carmichael's poetry,, is-the fact of life 
that is set against mystic, visions now (208). 
Released from the illusion of reflected beauty and 
unity, nature is seen as a reasonless and indifferent 
force; time also, "(for night and day, month and year 
ran shapelessly together)" (209). Nature in the novel is 
like Pascal's desert island: it is what we are thrown 
into. Attempts to find unity between that emptiness 
(for nature is empty at heart) and our being are hopeless, 
resulting only in illusions. 
- 
Memory, by which, as we 
have seen, the sense of identity must be formed and 
sustained, is helpless in stemming the rising "pool of 
Time": 
What power could, now prevent the fertility, the 
insensibility of nature ? Mrs. McNab's dream 
of a lady, of a child, of a plate of milk soup ? 
TTL It had wavered over the walls like a spot of 
213 sunlight and vanished. 
Here on the desert island, memory proves itself 
miserably ineffectual. It could only, by the 
vain miracle of affective reviviscence, transport 
us from island to island, from moment to moment, 
and from place to place. Never, for any moment 
nor for any place, could it tell us who put us 
34 there, nor what we are doing there. (Poulet, Metamorphoses) 
The language of 'Time Passes' reveals an acute 
struggle in UW's thinking: while suffused with the religious 
sense, it rejects the idea of any external agency, of the 
supernatural. Despite this, it does suggest an informing 
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I 
'spirit' 
- 
or, at least, a pattern 
-which might be. described 
as the non-being from which being arises, and against which 
being stands out. This otherness is usually misrepresented 
by mystics and visionaries who seek an escape from the 
actuality of human being. Without the creative power 
of human being, nature (or eternity 
-they seem synonymous 
here) will prevail. Human being, then, is seen as 
'rescued' from the dark nothingness of amorphous nature/eternity. 
The "singing of the real world", the "voice of the 
beauty of the world" (219) (Mrs. Ramsay was described as 
"the beauty of the world", 61), goes on unheeded by the 
sleepers, who might be taken as representing the majority 
of human beings. Again and again VW emphasises that 
apprehension of 'reality' is available only through 
effort. This is not to say that it can be achieved at 
will, for it is evident that only a very few are 
privileged to understand the effort required to live in 
such a way as to be susceptible to the experience. The 
voice of beauty is indifferent to those who sleep 
heedless of it: if they prefer to sleep, 
"gently then without complaint, or argument, the voice 
would sing its song" (220). It is significant that the 
passage closes with the awakening of Lily, the artist, to 
whom the song has penetrated (221). 
To even think about what VW might mean is immediately 
to turn away from 'it' because its mode of being is 
metalinguistic. It is perhaps this inability of hers to 
put in actual terms what she means by 'reality', beauty, 
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soul that gives the 'philosophy', implicit in the novels 
its essentially religious character. 
- 
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Notes to Chapter Six 
1. (p. 178) Metamoiphbses of the Circle,, xii-xiii 
2. (p. 181) Quoted in Jane Novak, The Razor Edge of Balance, '57 
3. (p. 184) Poulet, Studies in Human Time, writes this 
of Montaigne's search for solutions: 
Neither God nor nature gives being to thought; tlhey 
give it"only a momentary form. Only one thing 
remains:. never to look fora phantom being, 
outside the human condition, but to accept 
the situation for what it is, an existence 
which is-not -being, which, is only "flux, 
shadow, and perpetual variation": "I do 
not depict being, " says Montaigne, `"I'depict 
42-3 passage. " 
4. (p. 187) See also, e. g., 'Moments of Being': 
AHH 
... 
she saw the very fountain of her being 
95 'spurting its pure silver. drops. 
5. (p. 187) Cf. Robert Kiely, Beyond Egotism, Ch. 1 
6" (p. 187) See 'On Being I11''(1930): 
It'is only the recumbent who know. what, "after all, 
Nature is'at no pains to conceal 
- 
that she in 
the'end, will conquer; heat will leave the 
world; stiff with frost we shall cease to drag; 
ourselves about the fields; ice will lie thick, 
upon factory and, engine; the'sun will go out. 
Even, so, when the whole earth is sheeted and-, 
slippery, some undulation, some irregularity 
'of surface will mark the boundary. of an ancient 
garden, and there, thrusting up its head undaunted ' 
in the starlight, the rose will flower,. the crocus 
will burn. But with-"the hook of life still' 
in us still we must wriggle. We cannot stiffen--, 
peaceably ' into, glassy mounds. 
_ 
Even the'recumbent 
spring up at the, mere imagination'of frost, 
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about the toes and stretch out to avail themselves 
of the universal hope - Heaven, Immortality. 
Surely, since men have been wishing all these 
ages, they will have wished something into 
existence; there will, be some green isle for 
CE IV the'mind to rest on even if the foot cannot 
198 plant itself there. 
7.. (p. 188) It is interesting to note here the conclusion 
to a review of H. Fielding Hall's The Inward Light that 
UW wrote in 1908: 
The continued metaphors in which their philosophy 
is expressed, -taken. from, the wind and light,, 
waters,. chains of bubbles and other sustained 
forces, solve all personal energy into one 
suave stream. It. is wise and harmonious, 
beautifully simple and innocent, but, if, 
religion is, as Mr. Hall defines it, "a way of, 
looking at the world", is, this the richest 
way 7 Does it require any faith so high as 
CW' that which believes that it is right to develop 
46 your powers to-the utmost 7 
8. (p. 188) See also The Waves, holograph draft 2: 
her effort is to 
make us acquiescent as she is; ours, to fling 
-off, to get up, to explore,, not to be. overcome. 
Graham And I will not fail I said: I will not acquiesce. 
698 1 will not lose my sense of the enemy. 
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Chapter Seven 
Time 
Now there is nothing so mysterious, so enigmatic, 
so wonderful as Time. It is not only that it 
is the most difficult of all problems; it is 
also the most urgent, the one which most frequently 
confronts us and reminds us of its actual 
importance, the one which is perpetually exper- 
ienced not only as a thought, but as the very 
essence of our being. We are not only living 
in time; we are living time; we are time. 
1 
* 
VW's concept of time is essentially Romantic. A 
sense of transience, of the deficiencies of human life 
in time, pervades her writing, and with no belief in a 
supernatural agency, any possibility of transcending the 
horizon of time must be rooted in actual experience. 
The most significant feature of the Romantic concept of 
time is identified by Georges Poulet as a belief in the 
continued existence of the past. That such a belief 
was an important part of UW's thinking is vaguely 
implied even as early as The Voyage Out: 
She was haunted by absurd jumbled ideas - how 
if one went back far enough, everything 
perhaps was intelligible; everything was in 
common; for the mammoths who pastured in the 
fields of Richmond High Street had turned 
into paving stones andboxes full of ribbon, 
73 and her aunts. 
The immanence of the past in the present is felt more 
definitely later in the novel: 
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The time of Elizabeth was only distant from the 
present time by a moment of space compared with 
the ages which had passed since the water had 
run between those banks, and the green thickets 
swarmed there, and the small trees had grown 
323 to huge wrinkled trees in solitude. 
Such intimations of the past's persistence in the 
present lead easily to a belief in the continued existence 
of. some 'part' of people's being after death 
-a belief 
that Clarissa voices in Mrs. Dalloway. The fact of death 
'temporalizes' human being; it is that which manifests 
the horizon of time by which all actual being is bounded. 
VW's novels (which she once wrote she would prefer to 
call "elegies") testify-to a potential in human experience 
for perceiving a time out of time, for overcoming the 
limits of actual life through apprehension of a different 
mode of being altogether. 
Her acute sense-Of life's transience and the search 
for a way of overcoming it may have arisen from the 
devastating experiences of her childhood. In an early 
memoir ('Reminiscences', 1907/8) she wrote that 
the effect of death upon those that live 
MOB is always strange, and often terrible in the 
31 havoc it makes with innocent desires. 
The "greatest disaster that could happen" was the death 
of Julia, her mother. The sombre world of death and 
mourning that may be discovered in Leslie Stephen's 
Mausoleum Book is recalled throughout We fiction. 
It is interesting to note in the description of Julia 
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Stephen in 'Reminiscences' the similarity between mother 
and daughter's sense of life's ephemerality: 
She kept herself marvellously alive to all the 
changes that went on round her, as though she 
heard perpetually the ticking of a vast clock 
MOB and could never forget that some day it would 
35 cease for all of us. 
Her daughter records that Julia saw those around her as 
a "vast procession on the march towards death"2. Like 
VW9 she was poised between making the most of things 
since we know nothing of the future, and thinking that 
nothing mattered, as perhaps there is no future. 
The deaths that occurred in her early life - particul- 
any that of her mother 
- 
were constantly in Ws mind: 
0. II People never get over their early impressions 
298 of death I think. I always feel pursued. (5.4.1924) 
Evidence of this persistence is found, for example, in 
the striking similarity between a description of Julia's 
death written in 1924, and another written in 1940: 
This is the 29th anniversary of mother's death. 
I think it happened early on a Sunday morning, 
and I looked out of the nursery window and saw 
old Dr. Seton walking away with his hands behind 
his back, as if to say It is finished, and then 
the doves descending, to peck-in the road, 
D. II 'I suppose, with a fall & descent of infinite 
300 peace. (5.5.1924) 
- 
197 
- 
I leant ' out. of. the nursery window the morning 
she died. It was about six, I suppose. I saw 
Or Seton walk-away up the street with his head 
bent and his hands clasped behind his back. 
I saw the pigeons floating and settling. I got 
a feeling of calm, sadness, and finality. It 
was a beautiful blue spring morning, and very 
MOB still. That brings back the feeling that 
84 everything has come to an end. 
The late memoir, A Sketch of the Past (from which the latter 
quotation comes), makes clear that VW felt the deaths 
of her mother and Stella (her half-sister), and later her 
brother Thoby, in some way revealed to her the true 
lineaments of life: - 
But at 15 to have that protection removed, 
to be tumbled out of the family shelter, to see 
-cracks and gashes in that fabric, to be cut by 
them, to see beyond them 
- 
was that good 7 
... 
I would see3(after Thoby's death) two great 
grindstones (as I walked round Gordon Sqe) 
and myself between them. I would typify a 
contest between myself and "them" 
- 
some 
'invisible giant. I would reason, or fancy, 
that if life were thus made to rear and kick, 
it was at any rate, the real thing. Nobody 
could say I had been fobbed off with an 
unmeaning slip of the precious matter. So I 
came to think of life as something of extreme 
reality. And this, of course, 'increased my 
feeling of my own importance. Not in relation 
to human beings: in-relation to the force which 
X708 had respected me sufficiently to make me feel 
118 what was real. 
Allowing'for the retrospective modifications of memory, 
we may'say that We sense'of a distinct 'reality'"apart 
prom the general reality of everyday life began to develop 
very early in her life. 
* 
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In many of the transitional sketches that helped VW 
towards Jacob's Room (see D. II9 13; 26.1.1920) 
- 
'An 
Unwritten Novel', 'Kew Gardens', 'The Mark an the Wall' 
- 
the ghostly atmosphere of that novel is already prevalent, 
a sense that what is seen is transient, passed away as 
soon as looked at. Jacob's Room is elegaic, incorporating 
the traditional elements of lonely widows, tolling bells, 
and country churchyards; echoes of the dead reverberate 
through the novel, mingling inextricably with the voices 
of the living. It was in Jacob's Room that VW felt she had 
"found out how to begin (at 40) to say something in my 
own voice" (D. II, 186; 26.7.1922). Although death had 
been a significant element of her first novel, it does not 
assume the thematic importance it was to retain in her 
fiction until Jacob's Room. 
This novel is, so to speak, 'bracketed', for instance 
by the repetition of certain phrases, giving it the 
appearance of being 'scenes from a life's 
Then here is another scrap of conversation; 
the time about eleven in the morning; the scene 
126 a studio; and the day Sunday. 
More than once it is stressed that Jacob is a shadow, 
blown through the pages of the book like a leaf by the wind. 
Even in the beginning, on the beach, there is an undefinable 
note of absence, of loss; a sense that Jacob is already 
gone when the work opens, that what follows is only an 
attempt to imagine his life (which is, of course, only 
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imaginary). This note can be heard in Archer's calling 
for his brother: 
"Ja-cob! Ja-cob: " shouted Archer, lagging on 
after a second. 
The voice had an extraordinary sadness. Pure 
from. all body, pure from all passion, going out 
into the world, solitary, unanswered, breaking 
7 against rocks 
- 
so it sounded. 
To call and receive no answer. is, an intimation of death. 
Jacob's death is unseen, unknown; all that-is known of 
death is its effect on the living, which. was. UW's habitual 
focus. At the close of the book, as Bonamy echoes Archer's 
cry (a bracket), it is the continuing passage of time that 
dominates. 
The sense of the passing of time grows increasingly 
strong in UW's diary from 1920 onwards, and with it her 
search for something apart from time, for moments of 
timelessness: 
Nowadays I'm often overcome by London; even 
think of the dead who have walked in the city. 
Perhaps one might visit (c ty) the churches. The 
view of the grey white spires from Hungerford 
D. II Bridge brings it to me; and yet I can't say 
47-8 what 'it' is. (8.6.1920) 
Why'do I trouble to be so particular with facts ? 
. 
I, think it is my sense of the flight of time: so 
soon Towers Place will be no more; & twigs, 
&I that write. I feel time racing like a film 
D. II at the Cinema. I try to stop it. I prod it 
158 with my pen. I try to pin it down. (22.1.1922) 
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D. II I have the sense of the flight of time; and this 
247 shores up my emotions. (13.6.1923) 
In Mrs. Dallowav, Clarissa expresses her belief in 
surviving death through the "odd affinities" she has with 
people and places: 
... 
somehow in the streets of London, on the 
ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, 
Peter survived, lived in each other, she being 
part, she was positive, of the trees at home; of 
the house there, ugly, rambling all to bits 
and pieces as it was; part of people she had 
never met; being laid out like a mist between 
the people she knew best, who lifted her on 
their branches as she had seen the trees lift 
the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, 
11-12 herself. 
Later in the novel this (Romantic) autochthonous idea 
is repeated: 
But she said, sitting on the bus going up 
Shaftesbury Avenue, she felt herself everywhere; 
not "here, here, here"; and she tapped the back 
of the seat; but everywhere. She waved her hand, 
going up Shaftesbury Avenue. She was all that. 
So that to know her, or anyone, one must seek 
out the people she had never spoken to, some 
woman in the street, some man behind a counter 
-.. 
even trees, or barns. It ended in a transcendental 
theory which, with her horror of death, allowed 
her to believe, or say that, -. she believed (for 
all her scepticism), that since our apparitions, 
the part of us which appears, are so momentary 
compared with the other, the unseen part of us, 
which spreads wide, the unseen might survive, 
be recovered somehow attached to this person 
or that, or even haunting certain places, after 
168 death. Perhaps 
- 
perhaps. 
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As if to illustrate the truth of this theory, there is 
a remarkable "odd affinity" between Clarissa and Septimus 
("She felt somehow very like him 
- 
the young man-who had 
killed himself", 204). His death seems to endorse Clarissa's 
understanding of the nature of, life, something she believes 
to be distorted and covered over by love and religion: 
And the supreme mystery which Kilman might say 
she had solved, or Peter might say he had solved, 
but Clarissa didn't believe either of them had 
the ghost of an idea of solving, was simply 
this: here was one room; there another. Did 
141 religion solve that, or love ? 
This simple 'philosophy of life' is expressive of the 
divisions between one human being and another. As has 
been noted many times, there is a profound sense of longing 
in VW's writings that arises largely from the sense of 
human separateness, and the failure-of relationship. to 
provide anything tangible. 
Clarissa's "transcendental theory"-suggests that 
divisions can be overcome, perhaps, by what VW sometimes 
called the soul ("the unseen part of us, which spreads 
wide"). The word 'soul' occurs frequently in the novel, 
and also in Ws diary from about 1922, but in both 
contexts it is never given any very clear meaning. She 
uses 'soul' to signify the essence of a person, and in 
this signification might be seen a move towards belief 
in transcendence, the existence of something apart from 
all modalities (a self). As, already seen, however, this 
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essence cannot be approached directly or described: 
... 
but then I should have to speak of the soul, 
and did I not banish the soul when I began ? 
What happens is, as usual, that I'm going to 
write about the soul and life breaks in. 
... 
In scribbling this, I am led away from my soul, 
which interests me nevertheless. My soul peeped 
out. For it is the soul I fancy that comments 
on visitors and reports their""comments, & 
sometimes sets up such a to-do in the central 
D. II departments of my machinery that the whole 
234-5 globe of me dwindles to a button-head. (19.2.1923) 
Love and religion destroy-the "privacy of the soul" in 
Clarissa's view (140) by their attempt to conclude, to 
state what the essence of life is. 
Mrs. Dalloway is'explicitly concerned with'the experi- 
ence of time (an early title was The Hours) and the role 
of memory. Life is characterised as a tension between 
lived time and clock time. Freud, writing about Maury's 
famous dream of being guillotined (The Interpretation 
of Dreams, 88 f. ) says that 
it seemed to show that a dream is able to 
compress into a very short space of time an 
amount of perceptual matter far greater than 
the amount of ideational matter that can be 
131 dealt with by our waking mind. 
We novels reverse this, emphasising the great discrepancy 
that exists between the'time of the waking mind and that 
ticked off by clocks4. The most fundamental aspect of 
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lived time is tension, which arises from the workings of 
memory5. Mrs Dalloway successfully conveys this form of 
life, because the act of reading at once involves the 
reader in the ambiguities of the'different characters' 
experiences of time. 3. Hillis Miller has noted that 
memory often "displaces altogether the real present of 
the novel and becomes the virtual present of the reader's 
experience"b. 
The seminal event of Clarissa's refusal of Peter at 
Bourtan reverberates throughout the navel, seeming, to 
Peter at least, to have defined his life (see above, p. 97). 
It might be said that In the way shared memories irrupt 
into the present of the main characters can be seen a 
possibility of overcoming human separateness. The life of 
memory is not actual; it is an immaterial substance, an 
access to a timeless world within the world of time. 
Clock time threatens an individual's sense of continuity, 
because it takes no account of the lived experience of 
time; this threat is actualised in the novel when Clarissa 
calls out after Peter, as he leaves her house after their 
reunion: 
54 
"My party! Remember my party tonight! " she 
cried, having to, raise her voice against the 
roar of the open air, and, overwhelmed by the 
traffic and the sound of all the clocks striking, 
her voice crying "Remember my party tonight! " 
sounded frail and thin and very far away as Peter 
Walsh shut the door. 
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If Big Ben strikes clock time, the bell of St. Margaret's 
seems to 'sound' lived time: it does not coincide with the 
authoritative strokes of Big Ben, but seems "like something 
alive". For Peter, the sound contains past, present, and 
future; it recalls that moment from the past shared by 
he and Clarissa, which is separated from their 'present' 
by only a moment of space, but also by many of Big Ben's 
leaden circles. The moment of intimacy has its being 
in Peter's memory, at one remove, so to speak, from the 
actual. Peter himself is uncertain of the moment: 
But what room ? What moment ? And why had 
he been so profoundly happy when the clock 
56 was striking ? 
The sound of the striking clock contains both his 
prevailing mood of sadness (at the memory of Clarissa's 
refusal) and his memory of happiness with her. The 
dislocation of these perspectives unnerves Peter, and 
produces an image of the future which compounds his wretched 
feelings. To regain his sense of identity, Peter rebels 
against the inexorable bell that is sounding away the 
moments of his life: 
No! ' No! he cried. She is not dead: I am not 
old, he cried, and marched up Whitehall, as if 
there rolled down to him, vigorous, unending, 
56 his future. 
"The future lies in the hands of young men like that", 
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says Peter as a squadron marches past. He seems to wish 
to. reorganise his past, thinking himself back to how he 
was thirty years previously, to adapt his memories to his 
present consciousness in a way that will not represent 
to him what he feels is his failure. As if to deny the 
possibility of being anywhere but at the front of a rushing 
train of time, the human emblems of clock time sweep 
Peter's dreams and memories away: 
... 
on they marched, past him, past everyone, 
in their steady way, as if one will worked 
legs and arms uniformly, and life, with its 
varieties, its irreticences, had been laid 
under a pavement of monuments and wreaths and 
drugged into a stiff yet staring corpse by 
57 discipline. 
The different times must be. synthesised: linear, 
leaden circles, pealing out with inexorable regularity,, and 
the erratic instants of a sudden plunge into the moment. 
Peter Walsh and Clarissa cannot bear to live lineally, 
but strive throughout the novel to complete a circle, 
joining past and. present in the hope of achieving unity. 
The party at, the end, which brings the protagonists of 
the earlier event together once more, does not solve the 
problem because the characters are no longer those people 
that came-together, at Bourton. 
, 
This "incomplete circle" 
(Hillis, Miller) is the form of, the novel; it involves 
the reader by placing him in the memories of the characters 
(and vice-versa). For the reader, then, the circle can 
be. completed in that the whole timescale is not in the 
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actual world of time and death,, but in the virtual space 
between reader and text. 
The form of the novel anticipates. a historic conscious- 
ness that is enshrined in T. S. E1iot's quartet of 1935, 
Burnt Norton: 
Time past and time future 
What might have been and what has been 
44-46 Point to one end, which is always present. 
Such a historic consciousness is most fully expressed 
in VW's last novel, Between the Acts. For a formal 
articulation"of what the idea implies, we may turn to 
Cassirer's Logic of the Humanities: 
History, viewed as spiritual, is in no sense 
a mere succession of events separating and 
supplanting each other in time. It is, in the 
midst of this change, an eternal present. 
... Its 'meaning' is in no one of its moments; 
and yet, in each of them, it is complete and 
56 unbroken. 
The continuous present is created only in the act of reading. 
For the novel's characters, however, the moment passes, as 
do all moments. 
If the Clarissa-Peter-Richard side of Mrs.. Dalloway 
exemplifies the common human experience of time, that other 
strand of the novel, that relates Septimus Smith's final 
hours, constructs an image of the actual experience of 
timelessness. This is a paradox the possibility of, which 
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is explained only, by the breakdown of the limits 'normality' 
imposes on each individual: VW is quite explicit in her 
diary about the source in her own experience of the 
contours of Septimus's madness 
7 
Septimus seems to have fallen out of time; "he is 
caught in-a perpetual present, a horrific timelessness 
in which he is no`longer sheltered by past and future8. 
The striking clocks of the actual world do not penetrate 
to Septimus because he experiences himself as beyond time, 
high above the world where time's "leaden circles" 
dissolve. It is peculiarly ironic that Septimus should 
be taken for "help" to the clockwork Bradshaw who gives 
just three quarters of an hour to his patients in his 
offices on Harley Street, where the clocks shred and slice 
the day (113). 
Septimus's sense of the oneness of the world is a 
refusal to admit death: if he does not recognise the passage 
of time, he need not admit death. This, indeed, is the 
basic tenet of his "new religion"; birds sing to him 
"from trees in the meadow of life beyond a river where 
the dead walk, -, how there is no death" (28). It is'in 
his belief in transcendence that Septimus is allied to 
Clarissa, the difference between them being that he has 
lost all touch with the actual. Like Clarissa, Septimus 
sees himself as wholly essenca, 'as soul. It is for this 
reason that he cannot communicate his visions. They come 
to him "not in actual words" but in a "language" he cannot 
read (25). Clarissa, too, feels the pressure of "an inner 
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meaning, almost expressed" (36), but remains rooted in her 
embodied, time-bound, 
aactual 
life. 
Septimus's death reveals to Clarissa a "thing there 
was that mattered" (202): as in. so many entries in the 
diary, language halts here. The meaning must be drawn 
from the similarity of expression that is found wherever 
VW writes of the 'essence' of life. Death reveals the 
"impossibility of reaching the centre" because it manifests 
the ultimate horizon of time in human life. However much 
the moment is expanded, the past recreated, or a sense of 
being outside time achieved, the actual fact of death 
circumscribes all effort. In death, however, Septimus 
both retains his integrity and communicates to Clarissa. 
This communication argues for an abstract 'reality' in 
which the soul can find rest and continue to exist, but 
not in the modes of actual life, and not within the scope 
of language. 
* 
In an essay on De Quincey ('Impassioned Prose', 1926), 
VW asked in conclusion 
Whether the prose writer, the novelist, might 
not capture fuller and finer truths than are 
CE I now his aim if he ventured into those shadowy 
172 regions where De Quincey has been before him. 
De Quincey's "most perfect passages", she wrote, 
- 
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are - descriptions of states of mind in which, 
CE I often, time is miraculously prolonged and space 
172 miraculously expanded 
This could describe many significant passages of Ws 
own novels, which seek to "make of the moment something 
permanent" (TTL, 249). The novels are lyrics, in Cassirer's 
definition that 
by losing itself Iin the moment, seeking nothing 
else than to exhaust it of its entire mood 
and atmosphere (the lyric] th6reby invests it 
with duration and eternity. 
The effort to escape from the ceaseless flow of future to 
past that is our present is a common human effort, as 
Poulet notes: 
Each poet, each religion, each'philosophy, 
each time has collaborated in man's attempt 
22 to escape out of time. 
Faith in the possibility of such an escape must entail - 
as it did in the Romantics' case 
- 
belief in the continued 
existence of the past. This Poulet holds to be the 
"essential belief" of "nearly all the Romanticists": 
All our life, and especially all our childhood, 
with all our perceptions, images and feelings, 
and whatever ideas we have had, persists in our 
mind; but as we are living in duration, it is not 
permitted to us to have anything but rare glimpses, 
disconnected reminiscences, of this immense 
11 treasure stored in a remote place in our soul. 
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Life constantly vanishing into the-past (e. g. TTL, 172-3) 
and the possibility of its recovery10 is a recurring centre 
in VW's thought, a significant mapping of the deep tension 
in all her thinking between faith and despair: 
Now-is life very solid or very shifting ?I 
am haunted by the two contradictions. This 
has gone, on forever: will last forever; goes 
down to the bottom of the world 
- 
this moment 
I stand on. Also. it is transitory, flying, 
diaphanous. I shall pass like a cloud on the 
waves. Perhaps it may be that though we change; 
one flying after another, so quick so quick, 
yet we are somehow successive, & continuous - 
D. III we human beings; & show the light through. 
218 But what is the light ? (4.1.1929) 
The "light" I understand as synonymous with 'reality': 
that essence that is apart from all modalities of, being 
and continuous. It is this timelessness that Lily Briscoe 
attempts to capture in her painting through the recreation 
as a work of art of her own past. Memory and art are 
explicitly identified with one another by Lily: 
That woman 
... 
made out of that miserable 
silliness and spite (she and Charles squabbling, 
sparring, had been silly and spiteful) something 
... 
which survived, after all these years complete, 
so that she dipped into it to re-fashion her 
TTL memory of him, and it stayed in the mind almost 
248-9 like a work of art11. 
Lily continues by reframing "the old question which 
traversed the sky of the soul perpetually": What is the 
meaning of life ? The answer she gives to herself illuminates 
- 
211 
- 
once more the close association. between the modes of being 
of memory and of art: 
The great revelation had never come. The great 
revelation perhaps never did come. Instead 
there were little daily miracles, illuminations, 
matches struck unexpectedly in the dark; here 
was one. This, that, and the other; herself and 
Charles Tansley and the breaking wave; Mrs. 
Ramsay bringing them together; Mrs. Ramsay 
saying "Life stand still here": Mrs. Ramsay 
making of the moment something permanent (as 
in another sphere Lily herself tried to make of 
the moment something permanent) - this was of 
249 the nature of a revelation. 
VW frequently wrote of novelists being 'closer' to life, 
to 'reality', than o-ther artists. Fiction is defined by 
the creation of a world of time out of time. Novels can 
achieve a fixing of single moments because they embody 
a (fictional) present (which may be written as a past) that 
can be experienced over and over again as a 'present' in 
the act of reading. In this may be seen a correlation 
between We 'reality' and her concept of art's ability 
to overcome time (and hence death)12. 
* 
Identity must have a base; this can be provided by 
the sense of one's physical being, by a sense of being 
defined by a name, or through relationship with another. 
Whatever a person's identity, it must exist in and through 
time; there must be a temporal as well as 'a spatial aspect 
in the formation of identity. However, the present is 
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not a unity to be fixed, but the endless flow of future to 
past. Because past and present can never (as far as 
actual human identity is concerned) be completely synthesised 
an autonomous identity can never form; it proceeds 
constantly towards death. To locate oneself in time, 
therefore, requires continuous effort. 
The sense that life is a battle against nothingness, 
that all actions and efforts are merely necessary but 
futile attempts to disguise life's empty centre, is strong 
in VW's thinking. Clock time carries forward a vegetative 
life controlled by forces that have nothing to do with 
identity; individual life must be rescued from those 
forces13. This sense is prevalent in The Waves, in which 
the lives of the six characters appear as random moments 
of organisation rescued from unidentified chaos. The 
import of life being seen as poised over an abyss from 
which only an accident has momentarily drawn consciousness 
is that it is not, then, a progression from one moment to 
the next in order, but has its being in a loop that 
expands around us all 
- 
eternity. The past is always there, 
ready-to-irrupt into the present at any moment. 
The precariousness of the hold that identity needs to 
retain on its 'present' is illustrated by a moment in 
Bernard's life: ' 
And, what is this moment of time, this particular 
day in which I have found myself caught ? The 
growl of traffic might be any uproar 
- 
forest 
trees or the roar of wild beasts. Time has 
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whizzed back an inch or two on'its reel; our 
short progress has been cancelled. I think 
also that our bodies are in truth naked. We are 
only lightly covered with buttoned cloth; and 
beneath these pavements are shells, bones 
81 and silence. 
This is not an isolated mood of a single moment but a 
characteristic expression of an attitude to human being 
that is found in other of VW's novels too. At the reunion 
dinner, Bernard recalls, 
we felt enlarge itself round us the huge 
blackness of what is outside us, of what we are 
197 not. 
It is this radical awareness of being in the face of the 
possibility of not being that charges VW's fiction with 
its need for faith and its tendency to despair. 
I reflect now that the earth is only a pebble 
flicked off accidentally from the face of the 
TW sun and that there is no life anywhere in the 
159 abysses of space. 
In the face of such perception human history becomes 
meaningless: 
It roars; the lighted strip of history is past 
and our Kings and Queens; we are gone; our 
civilisation; the Nile; and all life. Our 
TLI separate drops are dissolved; we are extinct, 
160 lost in the abysses of time, in the darkness. 
Thus Louis voices the brooding perception of the ultimate 
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emptiness of human being that pervades all VW's fiction. 
For meaning, for a centre, she looked to a 'reality' that 
escaped the decadence of human being's spatio-temporal 
horizons, a 'reality' the experience of which she could 
express, but not the nature. Her faith is in a. consciousness 
of eternity, dissolving the human-made divisions of past, 
present, and future, a 'being' in the mode of nothingness, 
offered in her art. 
* 
The hope for order, for meaning, is not abandoned 
after The Waves. At the party which closes The Years, 
bringing together the different generations, several 
characters are troubled by that now familiar sense 
of human separateness. In the face of the chaos to which 
memory reduces life (e. g. TY, 358) there is still a 
yearning for conclusiveness: 
Millions of things came back to her. Atoms 
danced apart and massed themselves. But how 
did they compose what people called a life ? 
... Perhaps there's "I" at the middle of it, she 
395 thought; a knot; a centre. 
It is the fact of the *ast's persistence into the present 
(in memory) that gives Eleanor Pargiter the vague hope of 
an order to life: 
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And suddenly it seemed to Eleanor that ii had 
all happened before.. So a girl had come in that 
night in the restaurant: had stood, vibrating, 
in the door. She knew exactly what he was going 
to say. 
... 
As she thought it he said it. 
Does everything then come over again a little 
differently ? she thought. If so, is there a 
pattern; a theme, recurring, like music; half 
remembered, half foreseen ? 
... 
a gigantic 
pattern, momentarily perceptible ? 
... 
But 
who makes-it ? Who thinks it ? Her mind slipped. 
398 She could not finish her thought. 14 
Peggy, too, feels intimations of the possibility of 
a state of being, in which there was real laughter, 
real happiness, and this fractured world was 
420 whole; whole and free. 
The Years offers no new ground; its predominant 
theme is the failure of communication and relationship 
to establish anything whole or lasting. In many ways the 
novel merely rehearses what VW had already learned. It 
is clear that the forlorn hope of Eleanor for "another 
life" (461) is a repetition of the desire to "make of the 
moment something permanent" in actual life. Such permanence 
is not in the power of life, the "here and now", but art. 
Eleanor wishes to "enclose the present moment; to make it 
stay" by filling it with past, present, and future (462). 
The effort is doomed to failtre, to what Poulet has 
described as the 
Shattering return to the misery of the human 
condition and to the tragedy of the experience 
of time: in the very instant man catches his 
216- 
prey, experience dupes him, and he knows he is 
duped.. His prey, is a'shadow. In the instant', 
he catches the insýgnt, "the instant pass 
for it is instant. 
Any hope of "rest" in the actual world now seems 
entirely mistaken. In the development of her idea of 
'reality' and experiences of the soul, VW emphasises the-, 
rootedness in actual life of her perceptions. Nevertheless, 
actual life has seemed hopelessly far removed from 'reality' 
in the novels. In the last few years of her life VW moved 
closer to the actual expression, of her beliefs, achieving 
in Between the Acts a brilliant union of design and 
substance that holds within it`the clearest exposition of 
her faith in 'reality'. 
-ý 
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Notes to Chapter Seven 
1. (p. 194) Georges Poulet, 'Timelessness and Romanticism', 
p. 3- all other references to Poulet in this chapter 
are to this essay, unless stated otherwise. 
2. (p. 196) A namesake of, Julia's 
-, 
Julia Eliot 
- 
displays 
just this sense in Jacob's Room: 
... 
the tumult of the present seems like an elegy, 
for past youth and past summers, and there rose, 
in her mind a curious sadness, as if time and 
eternity showed through skirts and waistcoats, 
and she saw people passing tragically to 
168 destruction. 
3. '_(p. 197), See also The Waves: 
"There is the puddle, " said Rhoda, 
-"and'I 
cannot cross it. I hear the rush of the great 
grindstone within an inch of my head. Its wind 
113 roars in my face. 
4. (p. 202) E. g. Orlando: 
But Time, unfortunately, though it makes 
animals and vegetables bloom and fade with 
amazing punctuality, has no such simple effect 
on the mind of man. " The mind of man, moreover, 
works with equal strangeness upon the body of, 
time. An hour, once it lodges in the queer 
element of the human spirit, may be stretched 
out to fifty or a hundred times its clock length; 
on the other hand,. an hour may be accurately, 
represented on the timepiece of the mind by 
one second. This extraordinary discrepancy 
between time on the clock'and time in the mind 
is less known than it should be and deserves 
91 '. 
"fuller investigation. 
5. (p. 203) Cf. S. K. ýLanger, Feeling and Form: 
Time exists for 'us-because we undergo tensions 
and their resolutions. Their peculiar building- 
up, and their ways of breaking or diminishing 
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or merging into longer and greater tensions, 
make for vast'variety, of temporal forms. 
If-. we could experience only single, successive 
organic strains, perhaps subjective time would 
be one-dimensional like the time ticked off by 
clocks. But life is always a dense-fabric of 
concurrent. tensions, and as each of them is a 
measure of time the measurements themselves 
do not coincide. This causes our temporal 
experience, to fall apart into incommensurate= '.. 
elements which cannot all be conceived together 
as clear forms. When one is taken as a parameter, 
others become 'irrational', out of"logical focus, 
112-113 ineffable. 
-, 
6. (p. 203) J. Hillis fliller,. 'Virginia Woolf's All, Souls' 
Day: The Omniscient Narrator in Ihrs. Delloway', p. 109 
7. (p. 204) See D., II, 272; 15.10.1923, and also note 
the following correspondence': 
I've had some very curious visions in this room 
too, lying in bed, mad, & seeing the sunlight 
D. 1I quivering like gold water, on the wall. I've '. ` 
283 heard the voices of the dead here. (9.1.1924) 
... 
Septimus'Warren Smith lying on-the sofa in : 
the sitting-room; watching the watery gold glow 
MD and fade"with'the astonishing sensibility of``- 
152 some live creature on the roses, on the wall-paper. 
" 
8" (p. 207) See Orlando: 
For what more terrifying revelation can there_be 
- 
-than that-it is the present moment ?, That we` 
survive the, shook, at all is only, possible 
because the-past shelters us on, oneside and the, 
... 
° 
268 future on, another. 
-° 
9" (p. 209) E. Cassirer, 'The Looic'of the. Humanities,, 85 
- 
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10. (p. 210) See, for example, A Sketch of the Past (1939/40): 
Those moments 
- 
in the nursery, on the road to, 
the beach 
-'can still be more real than the 
present moment. 
... 
At times I can go back to 
St Ives more completely than I can this morning. 
I can reach a state where I seem"to be watching 
things happen as if I were there. That is, 
_I 
suppose, that my memory'supplies what I had forgotten, 
so that it seems as if it were happening 
independently, though I am really making it 
happen. In certain favourable moods, memories 
- 
what one has forgotten 
- 
come to the top. Now 
if this is so, is it not-possible 
-I often 
wonder 
- 
that things we have felt with great 
intensity have an existence independent of our 
minds; are in fact still in existence ? And 
if so, will it not be possible, in time, that 
some device will be invented by which we can 
tap them ?I see it 
- 
the past 
- 
as an avenue 
lying behind; a long ribbon of scenes, emotions. 
There at the endýof the avenue still, are the 
garden and the nursery. Instead of remembering 
here a scene and, there, a"sound, I shall fit a 
plug into the-wall; and listen into the past. 
I shall turn up August-1890. I feel that 
strong emotion must leave its trace; and it is 
only a question of discovering how we can 
get ourselves again attached to it, so that 
MOB we shall be able to live our lives through 
67. 
-from the start. 
11. (p. 210) See above, p. 96, referring to D. III, 189; 
8.8.1928, where VW wrote of her memory of a friend's 
visit "making a work'of art for itself". 
12. (p. 211) See,. e. g., "A Writer's Diary, 225; 18.9.1934s, 
But then, next, day,, today, which, is'Thursday, Y 
one week later, the other thing begins to work 
- 
the exalted sense of being above time and death, ' 
which comes from being again in a writing mood. 
See also above, p. 129 
13. (p. 212) Cf. A Sketch'of the Past: 
One must get, the feeling of everything approaching 
-and, then disappearing, getting large, getting 
small,. passing at different rates, of speed 
- 
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past the little creature; one must get the feeling 
that made her. press on, the little creature 
driven on as she was by the growth of her legs 
and arms, driven without her being able to 
stop it, or to change it, driven as a plant is 
driven up out of the earth, up until the stalk 
grows, the. leaf-grows, buds swell. That is 
what makes all images too static, for no sooner-. 
MOB has one said this was so, than it was past and 
79 altered. 
14. (p. 215)"Cf. Poulet, 'Timelessness and Romanticism': 
Paramnesia seems to bring forth before our eyes 
a past which is still real, still alive. It 
is as" if, abruptly, we were projected into a 
timeless world or into a world where time does 
not flow but stands still. The incredible 
idea that all the past we thought, we had left 
for ever, continues to stay here,, at our very 
feet, invisible but intact, and in all its 
forgotten freshness, shoots forth in our minds. 
... Of course, paramnesia is merely an illusion. 
It does not bring back the past. '"It just makes' 
a perception look, like a, recollection. 
... 
Generally our memory grows'gradually'fainter; 
it tends to disappear., But sometimes some 
association may revivify the past sufficiently 
to make"it flash after ,a long oblivion into our 
consciousness; and if those associations are 
very. potent, the flashing may be so intense. 
4 
, 
that it'has the vividness of the present. 
15.. (p. 216) Poulet, 
-Studies in"Human-Time, '85- 
- 
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Chapter Eight 
Between the Acts 
In nearly all that she wrote in the last five years 
of her life VW was deeply concerned with the relationship 
between life and art. This preoccupation is marked in 
her biography of Roger Fry, in her notes and drafts for 
a projected new book of criticism1 , in autobiographical 
writings 
- 
particularly A Sketch of the Past -, in her 
diary, and in Between the Acts. It is in those "hybrid 
books in which the writer talks in the dark to himself 
for a generation yet to be born"2 -namely, her diary and 
A Sketch of the Past 
- 
that she is found writing directly 
and investigatively about her feelings and beliefs over 
the last few years of her life. What VW once wrote of 
her sister's paintings is especially true of her last 
novel: it yields its full meaning 
only to those who can tunnel their way behind 
Rosen- the canvas into masses and passages and relations 
baum, 172 and values of which we know nothing - 
Behind Between the Acts is a matrix the elements of which 
are displayed in the writings contemporary with the novel, 
in which those necessary "masses and passages and relations 
and values" can be discerned. 
* 
- 
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In Between the Acts the brooding, isolated artist 
sets against the pathetic pageant of "our island history" 
a private vision of beauty which gives meaning to life 
through the perception of a pattern in privileged moments. 
This vision has been the centre of We art, but never 
so completely realised as in, her last work. In Mrs. 
Dalloway and To the Lighthouse, especially, there have 
been moments when the chaotic fragments of seemingly 
absurd existence have coalesced, revealing a pattern 
in which brief security may be found: 
In the midst of chaos there was shape; this 
eternal passing and flowing (she looked at the 
TTL clouds going and the leaves shaking) was 
249 struck into stability. 
In Between the Acts this vision is expressed primarily 
through Lucy Swithin's faith. Before looking at the novel 
itself, however, we must examine the context in which it 
was written: "the present state of my mind" (AWD, 290; 26.4. 
1938). 
0 
The most salient feature of VW's diary from early 
- 
in 1937 is a sense of freedom; not a relaxed, secure 
freedom, but a kind of hysteria arising from her feeling 
that there was no longer anything in life to "contain" 
her. As I pointed out early on, identity must have a 
base of some sort: in the last years of her life the 
securities upon which VW's identities rested began to 
disappear. Lytton Strachey and Roger Fry had died (1932 
- 
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and 1934); people who had been part of her world began 
to die 
- 
Janet Case (1937), Jack Hills (1937), Ottoline 
Morrell (1938), Ka Cox (1938). Even if relatively unimport- 
ant as friends, such deaths were to UW an erosion of her 
particular world. The death in 1937 of her nephew Julian 
Thoby Bell may well have seemed to her a cruel repetition 
of the sudden death of her brother Thoby (in 1906), and 
also to presage the many deaths the imminent war would 
bring, mirroring the days before the First war. In a 
memoir of her nephew VW wrote that "I am so composed that 
nothing is real unless I write it"3. This is significant, 
for in reading her diary from 1937 onwards the sense 
emerges that writing was all she could cling to for 
stability. 
From this awareness perhaps came her assertion of 
freedom, of independence. She felt that the encircling 
wall of her audience had disappeared, and so she would 
now write only for herself: 
One thing I think proved, I shall never write 
to "please", to convert; now am entirely and 
forever my own mistress. (6.8.1937) 
... 
But 
I now feel entirely free. Why ? Have committed 
myself, am afraid of nothing. Can do anything 
I like. No longer famous, no longer on a pedestal: 
no longer hawked in by societies: on my own, 
for ever. (26.4.1938) 
... 
for in God's name 
I've done my share, with pen and talk, for the 
human race. 
... 
Yes, I deserve a spring, 'I owe 
AWD nobody nothing. (29.3.1940) 
From the silence she felt all around her came another 
sense, coexisting with her "freedom", of utter meaninglessness: 
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What's odd 
... 
is the severance that war seems 
to bring: everything becomes meaningless: can't 
plan: then there comes too the community feeling: 
all England thinking the same thing 
- 
this 
horror of war 
- 
at the same moment. Never 
felt it so strong before. Then the lull and 
one lapses again into private separation. (15.4. 
1939) 
... 
Boredom. All meaning has run out 
of everything. 
... 
Yes, it's an empty meaningless 
world now. 
... 
And for the hundredth time I 
repeat 
- 
any idea is more real than any amount 
of war misery. 
... 
recovering that sense of 
something pressing from outside which consolidates 
AWD the mist, the non-existent. (6.9.1939) 
Her mood in the diary of these years tends strongly to 
despair; she struggled to find something to push against 
in order to achieve a sense of identity, but felt often 
that her world, and thus her life, was very near its end: 
I feel, if this is my last lap, oughtn't I 
to read Shre ? But can't. I feel oughtn't I 
to finish off P. H.: oughtn't I to finish something 
by way of an end ? The end gives its vividness, 
even its gaiety & recklessness to the random 
daily life. 
... 
No echo comes back. I have no 
surroundings. I have so little sense of a 
public that I forget about Roger coming or not 
coming out. Those familiar circumlocutions 
- 
those standards 
- 
which have for so many years 
given back an echo & so thickened my identity 
are all wide and wild as the desert now. I 
mean, there is no "autumn", no winter. We pour 
to the edge of a precipice 
... 
And then ? 
I can't conceive that there will be a 27th June 
1941. This cuts away something even at tea 
at Charleston. We drop another afternoon into 
the millrace. (22.6.1940) 
... 
All the walls, 
the protecting and reflecting walls, wear so 
terribly thin in this war. There's no standard 
to write for; no public to echo back; even the 
"tradition" has become transparent. 
... 
And 
perhaps the walls, if violently beaten against, 
will finally contain me. 
... 
tomorrow when 
my book comes out 
... 
I may feel once more round 
me the wall I've missed 
- 
or vacancy ? or chill 7 (24.6.1940) 
... 
What is the phrase I always remember - 
or forget. Look your last on all things lovely. (9.1.1941) 
... 
Yes, I was thinking: we live without 
- 
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AWD a future. (26.1.1941). 
As Susan 
.. 
Kenney has pointed out4, the general 
tenor of the diary did not find its way into Between the 
Acts. The novel, she finds, is affirmative on the whole. 
Although I would discern a more apocalyptic tone, it is 
certainly true that in Between the Acts we are shown 
"the effort renewed": again and again everything seems 
about to grind to a halt, and vacancy to prevail, but 
each time something rescues the scene 
-a lowing cow, a 
shower of rain, an old man's brash cry of "Bravo! " 
- 
and 
life lurches on. The novel is a testament of hope 
created in the face of despair (see above, p. 173). 
In her late memoir A Sketch of the Past, begun at 
her sister's suggestion in 1939, VW traces a fundamental 
polarity in her view of life to childhood experiences. 
She writes of three "exceptional moments" which often 
"came to the surface unexpectedly". Briefly, these moments 
were: a feeling of "hopeless sadness" during a fight with 
her brother, Thoby; a sense of wholeness on looking at 
a flower; horror at hearing her parents mention the suicide 
of a man who had been staying at St. Ives (MOB, 71). Two 
of these moments find their way into her fiction: Neville, 
in The Waves, is transfixed at hearing of a suicide; the 
two passages describing the experience are remarkably 
similar: 
- 
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... 
I heard about the dead man through the swing- 
door last night when cook was shoving in and 
out the dampers. He was found with his throat 
cut. The apple-tree leaves became fixed in the 
sky; the moon glared; I was unable to lift 
my foot up the stair. 
... 
There were the 
floating, pale-grey clouds; and the immitigable 
TW tree; the implacable tree with its greaved 
17 silver bark. 
We were waiting at dinner one night, when somehow 
I overheard my father or my mother say that Mr. 
Valpy had killed himself. The next thing I 
remember is being in the garden at night and 
walking on the path by the apple tree. It 
seemed to me that the apple tree was connected 
with the horror of fir. Valpy's suicide. I could 
not pass it. ' I stood there looking at the grey- 
green creases of the bark 
- 
it was a moonlit 
night 
- 
in a trance of horror. I seemed to 
be dragged down hopelessly, into some pit of 
MOB absolute despair from which-I could not escape. 
71 My body seemed paralysed. 
The moment of "wholeness" reappears in Between the Acts, 
and again there is a distinct descriptive homology between 
novel and memoir: 
I was looking at the flower bed by the front 
door; "That is the whole", I said. I was looking 
at a plant with a spread of leaves; and it 
seemed suddenly plain that the flower itself was 
a part of the earth; that a ring enclosed what 
was the flower; and that was the real flower; 
part earth; part flower. It was a thought 
MOB I put away as likely to be very useful to me 
71 later. 
George grubbed. The flower blazed between 
the angles of the roots. Membrane after 
membrane was torn. It blazed a soft yellow, 
a lambent light under a film of velvet; it 
filled the caverns behind the eyes with light. 
All that inner darkness became a hall, leaf 
smelling, earth smelling of yellow light. And 
the tree was beyond the flower; the grass, the 
flower and the tree were entire. Down on his 
- 
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16-17 knees grubbing he held the flower complete. 
In her biography of Roger Fry (1940) VW wrote of 
moments of vision 
, 
when a new force breaks in, 
and the gropings" of the past suddenly seem to 
161 have meaning. 
The meaning of these moments from her own past now, in 
1939, seems clear to her; they represent a "profound 
difference" between satisfaction and despair: 
This difference I think arose from the fact 
that I was quite unable to deal with the pain 
of discovering that people hurt each other; 
that a man I had seen had killed himself. The 
sense of horror held me powerless. But in the 
MOB case of the flower I found a reason; and was 
71-2 thus able to deal with the situation. 
All through her life and fiction the possibility of 
order, of pattern, has been felt in the midst of uncertainty, 
the possibility of a transcendence of the passage of time. 
In Between the Acts this possibility is in the foreground 
of the work: an explicit "private vision" is set against 
the "scraps, Orts, and fragments" of daily life. UW, in 
the last years of her life, asserted what before she only 
more tentatively attested to: a 'reality' apprehended by 
very few, by artists mainly, that is apart from actual 
life and yet rooted in it; not mysticism, but a 'coming to 
fruition of the potential of imagination to order the world 
of experience in the forms and modes of art. 
- 
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- 
It seems likely that the review of Fry's life and 
work she made to write his biography helped VW to reach 
this new positiveness, for he too had written of a similar 
perception: 
But if, reason must stop short, beyond reason 
lies reality 
- 
if nothing will make him doff 
his reason, nothing will make him lose his 
faith. The aesthetic emotion seems to him of 
supreme importance. But why ?- he cannot 
say. "One can only say that those who experience 
it feel it to have a peculiar quality of 
'reality', which makes it a matter of infinite 
importance in their lives. Any attempt I 
might make to explain this would probably land 
me in the depths of mysticism. On the edge of 
that gulf I. stop. " But if he stops it is in 
the attitude of one who looks forward. We are 
RF always left with the sense of something to 
229 come... 
In support of the suggestion that VW found a new certainty 
in her vision in the last few years of her life, we can 
-turn once, more to her diary: 
I lay awake so calm, so content, as if I'd 
stepped off the whirling world into a deep blue 
quiet space and there open eyed existed, beyond 
harm; armed against all that can happen. I 
have never had this feeling before in all my 
life; but I have had it several times since 
last summer: when I reached it, in my worst 
depression, as if I stepped out, throwing 
AWD aside a cloak, lying in bed, looking at the 
281 stars, these nights-at Monk's House. (9.4.1937) 
As in those many records of her summer "retreats" at 
Rodmell, here she has drawn security from her deepest 
despair; descending into_the depths she finds rest, in 
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'reality'. During the summer of 1936, to which she 
refers here, she was devastated by the grind of revising 
The Years and Three Guineas. Of that time she wrote that 
she had "never been so near the-precipice of my own 
feeling since 1913 
-" 
(AWD, 268-9; 11.6.1936). It was 
an "extraordinary summer" in which she felt she had 
destroyed her writing gift. Thus, she subsequently 
determined to concentrate on her own, private vision, 
to write for herself: 
I would like to write a dream story about 
the top of a mountain. Now why ? About 
lying in the snow; about rings of colour; 
silence; and the solitude. I can't though. 
But shan't I, one of these days, indulge myself 
in some short releases into that world ? 
AWD Short now for ever. No more long grinds: 
283 only sudden intensities. (22.6.1937) 
There is a hint, too, that her faith was consolidated 
even earlier: 
... 
I must cling to my "freedom" 
- 
that mysterious 
hand that was reached out to me about four 
years ago. (26.4.1938) 
... 
still I'm free. 
This is the actual result of that 
spiritual conversion (I can't bother to get the 
right words) in the autumn of 1933 or 4- when 
I rushed through London buying, I remember, a 
great magnifying glass, from sheer ecstasy, near 
.;: 
BLackfriars: when I gave the man who played the 
harp half a crown for talking to me about his 
AWD life in the tube station. (20.5.1938). 
There is nothing to be found in her writings of11933 or '34 
that refers to a "spiritual conversion". There is, however, 
- 
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an entry in her diary made in the, autumn of 1934 that might 
be read as the record of a moment in which her faith in 
the power of art to achieve 'reality' came home to her 
with force. It concerns the funeral of Roger Fry (who 
had died on September 9th). which took place on 
"a day as it happened of extraordinary beauty" (FF9 298)s- 
I had a notion that I could describe the 
tremendous feeling at R. 's funeral: but of 
-course I can't. I mean the universal feeling; 
how we all fought with our brains, loves and 
so on; and must be vanquished. Then the 
vanquisher, this outer force became so clear; 
the indifferent, and we so small, fine, delicate. 
A fear then came to me, of death. Of course 
I shall lie there-too. before that gate and slide 
in; and it frightened me. But why ?I mean, 
I felt the vainness of this perpetual fight, 
with our brains and loving each other against 
the other thing; if Roger could die. 
But then, next day, today, which is Thursday, 
one week later, the other-thing begins to work - 
the exalted sense of being above time and 
death which comes from being again in a writing 
mood. And this is not an illusion, so far as 
I can tell. Certainly I have a strong sense 
that Roger would be all on one's side in this 
AWE) 
- excitement, and that whatever the invisible 
224-5 force does, we thus get outside it. 5 (18.9.1934) 
From: 1937, VW's world of friends who had "fought with 
our brains, loves and so on" seemed to disappear ever 
faster. Her houses at Mecklenburgh Square and Tavistock 
Square,,, in London, were both bombed, destroying books, 
letters and furniture accumulated over many years. 
VW'smood may be judged., from the following fragment, 
from a sketch written in late October, 1939, headed 
'London in War': 
- 
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Everyone is on business. 
- 
Their minds are made 
up. It is extremely sober. The streets are[... ] 
lit. They have gone back to the 18th century. 
Nature prevails. I suppose badgers and foxes 
wd. come back if this went on, & owls & 
nightingales. This is the prelude to barbarism. 
The city has become merely a congeries of houses 
lived in by people who work. There is no 
society. no luxury no splendour no gadding & 
flitting. Allis serious and concentrated. 
It is as if the song had stopped 
- 
the melody, 
the unnecessary the voluntary. Odd if this 
should be the end of town life. 6 
Other details from this period contribute to the sense 
of ending: for example, in 1936 Violet Dickinson returned 
to VW all the letters she had written her'- a strange gift 
from VW's adolescence (see L. VI, 87,89). 
VW could, however, still create, could still expand 
the bounds of the moment by the ordering of chaos that 
her art achieved in creating its own world. Although 
the usual view of the end of 1934 and beginning of 1935 is 
that it was a desolate time for VW (see Bell, II, 183), I 
suggest it may have offered her something to fight against, 
so strengthening in the years that followed her resolve 
to "squeeze the moment"7 and continue the effort. There 
is no suggestion'whatever that VW suddenly accepted any 
conventional, systematic religion; her continued vehemence 
against the arrogance of Christianity is attested to, for 
example, in her letters to Ethel Smyth (e. g. L. V, 319-22). 
What I am suggesting is that the deeply personal vision 
of 'reality' that VW developed throughout her life, and her 
faith in the possibilities of transcendence through art, 
now became the necessary foreground of her thought. What 
- 
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had frequently been a vaguely articulated, shadowy 
adumbration'(however deeply felt) was now confidently 
grasped and directly embodied in her last novel. 
* 
That "deep blue quiet space" into which UW passed 
when she seemed to step "off the whirling world" (AWO, 281; 
9.4.1937) was a relief from the vacancy and inconsequence 
of life around her. She longed for solitude in which she 
could "glide my way up & up into that exciting layer 
so rarely lived in: where my mind works so quick it seems 
asleep" (AWD, 312; 11.4.1939). Lucy Swithin, like her 
author, is seen early in Between the Acts drawn to an 
impersonal quality felt in the sky: 
There was a fecklessness, a lack of symmetry 
and order in the clouds, as they thinned and 
thickened. Was it their own law, or no law, 
they obeyed!,? Some were wisps of white hair 
merely. One, high up, very distant, had hardened 
to golden alabaster; was made of immortal 
marble. Beyond that was blue, pure blue, black 
blue; blue that had never filtered down; that 
had escaped' registration. It never fell as 
sun, shadow, or rain upon the world, but-dis- 
regarded the little coloured ball of earth 
entirely. No flower. felt it; no field; no 
30 garden. 
Ise thinks that Lucy sees "God there, God on his throne" (31), 
but there is nothing in Lucy's thinking to corroborate this. 
- 
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Throughout the novel various characters 
- 
Bart, Isa, 
William, Giles 
- 
invent for themselves a God they suppose 
Lucy to be worshipping; but they are mistaken8. As the 
day goes on, and the pageant is performed, Lucy's vision 
is eventually seen to be that which VW has held to for 
most of her life: 
... 
a consciousness of what I call 'reality', 
D. III a thing I see before me: something abstract; 
196 but residing in the downs or in the sky. (10.9.1928) 
Although this consciousness is only actually 
expressed by Lucy, it pervades the entire novel. Between 
the Acts is extremely difficult to anatomize because it 
is, more than any of the other books, so closely woven. 
There is a definite sense in the novel that all life 
goes forward in a medium which connects people and things, 
rarely actually apprehended but allowing for unspoken 
communications and intimations of a 'reality' that escapes 
the bounds of the actual. This may recall Clarissa 
Galloway's "transcendental theory", and, indeed, something 
similar is voiced by Lucy: 
"But we have other lives, I think, I hope, " 
she murmured. "We live in others, Mr. 
. 99 , We 
86 live in things. " 
Throughout Between the Acts people "hear" when no 
words are spoken: silence makes an "unmistakable contribution" 
to talk (50). Lucy twice gets up, once to show William 
- 
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the house, once to return with her brother, Bart, to the 
pageant (83,141), as if a signal had been given, though 
nothing is said. Isa, Giles, and William each say 
"without words" that they are desperately unhappy (205). 
It is to silence that art should lead. The picture in 
the dining-room at Pointz Hall which leads those who 
look at it "down green glades into the heart of silence" 
(62) is an access to that medium which circumscribes the 
entire novel. To clarify this admittedly rather obscure 
notion we may look out from the world of the novel to those 
elements of its background that have already proved 
illuminating. 
In A Sketch of the Past UW touched briefly on the 
idea of an impersonal medium circumscribing the whole of 
lifeg Although she says that she is simply making a note 
of something that interests her as a reminder to return 
to it, I believe the following passage goes some way to 
explaining the sense in the novel that everything is 
somehow connected. She has been writing about her 
childhood holidays in St. Ives, recalling the "pure delight" 
that that place offered her senses: 
1 
.. 1 
The lemon-coloured leaves on the elm trees, the 
round apples glowing red in the orchard and the 
rustle of the leaves make me pause to think 
how many other than human forces affect us. 
While I am writing this, the light changes; an 
apple becomes a vivid green. I respond 
- 
how ? 
And then the little owl [make §3 a chattering noise. 
Another response. St. Ives, to, cut short an 
obscure train of. thought, about the other voice 
or voices and their connection with art, with 
religion: figuratively, I could snapshot what I 
mean by fancying myself afloat, [in an element] 
- 
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which is all the time responding to. things'we 
have no words for 
- 
exposed to some invisible 
ray: but instead of labouring'here to express, 
this, to analyse the third voice, to discover 
whether 'pure delights' are connected with art, " 
or religion: whether I am telling the truth when 
I see myself perpetually taking the breath of 
these voices in my sails, and tacking this way 
and that, in daily life asI yield to them -' 
instead of that, I note only this influence, 
suspect it to be of great 
-importance, 'cannot 
find how to check its power on other people; and 
MOB so erect a finger here, by way of signalling 
115 that here is a vein to work out later. 
This vein is worked out in the novel, in which the "third 
voice" (e. g. 137,139,142) seems to exist beyond the 
perceptions of actual life, connecting consciousnesses. 
The idea of "things we have no words for" will also be found 
to be of great significance in this novel, as has already 
been noted in discussing its precursors. 
Between the Acts is at once a hall of mirrors and a 
chamber of echoes; words and phrases ring throughout the 
book, slipping in and out of different minds, reflected 
sometimes by the actors, sometimes by the audience. 
These echoes and repetitions bind the book together, 
making of it an enclosed world, constantly fragmented and 
reunited by the shifty nature of words. On this June day 
in 1939 words will not stay still: to Giles Oliver they 
rise up and become menacing (74) or scornful (174); to 
William Dodge they become symbolical (88). Words take 
on substance, rolled and thinned on the nurses' tongues 
like sweets (15), or peppering the audience "as with a 
shower of hard little stones" (95). In many ways it is 
emphasised that life is bound together, given form by 
- 
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language. Triplets link together actors and audience, 
gentles and simples: "cut, cut, cut" (43); "Empty, empty 
empty; silent, silent, silent" (47); "Hurry, hurry, hurry" 
(90); "Chuff, chuff, chuff" (93, passim. ); "Tick, tick, 
tick" (100, Passim. ); "climbing, climbing, climbing" (116); 
"Death, death, death" (210); "Tears, tears, tears" (210,234); 
"life, life, life" (245); there are several more. Words 
and phrases spill over, colliding with each other. Language 
is described as an infection (174). Examples of the enormously 
complex rhyming and rhythming of Between the Acts can be 
found on every page, creating a web of sound in which 
life is, so to speak, suspended. The last scene of the 
pageant (216) represents this web of language, as the 
actors assemble and "each declaimed some phrase or fragment 
from their parts" (215-6). The word "their" is significant 
here, for in the cacophony that follows are heard not only 
fragments from the pageant, but also echoes from the 
thoughts and utterances of the audience. Some phrases 
even have a double echo, such as "I am not in " perfect 
mind", which Giles muttered early on (103), echoing 
King Lear (IV: vii). 
Language imposes over the confusion and chaos of life 
an order that is only apparent: as the last scene of the 
pageant shows, the web of language is in fact a chaos. 
As long as there are no gaps, no silences, the audience 
is happy, for silence reveals that "emptiness about the 
heart of life" that cannot be accepted by the crowd. 
Acquiescence (as 'Time Passes' stated) is the easy way out: 
- 
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The gramophone, while the scene was removed, 
gently stated certain facts which everybody 
knows to be perfectly true. 
... 
The view repeated in its own way what the tune 
was saying. The sun was sinking; the colours 
were merging; and the view was saying how after 
toil men rest from their labours; how coolness 
comes; reason prevails; and having unharnessed 
the team from the plough, neighbours dig in 
cottage gardens and lean over cottage gates. 
The cows, making a step forward, then standing 
still, were saying the same thing to perfection. 
Folded in this triple melody, the audience sat 
158-9 gazing; 
As long as they are distracted from themselves, the 
audience is happy; very few can be at home in solitude; 
silence brings discomfort. If reality is not distanced, 
mediated somehow, it cannot be borne. Miss La Trobe's 
. 
experiment, in which she intends to douche the audience 
with "present-time reality", fails because what they 
are exposed to is not framed. It is only when life is 
presented selectively that anyone notices it; for the 
most part we live unconsciously, not seeing what is 
right before us10. Only those such as Lucy 'see' with the 
vision VW attests to, see the beauty of the world. 
The verbal condition of human being is, however, 
not the whole picture. As already noted, there is the 
suggestion in the novel that felt influences pass between 
people without words. "Thoughts without words, " wonders 
Bart, the exemplar of reason, "Can that be ?" (68). It 
would seem from the experience of Lucy Swithin and Miss 
La Trobe that such thoughts can not only be, but are the 
privilege only of those of a certain faith. Beyond words 
is a timeless medium (that which "is outside of us 
... 
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what we are not", TW, 197). 
There is a long passage excised from the published 
novel that concerns the silence of "the thing that exists 
when we aren't there" (D. 111,114; 30.10.1926, Also see 
above, pp. 136 &154). Perhaps because it has the tone 
of philosophical speculation, VW deleted the passage, 
Putting in its place the two cryptic sentences that follow 
the description of the pictures in the dining-room: 
Empty, empty, empty; silent, silent, silent. 
The room was a shell, singing of what was 
before time was; a vase stood in the heart of 
the house, alabaster, smooth, cold, holding the 
47 still, distilled essence of emptiness, silence. 
Behind these lines is felt the idea that art can hold 
within it the timeless 'reality' which is the background, 
so to speak, against which being stands out11. Art can 
"make of the moment something permanent" because its form 
transcends the modes of actual life. Some understanding 
Of the implications of these lines from the novel may be 
gained from T. S. Eliot's Burnt Norton (1935): 
Words move, music moves 
Only in time; but that which is only living 
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach 
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern, 
Can words or music reach 
The stillness, as a China jar still 137-143 Moves perpetually in its stillness. 
In her novel, VW aspires to a poetic communication of 
concepts she attempted to explain in the deleted passage. 
- 
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That passage-seems to me to embody the central concerns 
of this study of the novels; it reads as follows: 
There was silence in the dining room, for 
lunch delayed. The chairs were all drawn up, 
and the places ready; wine glasses, knives and 
forks, napkins, and in the centre the 
variegated flowers which Bartlet picked, mixed 
and bunched together after a colour scheme of 
his own. But who observed the dining room ? 
Who noted the silence, the emptiness ? What 
name is to be given to that which notes that a 
room is empty ? This presence certainly requires 
a name, for without a name what can exist ? 
And how can silence or emptiness be noted by 
that which has no existence ? Yet by what 
name can that be called which enters a room when 
the company is still in the kitchen, or the 
nursery, or the library; which notes the 
pictures, then the flowers, and observes, 
though there itself. The room is empty. 
The great dictionary which records the names 
of infinitesimally small insects, has a name 
for grains of different sand 
- 
one is shell, 
the other rock; has ignored this presence, 
refusing to attempt to name it. Certainly it 
is difficult, to find a name for that which is 
in a room, yet the room is empty; for that which 
perceives pictures knife and fork, also men and 
women; and describes them; and not only perceives 
but partakes of [tham, and has access to the mind 
in its darkness. And further goes from mind to 
mind and surface to surface, and from body to body 
creating what is not mind or body, not surface or 
depths, but a common element in which the 
perishable is preserved and the separate becomes 
one. Does it not by this means create immortalityj] 
And yet we who have named other presences dqually 
impalpable 
- 
and called them God for instance 
or again the Holy Ghost, have no name but novelist, 
or poet, or sculptor or musician, for this 
greatest of all preservers and creators. But this 
spirit this haunter and joiner, who makes one 
where there are two, three six or seven, and 
preserves what without it would perish is nameless[] 
Nameless it is, yet partakes of all things 
named; it is rhyme and rhythm; it is dress and 
eating and drinking, is procreation and sensation; 
is love and hate and passion and adventure. 
partakes of the dog and the cat, of the bee and 
the flower and of bodies in coats and skirts. 
-' 
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This nameless spirit then, who is not "we" nor 
"I", nor the novelist either, For the novelist 
all agree must tell"a story; and there are no 
stories for this spirit; this spirit is not 
concerned to follow lovers to the altar, nor 
to cut chapter from chapter; and theft]write as 
novelists do The end with a flourish; since 
there is no end; this being, to reduce it to 
the shortest and simplest word, was present 
in the dining room at Pointz Hall for it observed 
how different the room was empty from what the 
room was when 
- 
as now happened 
- 
people entered. 
12 
The fictional world is created by an autonomous, 
impersonal presence, but this presence can nowhere actually 
be located 
- 
it is actually absent. The audience in the 
novel discover this: 
Whom could they make responsible ? Whom could 
they thank for their entertainment ? Was there 227 no one ? 
By this strange mode of being the absent, presence might 
be said to create immortality: the world of a novel 'is' 
actually nowhere, and yet it locates itself in the world 
of each reader in the act of reading, thereby becoming 
a valid part of the actual world. This "something/nothing" 
shares its mode of being (which is actually non-being) 
with the ideas of soul and 'reality'. Thus it might be 
said that art (in Ws sense) is a product of the soul 
that gives access to that medium by which all life is 
surrounded 
- 
'reality'. In her memoir of Julian Bell 
and in A Sketch of the Past (MOB, 72), VW wrote that 
writing things down made, them "real" for her, brought them 
under her control and made them "whole". Writing fiction 
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is creating a world which escapes the_spatio-temporal 
horizons of actual life, in the sense described above. 
Her surer belief in this concept may have contributed 
to the feeling of freedom noted in the last few years of 
her life. As her diary reveals, she felt there was no 
future: her world had disappeared. Like Lucy Swithin, 
perhaps, she felt "We've only the present",. the continuous 
present of writing. 
VW was observing the final chaos, from a tiny 
island of illusory security in which the villagers 
continued their meaningless doings as the, encroaching 
darkness edged closer13. This apocalyptic feeling is 
strong in Between the Acts: 
Only a few great names - Babylon, Nineveh, 
Clytemnestra, Agamemnon, Troy 
- 
floated 
across the open space. Then the wind rose, and 
in the rustle of the leaves even the great words 
became inaudible; the audience sat staring at 
the villagers, whose mouths opened, but no 
164-5 sound came. 
Leaning against a tree, the artist is tormented by her 
failure to ward off the emptiness: 
Illusion had failed. 'This is death, ' she 
165 murmured, 'death. ' 
Only for instants does the artist have the power of the 
gods to overcome time: 
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Ah, but she was not, merely a,, twitcher of individual 
strings; she, was. one, who seethes wandering, 
bodies and floating voices in. a. cauldron,, and 
makes rise up from its, amorphoüs. massa recreated' 
180 world. Her moment was on her 
- 
her glory. 
VW mocks the puppeteer artist in Between the Acts, 
allowing her only a brief triumph in*the'g6i vine of her 
Vision,. as Lily Briscoe triumphs in the instant she makes 
her final brush-stroke. "A visiön5impärted is relief 
from agony, " but, "She hadn't made them see" (117). Art 
cannot simply Qive the vision to everybody; as has been 
repeatedly emphasised this religion of art requires 
effort; in Lucy's terms, "hours of kneeling in the early 
morning" (239). 
* 
Between-the Acts disintegrates "our island history", 
taking away from the assembled audience any sense of 
autonomy or sovereignty in their own present. In the 
loop of, eternity the "ages" of the pageant are meaningless: 
"You don't believe in history g" says William Dodge to Lucy, 
when she says there were no such people as the Victorians - 
"Only you and me and William dressed differently" (203). 
In Lucy's apprehension of timeless 'reality' the periods 
of history are dissolved. This perception of the 
pageant is endorsed by the erosion of the audience's 
sense of identity, afforded them by, dress and their sense 
of. their 'own' time: 
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Yet somehow they felt -, how, could. one put it 
- 
a little not quite here or there. As if the 
play had jerked the ball. out of the cup; as if 
what I call myself was still floating unnattached, 
and didn't settle. Not quite themselves they 
175 felt. 
They were neither one thing nor the other; 
neither Victorians nor themselves. ', They were 
207 suspended, without. being,. in limbo.,,., 
.a4 
For Lucy time, as passage, is irrelevant; she is 
marking the approach of death14, but sustains her 'real' 
life through her faith in beauty. The audience is given 
security by the external trappings and conventions of 
life, including the monotonous plod of time: 
Chuff, chuff, chuff went the machine. Time was 
177 passing. How long would time, hold them together ? 
Ise longs to escape to a realm of death where "Change is 
not" (181); Miss La Trobe sways perpetually between 
despair and triumph. Only Lucy is at peace, untroubled;. 
only she-seems to have found rest. 
The pool in Orlando was an image of the depths of the 
mind (see above, p. 175). In To the Lighthouse the "pool 
of Time" would eventually cover all; Nancy turned a rock- 
pool into an entire world. In Between the Acts Lucy 
sees a world in the lily-pool: 
Now the jagged leaf at the corner suggested, 
by its contours, Europe. There were other 
leaves. She fluttered her eye over the surface, 
naming leaves India, Africa, America. Islands 
239 
of security, glossy and thick. 
- 
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As the last of the audience leaves, the pageant over, 
Lucy is found alone by the lily-pool. In this moment of 
solitude she expresses her faith: 
"Ourselves, " she murmured. And retrieving 
some glint of faith from the grey waters, 
hopefully, without much help from reason, she 
followed the fish; the speckled, streaked, and 
blotched; seeing in that vision beauty, power, 
240 and glory in ourselves. 
Her vision is contradicted by her brother's unfeeling 
reason, but this does not trouble her. That which she 
apprehends through the efforts of her faith is a universal 
medium, surrounding all life; in the words of To the Licht- 
house, Lucy hears "the voice of the beauty of the world". 
Looking back to Mrs. Ramsay's search for faith (TTL, 101) 
it can be seen now that the vision itself is not new in 
VW's writing; what is new in Between the Acts is the 
directness with which the private vision of faith in 
transcendent 'reality' is set against the despair of actual 
life in time. 
Silenced, she returned to her private vision; 
of beauty which is goodness; the sea on which 
we float. Mostly impervious, but surely every 
boat sometimes leaks 7 
He would carry the torch of reason till it 
went out in the darkness of the cave. For 
herself, every morning, kneeling, she protected 
her vision. Every night she opened the window 
and looked at the leaves against the sky. Then STA 
slept. Then the random ribbons of birds' voices 240 woke her. 
- 
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The elements of her faith, are, these: that life is 
surrounded by a halo of-'beauty, -"a nameless": quality=inhering 
in the actual, but not actual and so=free"of'the-constraint 
and decadence of space and time; 
-all beings are"afloat--' 
on this "sea" of beauty. For the most part-all people are 
impervious to beauty, but sometimes-it is glimpsed -=as' 
manifest in the novel by the-sense-of unity the-audience 
sometimes catches in music, the-perception of beauty, 'as 
the actors stand in fading sunlight-after-the pageant (228), 
and the unspoken communications that seem carried-by a 
medium other than words. To live` entirely: by Yreasön9-`the 
logical terms of actual life, isýto cast-a-light`tinto 
darkness that is merely artificialt'never-to turn-to see 
the light of 'reality'. Abstract, impersonal beauty 
resides in the natural world (the uncivilized earth is a' 
constant emblem of timelessness'tin'the novels); 'and can 
be-perceived by those whose faith is strong enough to 
recognise the emptiness at the heartýof life and not turn 
away from it. 
To-see this faith in a context wider than that of 
Be__tween the Acts, : it will be recalled that art - particularly 
literary art 
- 
was said to embody an abstract (bodiless) 
'reality' in a curious mode of being that is apart from 
actual being. The 'reality' UW felt behind and beyond 
actual life is the virtual property of great art (such as 
hers) because such creation is free from the personal, 
time-bound, death-tending life of its creator to exist 
on its own terms in the locationless space of art. 
- 
246 
- 
Throughout her life and 
-writings VW, apprehended, 
the 'reality' behind appearances that isthe-ignored 
... 
inheritance of all humanity.,. Her achievement is the,,,,,,, 
creation of a literary form which brings the transcendent 
into the actual, brings eternity into the world of time 
in the act of reading. Her diary and novels are full of 
the records of particular, intense "moments of being" in 
which 'reality' came closer. In A Sketch of the Past, 
for the first time in her life, she wrote in general 
terms directly of what she believed was the nature of 
the conceptual "rod" that her writing constantly held to. 
In the memoir she once again states that her entire life 
has stood upon a base formed in childhood. Writing was 
"what is far more necessary than anything else" (MOB, 73) 
because art enshrines the lineaments of 'reality', the form 
of the "thing itself", timeless and yet inherent in the 
world of time. This passage is explained by the entire 
effort of VW's life and art, which were inextricably 
interwoven 
with each other; it is with this slowly emergent 
"philosophy", 
now grasped firmly and become her own, that 
I have been concerned: 
... 
And so I go on to suppose that the shock- 
receiving capacity is what makes me a writer. 
... 
it is or will become a revelation of some 
order; it is a token of some real thing behind 
appearances; and I make it real by putting it 
into words. 
... 
From this I reach what I might 
call a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant 
idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is 
hidden a pattern; that we 
-I mean all human 
beings 
- 
are connected with this; that the whole 
world is a work of art; that we are parts of the 
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work of art. Hamlet-or, a Beethoven quartet 
is the truth about this, vast mass that we call 
the world. But there is no Shakespeare, there 
is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically 
there is no God; we are the words; we are the 
MOB music; we are the, thing itself. And, I see, this 
72 when I have a shock. 
ý ý. '. 
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Notes to Chapter Eight 
1" (p. 221) Published as 'Anon. ' and 'The Reader' in 
Twentieth Century Literature, 25,3,4, Fell/Winter, 1979, 
pp. 382-435 
2. (p. 221) See 'The Human Art' (1940): 
Instead of letters posterity will have confessions, 
diaries, notebooks, like M. Gide's - hybrid CE I books in which the writer talks in the dark 
104' to himself for a generation yet tobe born. 
3"" (p. 223) Quoted in Q. Bell, II, p. 255; note how it 
continues: 
& then I am so composed that nothing is real 
unless I write it. - And again, "I know by this 
time what. an odd effect'Time has: it does not 
destroy people 
- 
for instance, I"still think 
-, 
perhaps more truly='. than I, did, of Roger, of 
Thoby: but it"brushes away the actual personal 
presence. 
4" (p. 225) 'Two Endings: *Virginia Woolf's Suicide and 
Between the Acts', University of'Toronto Quarterly, xliv, 
4, Summer 1975;, pp. 265-2891 
5" (p. 230) See. also the following from VW's diary, 
quoted by Q. 'Bell (II9 180):, 
Then Desmond came up:. said "Wouldn't it be nice 
to walk'in the garden 7 Oh we stand on a little 
island" he'said., "But it, has been very lovely" 
I said. For the first time I laid my hand on 
his shoulder and said "Don't die yet. " "Nor you 
either" he said. "We have had wonderful friends" 
he said. (15.9.1934) 
6. ''(231) Quoted in Twentieth Century Literature, 25,3, 
4, Fall/Winter 1979-(Monk's House Papers, A 20) 
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7. (P"231) 
Still I see Lytton's. point 
- 
my dear old 
serpent. What a dream life is to be sure 
- that he should be dead, and I reading him: 
and trying to make out that we indented ourselves 
in the world; whereas I sometimes feel it's 
been an illusion 
- 
gone so fast; lived so 
quickly; and nothing-to show for it, save these AWD little books. But that makes me dig my feet in 314 and squeeze the moment. (29.7.1939) 
8" (P"233) E. g. 
32: It was, he supposed, more of a force 
... 140: She was thinking,, he supposed, God is peace 
... 
204: She was off, they guessed, on a circular tour 
... 
9. (234) It is apposite at this point to recalls famous 
passage from one of VW's best-known essays, 'Modern 
Fiction' (1919): 
... life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent 
envelope surrounding us from the beginning 
consciousness to the end. Is it not the task 
of the novelist-to convey this varying, this 
unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever 
aberration or complexity'it may"display, with CR I as little mixture of the alien and external as 189 possible ? 
10. "(p. 237) Reading over Roger Fry's Vision and Design when 
preparing her biography, VW"could not have avoided the 
following passage from 'An Essay in Aesthetics' that 
explains the effect. of'framing:, ` 
If, we look at. the street itself we. are almost 
sure. to adjust ourselves in some way to its 
actual existence. We recognise an acquaintance, 
and wonder why he looks so dejected this morning, 
or-become interested-in'a new fashion in hats 
- the moment, 
-we 
do that the spell is. broken, we 
are reacting to-life itself in-however slight a 
degree, but, in the mirror, it is'easier to 
abstract ourselves completely, and look upon the 
changing scene as awhole. It then, at once, 
takes on the visionary quality,, and we become 
; true spectators, not selecting what we will-see, 
but seeing everything equally ... -The frame of 
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the mirror, then, does to some extent turn 
the reflected scene from one that belongs to 
our actual life into one that belongs rather to 
19-20 the imaginative life. 
11. '. (p. 238) See The Waves: 
"Marriage, death, travel, friendship, " said 
Bernard; "town and country; children and all' 
that; a many-sided substance cut out of this 
dark; a many-faceted. flower. Let us stop for 
a moment; let us behold what we have made. 
Let it blaze against the yew trees. One life. 
162 There. It is over. Gone out. 
12. (p. 240) This passage, marked "silence" in the-margin, 
is from 
ýBTP) Typescript with author's corrections,, 
unsigned, 2 April '38 
- 
July 30 '39 (earliest 
dated draft) 
'in. the Berg Collection. It is begun-on p. 56 and again 
on p. 57 from which I quote (with obvious errors 
corrected). 
13. (p. 241) See letter to Judith Stephen: 
We're acting village plays;, ', written by the 
gardener's wife, and the chauffeur's wife; 
and acted by the other villagers. Also we're L. UI 
-doing this that-and the other about an air-raid 400 shelter. (29.5.1940)- 
14. (P. 243)" 
Oh'and I thought, as I was dressing,, how 
interesting, it would be to describe the 
approach of age; andthe gradual coming of death. " 
As people describe love. To note every symptom 
of failure: but why failure ? To treat age as 
an experience that is"different from the others; 
and to detect every one of the gradual stages 
towards death which is atremendous experience, 
'AWD, 
_ 
and not as unconscious, at least"in, its approaches, 315 
as birth is. (7.8.1939). 
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Appendix 11 . 
The Self in Philosophical Thought 
In using the term 'self' I immediately (and confidently) 
assume some sort of understanding of it (as-Heidegger said 
we already have some intuition into'Beingt'otherwise we-' 
could not begin to question it). This`intuitive understanding 
would not, however, very long resist any pressure to 
clarify 'self'; the concept has changed in meaning and 
importance throughout the history of Western thought. 
Here r propose to trace one, arbitrarily chose, line 
of it development. Try as we might to begin from a true 
beginning, however, it is impossible for us not'to always 
already have that first inkling of what we mean when we 
say 'self'. Thus the account is biased from the start. 
* 
(i) Socrates 
Socrates' disappointment at what he saw as Anaxagoras' 
missed opportunity to study Mind is the decisive point in 
the shift of emphasis in Greek thought, from the atomism 
and study of phenomena of the Ionians to the investigation 
r 
into what Socrates called the 'soul'. To a. fifth-century 
B. C. Athenian, 'soul' was a sort of shadow; his 'self' was 
his body. 
In the uncertain years following the Persian wars, the 
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thinkers known as Sophists began tozquestion the materialism 
of the preceding ages, and the centre, oftheir thought moved 
from the object to the subject. Socrates, advanced 
on their relativism 
-by conceiving. universal. concepts 
that might stand firm while the particular varied. 
-Man's 
soul was posited by Socrates as that facultyTwhichknows; y 
good from evil and infallibly chooses the good. He spent 
his life questioning those he met about what they considered 
to be the ends of life, and he found that-'what most people 
considered their goal was invariably happiness under one 
guise or another. True happiness, he held, could be-found 
only by a turning inwards, obeying his Delphic injunction 
to "Know thyself". "My very good friend, " Socrates would 
challenge his fellow citizen, 
... 
Are you not ashamed that you give your 
attention to acquiring; as much money as; possible, 
and similarly with reputation and honour,. and 
give no attention or thought, to 61 
truth and 
understanding and the, perfection of your. soul ? ('The Apology', +The Last Days 
of Socrates) 
The keynote for this age of enquiry into man's essence, 
inaugurated by Socrates, is found in. the celebrated second 
chorus of the Antioone of Sophocles, first performed 
when Socrates was about 54, in 442 8. C. : 
Many the wonders but nothing walks stranger than 
man. 
This thing crosses the sea in the winter's storm, 
making his path through the roaring waves. 
And she, the greatest of gods, the earth - 
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ageless she is, and unwearied 
- 
he wears her away 
as the ploughs go up and down from year to year 
and his mules turn up the soil. 
... ........... ............... ....... 
Language and thought like the wind 
and the feelings that make the town, 
he has taught himself, and shelter against the 
cold, 
refuge from rain. He can always help himself. 
He faces no future helpless. There's only death 
that he cannot find an escape from. He has contrived 
refuge from illnesses once beyond all cure. 
Socrates is known to us largely through the writings 
of his pupil, Plato, who developed his teacher's theories 
for himself. His dualistic conception of man reappears 
in the Neo-Platonists, St. Augustine, Descartes, and the 
line of thinkers descending from Cartesian thought. 
Throughout Plato's Dialogues, the soul's priority over the 
body is emphasised: 
'Surely the soul can best reflect when it is 
free of all distraction such as hearing or sight 
or pain or pleasure of any kind 
- 
that is, 
when it ignores the body and becomes as far_as 
possible independent, avoiding all physical 
op. cit. contacts and associations as much as it can, in 
109-110 its search for reality. ' ('Phaedo') 
The true philosopher is always preparing for death. The 
import of this is made explcit by Socrates in the 'Phaedo': 
We are in fact convinced that if we are ever to 
have pure knowledge of anything, we must get 
rid of the body and contemplate things by 
themselves with the soul by itself. It seems, 
to judge from the argument, that the wisdom 
which we desire and upon which we profess to 
have set our hearts, will be attainable only 
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111 when we are dead, and not in our lifetime. 
It begins to be clear that Socrates' conception was not 
of an individual self, but of a universal essence of which 
each man partakes. The Pythagorean "ghost in the machine" 
is given its almost archetypal expression in the 'Phaedo', 
developed by Socrates into an idea of man's divine essence. 
The soul strives continually for a higher state, and man's 
most important concern is the care of his soul: 
But when the soul investigates by itself, it 
passes into the realm of the pure and everlasting 
and immortal and changeless; and being of a 
kindred nature, when it is once independent and 
free from interference, consorts with it always 
and strays no longer, but remains, in that 
realm of the absolute, constant and invariable, 
op. cit. through contact with beings of a similar nature. 
131 And this condition of the soul we call Wisdom. 
Astrict-dichotomy is made between body and soul, 
much to the disadvantage of the. body: 
The soul is most like that which is divine, 
immortal, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, 
and ever self-consistent and invariable, whereas 
body is most like that which is human, mortal, 
op. cit. multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble and never 
132 self-consistent. 
This division persists throughout Western thought. When 
his friends ask how they are to bury him, Socrates laughs 
for, as he has explained to them, he ("this Socrates 
here who is talking to you now") cannot be killed, merely 
released from a body ('Phaedo', op. cit., 179). 
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Plato, in The Republic (Book IU) speaks'of a tripartite 
divisidn of the soul into : reason, the calculating, 
deciding faculty; appetite or desire, i. e. the basic 
physical drives; and, lastly, a rather vague faculty 
perhaps best called spirit. Plato's use of these 
divi'si`ons is not consistent, for sometimes he speaks of 
a single mental energy in three different manifestations, 
and sometimes of three autonomous faculties. The vagueness 
of these early concepts is apparent, not least from the 
way in which mind, soul, spirit, and self are all roughly 
analogous. Plato's concept of man's inner plurality does 
not'really work-if our consciousness of our inner conflicts 
is taken into account: a more unified concept is demanded 
than that offered`by Platonic psychology. 
Nevertheless, Socrates and Plato begin the search 
for self. The soul, said Socrates, must be discovered 
by each person for himself; discovery cannot be taught. 
Once realised, evil was no longer possible. The essence 
of man as a moral entity founds all later investigation 
into this question. 
* 
(ii) Descartes 
I shall now close my eyes, 'stop up my ears, 
turn away all my senses, even efface from my 
thought all images of corporeal things, or at 
least, because this can hardly be done, I shall 
consider them as being vain and false; and thus 
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communing only with myself, and examining my 
inner self, I shall try to make myself, little 
by little, better known and more familiar to 
113 myself. (3rd Meditation) 
1 
In his Socratic-sounding project, Descartes reduces 
thought to its most primary level, and finds that the 
fundamental thought is thinking that I think. He wishes 
to establish God's existence by mathematically precise 
principles. Reflecting on the fact that he doubts leads 
him, in the 3rd Meditation, to see that he must be imperfect, 
as to know is a greater perfection than to doubt. He has 
an idea of perfection and this can only have come from a 
perfect being 
- 
God. Also in the 3rd Meditation comes 
Descartes' second proof: if he had created himself he would 
have made himself perfect; since he is not perfect but has 
an idea of perfection he must have been created by another 
who is perfect 
- 
God. The so-called "ontological-proof" of 
the 5th Meditation is that, as absolute perfection is the 
sum total of all possible perfections, God - being absolute 
perfection 
- 
must necessarily exist, as existence is one 
of the perfections. From this, Descartes gains a confidence 
in the veracity of God, from which he proceeds to confidence 
in our own "clear and distinct ideas". An omnipotent God, 
thought Descartes, ensures my continued existence through 
creating and recreating me at every moment the same 'me' 
as in the moment preceding. Time, for Descartes, was a 
discrete series and in it we exist, in the immutable 
perfection of God. 
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The cogito experience is to a great extent intuitive: 
certain basic qualities are only to be known intuitively. 
It is in this way that we know the general character of 
the states we understand as consciousness. Descartes' 
first task was to establish what the essence of our conscious 
states was, and then to show its independence of material 
objects and their properties. Underlying the whole of 
Descartes' Natural Philosophy is the "qualitative difference 
and existential independence of minds and bodies" 
(S. v. Keeling, Descartes, 101). Replying to Hobbes' 
objections, Descartes maintains that what thinks is a 
'substance': 
" It is certain that thinking cannot exist 
without a. thing which thinks, or generally, that 
Keeling any accident or activity cannot be without a 
op. cit. substance of which it is the activity. 
106 (Reply to the Third Objections) 
In the experience of cogito I intuit simple natures 
such as substance, thinking, and existence, and also 
natures which are neither 'things or affections of things' 
but 'eternal truths' or, as Descartes sometimes calls them, 
'common notions'. Simple natures, in the co ito experience, 
are perceived to be connected in a way that can be 
expressed by saying "my present conscious-state entails 
the present existence of that self which is its subject, 
ana the subject I name "I". To know anything, says 
Descartes, is to know oneself as knowing it; it can be 
seen already how Descartes begins the subjective trend 
of modern philosophy which, as Whitehead put it, "most 
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characteristically differentiates it from mediaeval 
and ancient metaphysics". 
Descartes held that, because the defining attributes bf 
mind'and'body were totally different, there could be no 
causal connection between them. His view of the mind and. 
body being separate caused him difficulty, for he could not 
maintain that there was no interaction at all, as this was 
intuited: ' the problem, as he saw'it, was how we could 
understand the connection, or, indeed, how we come to 
know of the connection in the first place. The self of 
Descartes, the individual 'I' of his writings, is one that 
professes to need no body: 
Am I so dependent on body and senses that I 
cannot exist without them ? But I had persuaded 
myself that there was nothing at all in the world: 
.. * 
was I not, therefore, also persuaded that I 
did not exist ? No indeed; I existed without 
doubt, by the fact that I was persuaded, or 
103 indeed by the mere fact that I thought at all. (2nd Meditation) 
And therefore, from the mere fact that I know 
with certainty that I exist, and that'I do not 
observe that any other thing belongs necessarily 
to my nature or essence except that I am a 
thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence 
consists in this alone, that I am a thinking 
thing, or a substance whose whole essence or 
nature consists in thinking. And although' 
perhaps (or rather as I shall shortly say, 
certainly, ) I have a body to which I am very 
closely united, nevertheless, because, on the 
one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea 
of myself in so far as I am only a thinking and 
unextended thing, and because on the other hand 
I have a distinct idea of the body in so far as 
it is only an extended thing but which does not 
think, it is certain that I, that is to say my 
mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely and 
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truly distinct from my body, and may exist 
156-7 without it. ( 6th Meditation) 
Descartes never adequately reconciled this denial of the 
body's necessity with the fact of its existence and relation 
to the mind. He answered the question of how we know of 
the mind-body connection by again turning to intuition. 
A consequence of the dualism of material and mental 
substance is the dualism of knowledge and experience. It 
is, said Descartes, by pure thought alone. that we come 
to'know the physical world. 
But now I have come back imperceptibly to the 
point I sought; for, since it is now known to me 
that, properly speaking, we perceive bodies only 
by the understanding which is in us, and not 
by the imagination, or the senses, and that 
we do not perceive them through seeing them or 
touching them, but only because we conceive 
them in thought, I'know clearly that there is 
nothing more easy for me to know than my own 
112 mind. (2nd Meditation) 
When my mind, which knows itself but still doubts 
of everything else, looks around in order to 
extend its knowledge, it discovers certain 
common notions. From these it constructs 
various demonstrations that carry within them 
such conviction that their truth cannot be 
Keeling doubted so long as we concentrate attention on 
op. cit. them 
106 (Principles of Philosophy, I, 
xiii) 
We never perceive the natural world or the bodies in it, 
for we. perceive that which represents (and usually misrep- 
resents) in sensory media, that world. Again, Descartes 
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is arguing the primacy of the thinking self to the detriment 
of the body: the self can come to know the universe on its 
own, without the experience of the senses. However, by this 
he is once more brought to the problem of the fact that we 
are embodied beings, and the dependence (psychologically) 
of the self upon the body cannot be ignored, as Descartes 
is well aware. 
He distinguishes two mental operations involved 
in having "an idea, a thought, a cognition" : 'pure thought', 
which is a mode of the self's activity alone, and 'sensation' 
which is exclusively a mode of the body's activity as a 
physiological organism. The picture of knowledge that 
emerges is one in which the body's-sensory experience 
is taken over, as an obscure and confused impression, 
by the self which then clarifies it, replacing the 
physiological product with a "clear and distinct idea". 
As Keeling notes, "a completed knowledge completely 
unified would be a complete reflexion of all reality" (185). 
Descartes is a great divider and subdivider. Having 
discovered that the self was "I thinking I think", in 
effect, he proceeded to characterise this self's functions, 
distinguishing numerous activities. The cognitive 
characteristics have been outlined above; there were also 
characteristics of affective and conative (willing) activity. 
These latter could occur on either bodily or mental 
occasion: states which presupposed a bodily change were 
known by Descartes as 'passions' of the self and 'actions' 
of the body; conversely, those requiring mental change he 
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designated 'actions of the self'. Acts of volition, too, 
(which could only be initiated by the self) were divided 
into those the end of which lay in some further state of 
the willing self (as in the des. re for more complete 
knowledge), and those the end of which was in some state 
of the body (as in the desire for increased physical 
strength). The self is free in its will and this Descartes 
held to be an innate idea: we can choose to assent or 
not, or even postpone our decisions until we have understood 
more, or reflected. 
Despite his study of our ways of knowing, the nature 
of. the relationship between body and mind (self) eluded 
Descartes always. His ultimate position is one in which 
he accepts the union, but cannot explain it, and in a 
way: he must-crave indulgence for its going against the 
general import. 
-of. his philosophical theory. The self, 
to Descartes, is thinking: 
-there can exist in us no thought of which, at Keeling the very moment in which it is in us, we are 
op. cit. 
-unaware. 
207 (Reply to the Fourth Objections) 
We can never deny that the self is thinking, for this 
would deny its essence. There is no medium between the 
'I' and the thought "I 
----". 
As H. Caton writes (The 
Or iQin of Subjectivity), 
The literary 'I' of Descartes' first person 
narration-is the datum through which his 
30 principle manifests itself. 
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Despite its disparagement of the body and rather gratuitous 
dichotomies, Descartes' co ito er o sum clears the way 
for modern thought on the self. 
* 
(iii) Locke 
Influenced by Descartes, Locke was nonetheless not 
a Cartesian. He was an empiricist in that he believed 
all the material of our knowledge came from sensory 
experience. He did, in contrast to Descartes, oppose the 
theory of innate ideas, holding that all our ideas are 
ultimately derived from sensation or reflection. This 
may suggest that Locke conceived of the mind as passive, but 
this is not so as he distinguished between simple and complex 
ideas: while the former were received passively, the mind 
exercises an activity in producing the latter. The 
Essay Concernin4 Human'Understanding (1690) had a 
psychological intent, as may be gathered from the Introduction, 
where Locke gives as the first point of his method to 
enquire 
into the original of those ideas, notions, 
or whatever else you please to call them, which 
a man observes, and is conscious to himself 
he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the 
64 understanding comes to be furnished with them. 
For my purposes here, Book II9 Chaptbr 27 
- 
'Of 
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Identity and Diversity' 
- 
is most interesting. Identity, 
writes Locke, consists in our seeing a thing-at-a 
particular time and at a particular place. 
For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, 
that two things of the same kind should exist 
in the-same place at the same time, we rightly 
conclude that whatever exists anywhere at any 
time excludes all of the same kind, and is 
206-7 therefore itself alone. 
There is no doubt about God's constant self-identity 
because he is eternal, immutable and omnipresent. In the 
case of finite things, however, their identity will be 
in each case determined in relation to the time and place 
in which they exist. The principle of individuation is 
easily recognised as 
existence itself which determines a being of any 
sort to a particular time and place, incommunicable 
208 to two beings of the same kind. 
Loch. applies his principles to the self-identity 
of man, finding that it consists in 
nothing but a participation of the same continued 
life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, 
in succession vitally united to the same organized 
210 body. 
Locke's was a view of man as a more integrated, coherent 
being than the man of Descartes' theory. When we speak 
of the "same" man we are usually referring to a continuing 
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bodily identity: 
He that shall, place the identity of man in 
anything else, but, like that of other animals, 
in one fitly organised body, taken in any one 
instant, and from thence continued, under one 
organization of life, in several successively 
fleeting particles of matter united to it, will 
find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, 
mad and sober, the same man, by any supposition, 
that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, 
Socrates, Pilate, St Austin, and Caesar Borgia 
210 to be the same man. 
If; we were to take identity of soul as that which makes a 
man the same through time, there would, says Locke, be no 
way, of controlling what we intended by the word "same"; 
this is characteristic of his concern with language. 
Locke does not exclude the mind from what makes identity 
in man, but says that the "same successive body" must also 
be taken into account when we have "that idea in our minds 
of which the sound 'man' in our mouths is the sign" (211). 
Personal identity for Locke consists in consciousness, 
which he declares is inseparable from and essential to 
thinking. A person is defined as 
a thinking intelligent being, that has. reason 
and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, 
the same thinking thing, in different times and 
211 places. 
When we perceive, we know that we do so, and it is this 
knowledge that enables each person to call himself a self, 
to himself; no one can perceive without knowing that he 
does so. The identity of a person extends-back as far as 
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his consciousness extends back to any past thought or 
action. From this Locke draws the conclusion that if 
someone can have at different times a distinct and 
incommunicable consciousness, it cannot be said that he is 
the same at one time as at another: 
which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the 
solemnest declaration of their opinions, human 
laws not punishing the mad man for the sober 
man's actions, nor the sober man for what the 
217 mad man did; 
In the same way, a sleeping person is not the same as that 
person awake. 
The fact that iqe forget introduces a difficulty 
to this question of continuous identity. We do not always 
have "the whole train of our past actions before our eyes 
in one view" (212). We are intent, usually, on our 
present thoughts, and in sleep have no thoughts at all 
("at least none with that consciousness which remarks our 
waking thoughts"). These interruptions and ommissions 
raise the question of whether we are the same thinking 
thing ("substance") continuously; Locke emphasises that he 
is not here talking of personal identity, for different 
"substances" are united by consciousness into a single 
person in the same way that the 'different' bodies (i. e. 
as they develop, grow) of animals are united in one animal 
by the unity of one continued life. It is consciousness 
that makes one self to oneself, not the various thinking 
"substances": 
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For it is by the consciousness it has of its 
present thoughts and actions, that it is self 
to itself now, and so will be the same self, 
as far as the same consciousness can extend to 
actions past or to come; and would be by distance 
of,. time, or change of substance, no more two, 
persons, than a man may be two men by wearing other 
clothes today than he did yesterday, with a 
long or short sleep between; the same consciousness 
uniting those distant actions into the same 
person, whatever substances contributed to 
213 their production. 
Locke's concept of the self, as consciousness, is altogether 
more 'human' than that of Descartes. "Consciousness alone 
makes self" (218) for it is only identity of consciousness 
that brings, together all the different substances to make 
the single self. This self is the concern of each person, 
and-we would,. have that self happy. Any part of our bodies 
(any "substance" that is ) that is "vitally united" to our 
consciousness is a part of ourselves, but can become a real 
part of another person if separated from that "vital 
union by which that consciousness is communicated" (219). 
The name for the self that is present to one ("vitally 
united to the presentthinking being") is person. The 
personality's being a continuous identity is founded in a 
concern for happiness, an "unavoidable concomitant of 
consciousness"; something conscious of pleasure and pain 
desires "that that self that is conscious should be happy" 
(220). 
The third book of Locke's Essa is devoted to language. 
He assumed that thought in itself is really distinct from 
the use of words and symbols, taking as proof of this the 
fact that the same thought can be expressed in different 
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linguistic forms and languages. At the conclusion of the 
Essay Locke, calls for a study of "the doctrine of signs": 
For, since the things the mind contemplates are 
none of them, besides itself, present to the 
understanding, it is necessary that something 
else, as a sign or representation of the thing 
it considers, should be present to it: and these 
are ideas. 
... 
The consideration, then, of ideas 
and words as the great instruments of knowledge 
makes no despicable part of their contemplation 
who would take a view of human knowledge in the 
whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were 
distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they 
would afford us another sort of logic and critic, 
443 than what we have hitherto been acquainted with. 
This project of Locke's has been taken up only very 
recently; it is a witness tcthe modernity of his thought, 
which has been noted in his concept of the self as 
i 
consciousness. 
* 
(iv) Hume 
In his A Treatise of Human Nature (1738-40, later 
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1751) Hume made 
it clear that he was taking up Lockets original project of 
determining the extent of human knowledge. He saw human. 
nature as the "capital or centre" of the sciences, and so 
held that a science of man should be developed: 
As the science of man is the only solid, foundation 
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for the other sciences, so the only solid 
foundation we can give to this science itself 
must be laid on experience and observation. 
Like Löcke, Hume derived all the mind's contents from 
experience; we must start, he said, with empirical data, 
and not any supposed intuition of essences. "Perceptions" 
are, in general, the mind's contents, and these Hume 
divided into impressions and ideas, the difference between 
them being described in terms of 'vividness'. Hume's 
first concern was to distinguish between the immediate 
data of our experience and our thoughts about them. 
Fundamental to Hume's thought is a natural belief in 
the continuing existence of the body independently of the 
mind or perception: 
Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as 
much as possible; let us chase our imagination 
to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the 
universe; we have never really advanced a step 
beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of 
existence, but those perceptions which have 
appeared in that narrow compass. This is the 
Treatise universe of the imagination, nor have we any 
1,2,6 idea but what is there produced. 
This independent existence of the body must be taken for 
granted; all we can do is enquire into the cause of our 
belief in this existence: it is on the imagination that 
depends our supposition that there are objective and 
independent counterparts of certain impressions. Hume's 
position that it is natural ('animal') belief that should 
prevail in human life sets him apart from Locke and Berkely; 
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reason, for Hume, cannot justify these beliefs beyond 
giving some sort of psychological account of their origin. 
Characteristically, Hume decided that the problem of 
the substance of the soul is best dismissed as beyond odr 
comprehensidn. However, if there is no (extended or 
unextended) substance-we can call soul, this puts in 
question personal identity (in terms of a specific 'self'). 
Hume, of course, denied that we can have any idea of self 
distinct from our perceptions. He asks from what impression 
an idea of self could derive, for 
If any impression gives rise to the idea of 
self, that impression must continue invariably 
I, iv, 6 the same, through the whole course of our lives; 
-, 238 since self is supposed to exist after that manner 
There is no such impression, and so the idea of self does 
not exist; perceptions exist separately from one another, 
without need of "anything to support their existence" (239). 
Hume tries to find self by looking within for some 
particular object amongst others: 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into 
what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, 
... 
I never catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and 
never can observe anything but the perception 
... 
We are, then, "nothing but a bundle of different perceptions", 
all of which are in a`continual_. state of flux and movement: 
none of these remains the same for a single moment. Now 
follows Hume's famous description of the mind: it is 
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a kind of theatre where several perceptions 
successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, 
glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of 
postures and situations. There is properly no 
simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in 
different; whatever natural propension we have 
to imagine that simplicity and identity 
... 
They 
are the successive perceptions only that constitute 
the mind; nor have we the most distant notion 
of the place where these scenes are represented 
239-40 or of the materials of which it is composed. 
We do, though, presume an identity, and this, to Hume, 
is a pretence. We substitute this idea of identity for 
what is really a relation between objects, feigning 
the continued existence of the perceptions 
of our senses, to remove the inteiruption between 
perceptions of different objects; and run into 
the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to 
241 disguise the variation. 
Our notions of identity are fictions, and we carry over 
this trait from our perception of the phenomenal world to 
the mind of man. Personal identity is, to Hume, a 
product of imagination, which pretends that what is in 
fact a series of connected ideas is a "smooth and uninter- 
rupted progress of thought" (246). It is memory that he 
holds to be the chief source of the idea of personal 
identity, because it is by its operation that we are 
aware of the causal relations between perceptions. 
As memory'alone acquaints us with the continuance 
and extent of this succession of perceptions, it 
is to be considered, upon that account chiefly, 
as the source of personal identity. Had we no 
memory, we never should have any notion of 
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causation, nor consequently of that chain of 
causes and effects, which constitute our self 
247 or person. 
Concluding his Treatise, Hume dismisses questions of 
personal identity from philosophy, saying that they are 
really "grammatical" difficulties. However, he was 
aware of the problems his view of the self as a fiction 
gave rise to. His Cartesian identification of the person 
with 'mind' ignored the role played by our awareness of the 
body in judging personal identity, and because he was 
concerned to be consistent in. his thesis, Hume was led 
into implausibilities. He talks, for instance, as though 
the entities to which identity is ascribed are perceptions. 
In an Appendix to the Treatise Hume admitted that he could 
not say what it is that gives us the sense of simple 
unity and identity which binds our perceptions together 
into one self. 
* 
(v) Coleridge 
There is a "spontaneoud'consciousness natural to all 
reflecting beings; beneath, or behind this is a philosophic 
consciousness which is concerned with transcendental 
knowledge. In Biographia Literaria Coleridge images the 
human situation as a landscape: 
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The first range of hills, that encircles the 
scanty vale of human life, is the horizon for the 
majority of its inhabitants. On its ridges 
the common sun is born and departs. From 
them the stars rise, and touching them they 
118-9 vanish. 
Most people only know this range imperfectly, lacking either 
the courage or the curiosity to investigate its higher 
reaches. In each age there have been a few who have 
realised that the sources of their knowledge lie beyond 
the sight of the common range. This realisation is an 
intuition, operating without words, and it is only those 
who feel within them that "the wings of the air-sylph 
are forming within the skin of the caterpillar" who can 
"acquire the philosophic imagination, the sacred power 
of self-intuition". This openness to some 'higher' 
knowledge Coleridge sees as the requisite for the true 
philosopher, and so even the most learned and cultivated 
may not be able to reach the heart of philosophy. 
The "spirit" 
- 
by which this higher knowledge is 
intuited 
- 
communicates by way of its "freedom", which is 
the common element of all spirits: 
Where the spirit of a man is not filled with 
the consciousness of freedom 
.... 
all spiritual 
intercourse is interrupted, not only with others, 
121 but even with himself. 
Philosophy is concerned with "objects of the inner sense", 
according to Coleridge, and thus cannot (as geometry can) 
provide an outward intuition for each of its constructions. 
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However, if philosophy is to "arrive at evidence" it must, 
like geometry, begin with the inner sense's primary construct, 
the postulate from which knowledge can issue, as the moving 
point is the postulate for geometry. To find this 
primary postulate the "direction" of the inner sense must 
be found, and this direction is determined by an act of 
freedom. Coleridge's language is necessarily vague here 
as he is applying concrete terms to what he has already 
said is beyond words. Consciousness acts freely; this is 
its first principle. There is, however, a difference from 
mathematics in that there are different degrees of inner 
sense, and thus philosophy's first principle has a moral 
or "practical" side, that is not open to the understanding 
of all. To someone without the required inner sense, 
the whole is groundless and hollow, unsustained 
by living contact, unaccompanied with any 
realising intuition which exists by and 
in the act that affirms its existence, which is 
known because it is, and is, because it is 
124 known. 
The postulate of philosophy thus arrived at is the Socratic 
injunction "Know thyself", for philosophy is the "science 
of BEING altogether". Knowledge, real knowledge (i. e. that 
which is true), depends on "the coincidence of an object 
with a subject"; our thought must correspond to the thing 
represented to it. Coleridge now terms all that is 
objective "Nature", and all that is subjective "Self". 
He states the problem of thinking about thinking: 
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rr 
During the act of knowledge itself, the 
objective and subjective are so instantly 
united, that we cannot determine to which of the 
two the priority belongs. There is here no 
first, and no second; both are coinstantaneous 
and one. While I am attempting to explain this 
125 intimate coalition, I must suppose it dissolved. 
Nature exists without being perceived, and so if we 
start from the object, we have to account for the subject; 
this is the task of natural philosophy. Transcendental, 
or "intelligential" philosophy begins with the subject, 
and so must account for the object. The transcendental 
philosopher must not allow the subjective to be intruded 
on by the objective, and so must 'purify' his mind (as 
Descartes did by doubt). As the fundamental presumption 
for the natural philosopher is that things are without 
us, so for the transcendental philosopher it is: "I am. " 
The latter must demonstrate the identity of the fact of 
our being, and that nature exists in itself. The "man 
of common sense" believes that he sees a table, not a 
phantom table from which he can deduce by argument the 
existence of a table he does not see. Coleridge 
opposes this "realism" against contemporary metaphysics, 
which banishes us to a land of shadows, surrounds 
us with apparitions, and distinguishes truth 
from illusion only by the majority of those who 
129 dream the same dream. 
If we know,. we must know something: "Truth is 
correlative to being. "' In trying to elucidate what he 
calls his "Dynamic Philosophy" Coleridge seeks an absolute 
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truth, something "which is, simply because it is". This 
cannot be an object, because each thing "is what it is, in 
consequence of some other thing"; neither can it be a subject 
(as distinguished from an object). There is no third 
term, and so the principle is to be found in the identity 
of subject and object together: the sum, 
.L am, which 
Coleridge says he will term indiscriminately "spirit, self, 
and self-consciousness" (131). The sum 
is a subject which becomes a subject by the 
act of constructing itself objectively to itself; 
but which never is an object except for itself, 
and only so far as by the very same act it becomes 
131-2 a subject. 
Coleridbefinds that we know ourselves to be, and 
ourselves as knowing that we are, in a great eternal circle: 
"I am, because I affirm myself to be; I affirm myself to 
be, because I am. " This knowledge is the "ground" of 
all that we know. The self must continually dissolve the 
identity of subject and object in order to know that there 
is an identity, and thus the self consists in an act, in 
will: 
The self-conscious spirit therefore is a will; 
and freedom must be assumed as a 9round of 
133 philosophy, and can never be deduced from it. 
The principle of self, the "primary ACT of self-duplication", 
is the indirect principle of all the sciences, and is the 
"immediate and direct principle of the ultimate science 
... 
transcendental philosophy. " Coleridge points out that he 
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is confining his investigation to transcendental 
philosophy alone, i. e. to the question of knowledge, ' and 
the principle he has arrived at is the principle of knowing, 
not of being. If the natural and transcendental philos- 
ophies were somehow merged (that is, if it were possible 
to investigate the identity of subject and object without 
separating them) we would pass from philosophy to religion, 
in fact the two would become one: 
We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF, in order to 
end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from 
the SELF, in order to lose and find all self in 
134 GOD. 
Thus Coleridge limits his enquiry to what is possible 
for us, while having a sense of a more perfect knowledge, 
out of our reach. He suggests that our primary self- 
knowing may be derived from some higher consciousness, 
which may itself be derived from a higher, and so on in 
an infinite regression. If we attempt 
- 
as either natural 
or transcendental philosophers 
- 
to go beyond our self as 
the ground of our knowledge, we are "whirled down the gulf 
of an infinite series. " 
* 
(vi) Freud 
Taking a large leap across the emergence of what is 
best described, in general and retrospectively, as a 
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psychological approach to the question of self (German 
Idealism, Coleridge, etc. in opposition to positivist 
thought) and leaving aside positivism's conviction that 
philosophy must be scientific if it is to have cognitive 
value, we come to Freud and the first really comprehensive, 
dynamic investigation of what the self might be. 
Freud's idea of the self emerges as a complex of 
relationships, conflicts and compromises inspired by psychic 
energy. He frequently altered the terms in which he 
expressed his concepts, as indeed his ideas were developed 
and modified. In a sense, one could say his entire work 
is a study of the self. To build up an idea of how he 
saw the self we must trace a line through his work and 
attempt to extract what is relevant to our purpose here. 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) Freud wrote that 
the study of dreams may be considered the most 
trustworthy method of investigating deep mental 
processes. 
We may begin, therefore, by looking at The Interpretation 
bf Dreams (1900). 
In Chapter 7- 'Psychology of Dream Processes' 
- 
we 
find this: 
There is often a passage in even the most 
.. 
thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be 
left obscure; this is because we become aware 
during the work of interpretation that at that 
point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which 
cannot be unravelled and which moreover adds 
nothing to our knowledge of the content of the 
dream. This is the dream's navel, the spot 
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where it reaches down into 
dream-thoughts to which we 
cannot, from the nature of 
definite endings; they are 
out in every direction into 
671-2 of our world of thought. 
the unknown. The: 
are led by interpretation 
things, have any 
bound to branch 
the intricate network 
Some would say that this 'tangle' is the most interesting 
and relevant part of the psychic processes, in the question 
of what the self is. Freud, however, despite his saying 
(in The Unconscious, 1915) that "a gain in meaning is a 
perfectly justifiable ground for going beyond the limits 
of direct experience'; was concerned to give a natural 
scientific model of the mind. Although he swept away 
many of the 19th century positivists' conceptions, their 
language and 'spirit' influenced his thought. 
In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud assumes that 
the unconscious is "the general basis of psychical life" (773), 
and within this lies the smaller sphere of the conscious. 
Our conscious thoughts all have an unconscious preliminary 
stage, although not all that is unconscious need come to 
be conscious. The unconscious is "the true psychical 
reality", and its innermost nature is unknown to us; 
unknown, that is, in the way that the external world's 
"reality" is unknown "by the communications of our sense 
organs". From his study, Freud develops a system in which 
"excitatory material" flows into the conscious 'Cs. ') from 
without (the perceptual 
- 
Pcpt. 
- 
system) and from within. 
The concept is marked, as is familiar in Freud's writings, 
by its topographical description: Freud concretizes his 
insights. His interest was, after all, practical, not 
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philosophical: the concept of the unconscious was necessary 
to his model, and as has already been noted already, he 
was prepared to put weight on a hypothesis' unsupported 
by experience if it led to a gain in understanding the 
meaning of the mind's activities. 
- 
Having divided the self into unconscious, preconscious 
and conscious systems, Freud takes the first steps in 
developing this into the later id, ego and superego in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Finding that in analysis 
patients resisted certain ideas, Freud surmised that this 
originated from the "higher strata" of the mind which 
carried out repression. The resistance was unconscious in 
the early stages of treatment, and from this Freud detected 
a shortcoming in the contrast previously made between the 
conscious and the unconscious: the distinction should 
rather be between "the coherent ego and the repressed". 
Much of the ego, especially what could be called its 
"nucleus", is unconscious, and only a small part of it can 
properly be termed "preconscious". Speculating on the 
evidence of psychoanalysis led Freud to further his descrip- 
tion of mental processes and again the concreteness of his 
model is remarkable: 
What consciousness yields consists essentially 
of perceptions of excitations coming from the 
external world and of feelings of pleasure and 
unpleasure which can only arise from-within 
the mental apparatus; it is therefore possible 
to assign to the system Pcpt. 
- 
Cs. a position 
in space. It must lie on the borderline between 
outside and inside; it must be turned toward the 
external world and must envelop the other 
18 psychical systems. 
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A notable feature of Freud's concept of what is, in effect, 
the self-is that view of it as an entity buffeted on all 
sides by experience and sensation, an entity through and 
around which "energies" are in constant tension and flux. 
The "living organism" must be protected against stimuli; 
this is almost more important than their reception. Our 
sense organs are provided with protection against "excessive 
amounts" or "unsuitable kinds" of stimuli: 
The protective shield is supplied with its own 
store of energy and must above all endeavour 
to preserve the special modes of transformation 
of energy operating in it against the effects 
threatened by the enormous energies at work in 
the external world 
- 
effects which tend towards 
a levellin6 out of them and hence towards 
destruction. The main purpose of the reception 
-of stimuli is to discover the direction and 
nature of the external stimuli; for that it is 
enough to take small specimens of the external 
21 world, to sample it in small quantities. 
This piotection,, cannot, however, be given against stimuli 
from within the system itself. Taking pleasure and 
unpleasure as the principles on which the system operates, 
Freud explains that if too much "unpleasure" comes from 
within, it is treated as though it was coming from outside 
in order that the external shield may be used against it: 
this is the origin of projection. 
In keeping with his general view of the self as a 
nexus of conflicting instincts and drives, Freud has drawn 
a sharp distinction between 'ego instincts' and sexual 
instincts, the former being seen as an inclination to. 
death, the latter to life. The case is not, though, so 
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clear-cut,, for there are sexual instincts operating in the 
ego. Maintaining his dualistic approach, Freud alters his 
original division to one in which the basic conflict of 
the self is between life-instincts and death-instincts. 
Significantly, Freud finds that in "the greatest pleasure 
attainable by us " (sexual intercourse - "us" being 
restricted to men) there is a moment of 'extinction' (56) - 
a sort of fusion of the life- and death-instincts. So 
far, then, Freud's system is a fairly complex one in which 
two instincts are in perpetual conflict, and from this 
conflict arises the psychic energy of our lives. Freud's 
theory was continually revised, its terms refined and 
altered, and it is therefore unwise to make conclusive, 
definite statements about it: it should be seen as a process. 
The L2oo and the Id (1923, Standard Edition XIX) is a 
work helpful in clarifying the concepts of the central 
period of Freud's thought. The fundamental premiss of 
psychoanalysis is the division into what is conscious and 
what is unconscious. There are ("We have found - that is, 
we have been obliged to assume -", 14) powerful mental 
processes that produce all the effects within the system 
that ordinary ideas do; indeed, their effects can become 
conscious as ideas, though the processes themselves do not. 
Before being made conscious, the ideas are in a state that 
has been called repression; this is, obviously, a prototype 
for the unconscious. Further to this, two sorts of unconscious 
have been discovered: one in which ideas are potentially 
conscious (Pcs. ), and one in which they cannot become so 
(Ups. ). However, Freud writes, these distinctions now 
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prove to be inadequate. In each person there is "a 
coherent organisation of mental processes" which he calls 
the ego (17), and it is to this that consciousness is 
attached. The ego controls the discharge of "excitations" 
into the external world, and it also'supervises all its 
own constituent processes". The ego "goes to sleep at 
night" (14) and yet continues to function as a censor on 
dreams. Here Freud seems to have got himself into 
difficulties: when awake, the ego prevents repressed 
instincts from issuing in actions, thus they seek to escape 
in dreams, a sort of compromise. If the ego sleeps, then 
instincts hold sway in the mind, but to do this they 
would need the energy and tension provided by waking life. 
Sometimes Freud tries to solve the problem by the notion 
of a "drowsy" ego, but this is unsatisfactory. 
In psychoanalysis, repression reveals something in 
the ego itself that is unconscious; something, that is, 
which produces powerful effects without itself 
SE XIX being conscious and which requires special work 
17 before it can be made conscious. 
Freud discovers that in view of this finding, from the 
point of view of analytic practice, it is inadequate to 
derive neuroses from the conflict between conscious and 
unconscious. He substitutes for his original antithesis one 
between the ego and that repressed part which is separated 
from it. While it is true that all that is repressed is 
Ups., not all that is Ucs. is repressed; part of the ego is 
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Ucs., and this is not,. like Pcs., something latent. 
Freud turns his attention to thought-processes next, 
which 
represent displacements of mental energy which 
are effected somewhere in the interior of the 
SE XIX apparatus as this energy proceeds on its way 
19 towards action 
Anything that becomes conscious must at one time have been 
conscious already; anything that arises from within, 
seeking to become conscious, must try to change into 
external perceptions, and this is made possible by means 
of memory traces, or what Freud calls "mnemic residues" (20). 
Internal thought processes are made into perceptions by 
"word-presentations"; Freud takes this as a demonstration 
of the theorem that "all knowledge has its origin in 
external perception" (23). The model of the self now 
receives new dimensions as Freud names that which begins 
by being Pcs., starting out from the perceptual system, the 
'ego' and "the other part of the mind into which this 
entity extends and behaves as though it were Ucs. " (23) 
the 'id'. An individual is thus seen as a 
psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose 
surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus 
24 the Pcpt. system. 
The ego does not envelop the id, and is not sharply 
separated from it; the lower portion 'merges into it, 
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and through the id, the repressed can communicate with 
the ego. `Freud's concrete visualisation is emphasised by 
his diagrams'of the system he describes. The ego is in 
direct'contact with the external world, through the 
system Pcpt. ' 
--Cs., and tries to bring its influence to 
bear on the id. It "endeavours to substitute the reality 
principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestric- 
tedly in the id" (25). Basically, the ego can be taken 
as representing reason and common sense, whilst the id 
contains the passions. The ego is also primarily a bodily 
ego, in that it is ultimately derived from physical 
sensations. 
The 'superego' is "less firmly connected with 
consciousness" (28). To describe it, Freud returns to 
his sexual theories. The superego is a "precipitate" in 
the ego, which is formed from a union of the father- and 
mother-identifications which are the general result of 
the sexual phase of development dominated by the 
Oedipus complex; it is its heir, and thus also "the 
expression of the most powerful impulses and most 
important libidinal vicissitudes of the id" (34). The 
superego is the representative of the internal world (the 
id), as the ego is of the external. The conflicts b6tween 
the ego and the superego, the Ideal will, are made 
analogous by Freud to the conflict between real and 
psychical, external and internal; his model of the 
mental self thus retains its 'physical' attributes. The 
superego seems to be a sort of 'spirit', the 'higher man'; 
it is, says Freud, "the germ from which all religions have 
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evolved" (37). The superego becomes what can be called 
conscience through its conflict with the actual performance, 
in the "real" world, of the ego. 
In a late lecture, tellingly entitled The Dissection 
of the Psychical Personality (1932), Freud says: 
We wish to make the ego the matter of our enquiry, 
our very own ego. But is that possible 7 After 
all, the ego is in its very essence a subject: 
89 how can it be made into an object 7 (New Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis) 
Freud's answer is that the ego can be split, one part 
observing the other. ' This subdivision of the ego has 
been seen always to be a deep theoretical need of Freud's. 
His 'objectivity' does not, however, preclude him from 
profound insights: 
the insane3 have turned away from external reality, 
but for that very reason they know more about 
internal, psychical reality and can reveal a 
ibid. number of things to us that would otherwise 
90 be inaccessible to us. 
The superego, it seems, is the agency that 'observes' 
the ego, but the id is the "dark, inaccessible part of 
our personality" (105); we learn what we can about the id 
from the study of dreams and neuroses. Freud always 
shied away from philosophy (or rather, from philosophizing): 
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There is nothing in the id that corresponds to 
the idea of time; there is no recognition of the 
passage of time, and 
-a thing that is most 
remarkable and awaits consideration in philos- 
ibid. ophical thought 
- 
no alteration in its mental 
106 processes is produced by the passage of time. 
The ego has simultaneously to obey three "tyrannical" 
masters: external reality, the superego, and the id. After 
making these subdivisions, though, Freud would wish us to 
allow "what we have separated to merge once more". Freud 
was a scientific observer of and researcher into the mind, 
whose mechanistic formulations are shot through with 
brilliant intuitions into the darkness of human minds 
(intuitions which perhaps are not done justice to in this 
cursory sketch). Throughout I have equated 'mind' with 
'self'; I think the equation justified in the light of 
Freud's intentions. He was concerned to build up a model 
of the structure of the mind, by which the work of psycho- 
analysis could be carried forward: 
Psychoanalysis' intention is, indeed, to strengthen 
the ego, to make it more independent of the 
super-ego, to widen its field of perception 
and enlarge its organisation, so that it can 
appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where id 
was, there ego shall be. It is a work of 
ibid. culture 
- 
not unlike the draining of the Zuider 
112 Zee. 
* 
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(vii) Plerleau-Ponty 
Self in tIe works of (1erleau-Ponty is at once an 
elusive and a most central idea. In all thinking about 
the self-a duality has been introduced, explicitly or 
tacitly,, to explain what it is that thinks 'I'. Merleau- 
Ponty writes of a "paradox of immanence and transcendence" 
in perception: a thing perceived is present to the per- 
ceiver, and yet'there is always something more to it. 
Perception is the basis of our experience, in Ilerleau- 
Ponty's view; it is on this base that we build up other 
levels of experience (e. g. the cultural world). All 
consciousness is, in a sense, perceptual, even consciousness 
of self, and so the experience of self in the mind partakes 
of that presence and that absence which is always inherent 
in the paradoxical experience of perception. Addressing 
the Societe francaise de philosophie shortly after the 
publication of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
states the objection to his theory that he is proposing to 
answer: 
[hat] I grasp myself in pure reflection completely 
outside perception, and that I grasp myself not 
now as a perceiving subject, tied by its body 
to a system of things, but as a thinking subject, 
radically free with respect to things and with 
205 respect to the body. 
('The Primacy of Perception 
and Its Philosophical 
Consequences' in O'Neill ad. ) 
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To answer this Cartesian objection,. Merleau-Ponty 
begins by examining the cogito, finding, in the first 
place, that the c ogito of Descartes'and of psychologists 
is an "instantaneous constatation" by which the thinker 
is limited to grasping that 'I think' (op. cit. 205). This 
experience is limited to the instant and to silence; 
taken as the primary truth, it is incapable of formulation 
as truth. Secondly, the cogito can be taken in that sense 
found in Descartes' Regulae as not only the grasping of the 
fact that 'I think', but also as evidence of the objects 
that thought intends. Thirdly, Ilerleau-Ponty finds the 
only "solid" meaning of the cogito is the act of doubting, 
"by which I put in question all the possible objects of 
my experience". Doubt cannot be doubted as it grasps 
itself in its own operation: the mind grasps itself as a 
particular thought in act, and is in this way. assured of 
itself as not only thinking, but thinking something in 
particular. This takes Merleau-Ponty outside the 
"psychological" co ito, and is the criterion for consciousness 
of self, as is seen in the chapter on 'The Cogito' in 
Phenomenology of Perception: 
All thought of something is at the same time 
self-consciousness, failing which it could have 
no object. At the root of all our experiences 
and all our reflection, we find, then, a being 
which immediately recognises itself, because it 
is its knowledge both of itself and of all 
things, which knows its own existence, not by 
observation and as a given fact, nor by inference 
from any idea of itself, but through direct 
contact with that existence. Self-consciousness 
371 is the very being of mind 
. 
in action. 
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In the preface to Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau- 
Ponty rejects the scientific conceptions of man, which have 
dominated philosophy and psychology: 
I am not the outcome or the meeting-point of 
numerous causal agencies which' determine my 
bodily or psychological make-up. I cannot 
conceive myself as nothing but a bit of the world, 
a mere object of biological, psychological or 
sociological investigation. I cannot shut myself 
up within the realm of science. All my knowledge 
of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is 
gained from my own particular point of view, or 
from some experience of the world without which 
viii.. the symbols of science would be meaningless. 
Man is the "absolute source",. whose basic experience of 
the world is to be recovered by phenomenology. Ilerleau- 
Ponty. rejects the 'inner man' of St Augustine; we know 
ourselves only as in the world, and a true cogito reveals 
us as "being-in-the-world". In Phenomenology of Perception, 
as J. F. Bannan has said, (The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty), 
the central problem is the paradox of how there is "for us 
an in itself" (Phenomenology, 71). There is no universal 
resolution of one and other for Merleau-Ponty: the other 
(alter e o) is a problem: 
But this is precisely the question: how can the 
word 'I' be put into the plural, how can a 
general idea of the I be formed, how can I speak 
of an I other than my own, how can I know that 
there are other I's,. how can consciousness which, 
by its nature, and as self-knowledge, is in the 
mode of the I, be grasped in the mode of Thou, 
348 and through this, in the world of the 'one' ? 
(Phenomenology of Perception) 
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The other stands before me as an in itself, and yet 
exists for himself: I must treat him as the former to 
distinguish him from myself, and as the latter in order 
that he can be a consciousness perceiving me. It is not 
my consciousness that is myself (that consciousness' 
discerned by reflection) but that constitutes my self; 
consciousness is not enclosed within myself, so that it 
can constitute "other (my)selves" (358). 
Perception is our experience of "our presence at the 
moment when things, truths, values are constituted for 
us". In Phenomenology of Perception Ilerleau-Panty tries 
to define a method "for getting closer to present and living 
reality", and applies this method to man's relation to 
reality and to others at the level of perceptual experience; 
it should (he says in that addre$ to the Societe referred to 
above) be applied to other areas of man's relation to 
others. Throughout his writings, Merleau-Ponty comes 
again and again to a view of our being characterised by 
paradox: 
If we actually reflect on our situation, we will 
find that the subject, thus situated in the world 
and submitting to its influence, is at the same 
time he who thinks the world. No world whatsoever 
is conceivable that is not thought by someone. 
Hence while it is true that the empirical, 
subject is a part of the world, it-is also true 
that the world is no more than an intentional 
241 object for the transcendental subject. ('Phenomenology and the 
Sciences of Man' in J. O'Neill, ed. ) 
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We live in constant tension, of being and of time; 
Just as I grasp time through my present, I 
perceive others through my individual life, in 
ibid. the tension of an experience which transcends 
211 itself. 
For 1erleau-Ponty there are, as we have seen, two selves: 
the empirical, and the transcendental. In phenomenology 
- 
specifically in what Husserl called the 'reduction' 
- 
the 
transcendental (unreflected) self seeks to explain both 
the manifestations of the external world and the empirical, 
incarnate self. 
In the ambiguous self, Merleau-Ponty finds, as he 
thought Montaigne did, 
the place of all obscurities, the mystery of 
123 mysteries, and something like-an ultimate truth ('Indirect Language and the 
Voices of Silence', in O'Neill, ed. )' 
JJerleau-Ponty's ultimate truth is the primacy of perception 
in seeking to understand our being-in-the-world. The body 
is the medium through which we experience the world: 
The body is the vehicle of being-in-the-world, and 
having a body is, for a living creäture, to be 
intervolved in a definite environment, to identify 
oneself with certain projects and be continually 
82 committed to them. 
(Phenomenology of Perception) 
Phenomenology is in many ways a philosophical method especially 
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for the elucidation of"the self, for it treats man in his 
being, rather- than as an object. ', This sketch does scant 
justice to (lerleau-Ponty's work, but it should show at 
least the entirely different conceptual framework with 
which this modern movement approached perennial problems. 
* 
(viii) R. D. Laing 
R. D. Laing uses the insights-of phenomenology to 
examine the self of 0 person who, for one reason or another, 
has deviated from what the majority regards as normal. 
Although Laing is careful to point out the narrow limits 
of his interest in The Divided Self (1960), his ideas can 
be extended far beyond those limits: he himself gives an 
example of his thesis' wider relevance in his frequent 
reference to writers and artists (most notably Holderlin, 
Kafka, Blake, Dostoevski). The Divided Self is concerned 
with schizoid and schizophrenic individuals: a schizoid 
person is not able 
to experience himself 'together with' others 
or 'at home' in the world 
... 
he does not 
experience himself as a complete person but rather 
as 'split' in various ways, perhaps as a mind 
more or less tenuously linked to a body, as two 
17 or more selves, and so on. 
Man is split up in the languagft of psychoanalysis and 
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psychiatry, and thus an examination can never take as its 
starting point, a unitary whole, as man is a collection of 
components: psyche and soma, mind and body, personality, 
self. Into this language of division Laing brings the 
thought of' Heidegger, Binswanger, Merleau-Ponty 
- 
that 
unifying movement of modern thought that sees man as 
being-in-the world. The other, in the language of 
existential'phenomenology, as seen as person or organism, 
is "the object of different intentional acts" (op. cit., 21). 
Laing questions the validity of our concepts of sanity 
and insanityi a person is called sane by common consent; 
insanity is a disjunction of a certain degree between two 
people, one of whom is accepted as sane. A sane person 
has an autonomous sense of identity, and we will see that 
autonomy is important in Laing's understanding of the so- 
called insane person. Ontological insecurity leads a 
person to learn tricks to get by in life 
'All that you can see is not me', he says to 
himself. But only in and through all that we 
37, do see can he be anyone (in reality). 
Such a person is "irreal" if his actions are not his 
real self: if once he stops pretending to be what he is 
not, and 
steps out as the person he has come to be, he 
emerges as Christ, or a ghost, but not as a man: 
37 by existing with no body, he is no-body. 
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What is essential to Laing's understanding is that what 
is true existentially for a person is lived by that 
person as 'really' true. 
Self, to Laing, is a core of being, that voice with 
which, we address ourselves within. An ontologically 
insecure person might feel his self partially divorced 
from his body (42), All the efforts of such a person are 
towards preserving an identity, a self: he can take nothing 
for granted, but must keep a tight control over every 
aspect of his life, both alone and in relation to others. 
Others threaten the insecure person with loss of self in 
three ways: 
(i) by love or understanding, the self may be 
'engulfed', lost in the other; 
(ii) if the individual feels he is an empty space, 
he fears the implosion of reality, even while 
longing for the space to be filled; (iii) others may deprive one of subjectivity, treating 
one as an 'it'. 
The insecure self is thus particularly vulnerable in the 
world at large, as Laing explains: 
... 
if one experiences the other as a free agent, 
one is open to the possibility of experiencing 
oneself as an object of his experience and 
thereby of feeling one's own subjectivity 
drained away. One is threatened with the 
possibility of becoming no more than a thing 
in the world of the other, without any life 
for oneself, without any being for oneself. In 
terms of such anxiety, the very act of experiencing 
the other as a person is felt as virtually 
47 suicidal. 
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The self is the "basic existential core" of a persoh, 
and its autonomy is essential to the person's sense of 
identity, of being at home in the world. The first move 
in the establishment of this autonomy is the sense of being 
separate from other people;,, an ontologically insecure person 
feels bound up with others "in a sense that transgresses the 
actual possibilities within the structure of human 
relatedness" (52). 
The primary split in an ontologically insecure person 
is between mind and body: usually the person feels most 
closely identified. with mind; that is, his self is pred- 
ominantly felt as a mental entity. An embodied person feels 
that he began when his body did and will die when it does; 
if a person is unembodied, has never quite become incarnate, 
he feels somewhat detached_from his body. Thus there is 
what Laing calls a "basic difference in the self's position 
inýlife"-(66): although the basic issues arise in the same 
way for the unembodied as for the embodied person, the 
contexts. in which they are experienced are radically 
different, and thus the issues are lived differently. 
Although embodiment may not ensure ontological security, 
it-is a starting-point which is 
the precondition for a different hierarchy of 
possibilities from those open to the person 
who experiences himself in terms of a self-body 
68 dualism. 
An unembodied person develops a false self with which 
to live in the world; the body (by whose actions this self 
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is known in the world) is the core of the false self. Thus 
the 'true' self, that insecure self that hides within, -. 
cannot directly experience the world because it is mediated 
through the body. Laing illustrates this split with the case 
of "David", who holds what he calls his town', 'inner', 'true', 
or 'real' self to have nothing to do with those activities 
by which he is known to others, which he calls his 
'personality!. 'Personality' is a false-self system; the 
real self remains hidden, treating the false selves as 
depersonalized others. Once a person has come to experience 
himself in this way, a process of self-destruction is 
initiated, 
_for 
what is intended to defend the timid 'inner' 
self in fact destroys it. Often the inner self is split 
as it seeks to become-"a relationship which relates itself 
to itself". 
It is not by any means certain that such a person will 
develop; to the psychotic stage and disintegrate, but it:. is- 
the path to such a state that Laing is concerned with here. 
It is, he notes, (89) possible to "live out" "authentic 
versions of freedom, power and creativity". This is 
especially true of many schizoid artists: though relatively 
isolated from others, they succeed in "establishing a 
creative relationship with things in the world, which are 
made to embody the figures of their fantasy" (89). Laing 
has pointed the way to a most fruitful and interesting 
relationship between the self of an artist and his created 
work; reading The Divided Self many of Virginia Woolfts 
characters come to mind (e. g. Rhoda and Louis in The Waves, 
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Septimus Smith in Mrs. Dalloway). In much literature, 
especially that of the modernist period, Laing discovers 
insights very similar to his own, (which are, of course, 
based on clinical experience): Blake, Beckett, Kafka, have 
all written of states of mind (from a subjective point of 
view) which Laing encounters in treating schizoid and 
schizophrenic individuals. 
The schizoid person lives in the heart of the despair 
and paradox that characterises so much thought and art in 
the twentieth century. Often he believes in his own des- 
tructiveness: 
In the last resort he sets about murdering his 
'self', and this is not as easy as cutting one's 
throat. He descends into a vortex of non-being 
in order to avoid. being, but also to preserve 
93 being from himself. 
The 'inner. ' self crouches within, looking out on perceptions 
and actions it feels have nothing to do with it: its aim is 
transcendence, to be a pure subject, and so it must never 
allow itself to be influenced by experience, which would 
pin it down and give it an objective existence. In order 
to feel ', real', however, the schizoid individual must be 
"self-conscious" either temporally or spatially. The 
individual moves even closer to a pysohotic state because 
the false-self system cannot really provide the sense of 
reality the inner self requires. The inner self, becoming 
more and more isolated and hating, yet desperately needing, 
the false-self system, has to devise ways of "acquiring" 
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reality. This it achieves by-touching, imitating, or.. 
stealing in a "magical" way. Spiralling ever, downwards, 
towards psychosis, the schizoid individual feels "guilty 
at daring to be, and doubly guilty at not being, at being 
too terrified to be" (157). Psychiatry usually cannot 
detect the imminent disintegration of the inner self as it 
is concerned with accounting for the false selves. 
Ultimately, the inner self fragments into several parts, all 
of which have a certain-sense of 'I', and all of whicha 
regard the rest as 
. 
others, ("not-me", °158). 
The inner self is the centre of the person's being, 
for that person. 
- 
If this centre does not hold, neither 
the body-experience nor the self-experience of the person 
can retain a sense of identity. The individual is flung 
into a state Laing suggests could best be described as 
"chaotic nonentity": 
In its final form, such complete disintegration 
is a hypothetical state which has no verbal 
equivalents. 
... 
In its most extreme form it is 
162 perhaps not compatible with life. 
Language has been vitally important to Laing from the outset 
of his study; it is worth noting his belief in states of 
mind that go beyond the limits of language, for if these 
are possible it can easily be seen 
. 
how. language- distorts 
our ideas of others and of self, by supposing that language 
always coincides with the reality it is intended to represent. 
In Laing's view, schizophrenia comes to mean the outcome of 
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a more than usual difficulty in being a whole 
person with'the-other, and with not sharing the 
common-sense (i. e. community sense) way of 
189 experiencing oneself in the world. 
Identity requires another; it has to be realised 
through relationship. In Self and Others (1961) Laing 
continues his investigations into self: 
Every relationship implies a definition of self 
by other and'of other by self. 
... 
A person's 
'own' identity cannot be completely abstracted 
from'his identity-for-others. His identity-for- 
himself; the identity others ascribe to him; 
the identities he attributes to them; ': the 
idenitity or, identities he thinks they attribute 
to him; what he thinks they think he thinks 
86 they think 
... 
Self, for Laing, can mean many things: an inner self which 
is the voice with which we address ourselves; or how 
each other in our lives experiences us. Self is not static, 
nor is it necessarily ever completely known: 
In 'putting myself into' what I do, I lose 
myself, and in so doing I seem to become myself. 
The act I do is felt to be me, and I become 'me' 
in and through such action. Also, there is a 
sense in which a person 'keeps himself alive' 
by his acts; each act can be a new beginning, 
ibid. a new birth, a re-creation of oneself, a self- 
126 fulfilling. 
In all his works Laing sees the self as the being-in-the-world 
of the individual. To be in the world in the most fulfilled 
way is to seek out self and come to terms with it in the 
world of others; in this, Laing is following exactly the 
-300- 
path of his philosopher predecessors: 
To be 'authentic' is to be true to oneself, to 
be what one is, ýto be genuine. To be 'inauthentic' 
is to-not-be+oneself, to be false to oneself: 
127 to be not as one appears to be, to be counterfeit. 
If this appears over-simple, or difficult to grasp, it is 
because Laing can only indicate how self is to be realised. 
Each individual must come to terms with being, within 
and for his own particular self. 
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Contemporary-Writers, London: The Hogarth Press, '1965 
Collected Essas, 4 Vols., London: The Hogarth Press, 
"1966-1967 
-' 
304 
Mrs. Dalloway's Party: A Short Story Sequence, edited, 
with an-Introduction, by Stella McNichol. 
London: The Hogarth Press, 1973 
The Waves, The two holograph drafts transcribed and 
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The Hogarth Press, 1978 
'Anon. '; 'The Reader'; 'Notes for Reading at Random', 
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Edited With an Introduction and Notes by Jeanne 
11 Schulkind. Sussex: 'The University Press, 1976; 
Second Impression 1976 
The Diary of Virginia Woolf, edited by Anne Olivier Bell (Vols. II & III assisted by Andrew McNeillie). 
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Vol. 1: Virginia Stephen, 1882-1912, London: 
The Hogarth Press, 1972; Seventh Impression, 1973 
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Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970' 
NAREMORE, James. The World Without'a Self: Virginia Woolf 
,, 
'" and the Novel, New Haven and London: Yale University. 
Press, 1973 
NOVAK, Jane. The Razor Edge of Balance: A. study of"Virginia 
Woolf, Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1975" 
POOLE, Roger. The Unknown Virginia Woolf, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, Press, 1978-. 
RICHTER, Harvena. 
-Virginia Woolf: The Inward Vo a e, Princeton: 
Princeton" University Press, 1970 
00 ROSE, Phyllis. Woman'of Letters: A Life of"Virginia Woolf, 
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1971 0ý - 
STEWART, Jack F. 'Existence and Symbol in ' The `Waves' 
,' 
Modern 
Fiction Studies, 18,3, Autumn,, 1972; pp. 433-447 ' 
Bulletin of the New York Publio Library: "UirgLnia Woolf 
Issue; Winter, 1977. New-York: Readax Books,. 1977 0. 
''Bulletin of Research in the Humanities: -Virginia Woolf 
Issue II; Autumn 1979. New York: Readex Books, 
_. 
19790 
- 
308 
- 
(U) Other works consulted:, literary theory, psychoanalysis, 
philosophy, etc. 
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